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Introduction
The interest of economists in the determinants of economic growth is almost as 
old as the subject itself. But the systematic study of modelling growth may be 
traced back to two classic approaches which also formed the basis for a distinc­
tion that has remained valid until today. Optimal growth models as formulated 
in Ramsey (1928) address normative issues in long-term development. Positive 
growth models as in Harrod (1939) or Domar (1946) attempt to explain observ­
able facts in the development process.
The Harrod-Domar model suffers from the well known ’knife edge’ problem, 
according to which it is unlikely that the ’warranted rate of growth’ and the nat­
ural rate of growth coincide. Solow (1956) showed that allowing for substitution 
between factors of production removes that problem and leads to the existence 
of a stable, steady state growth rate. In all of these theoretical explanations of 
long-term growth the driving force of economic development such as technical 
progress has been viewed as outside the realm of economic explanations. That 
is one reason why it has become common to refer to models of this kind as ex­
ogenous growth models. For a good introduction into that literature see, for 
instance, Burmeister and Dobell (1970), Intriligator (1971) or Takayama (1985).
However, for almost a decade now there has been interest in explaining eco­
nomic growth endogenously, that is, by factors that are governed by economic
1
’laws’. The seminal contributions in the field that spurred this interest were 
made by Arrow (1962), Uzawa (1965), Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and Romer
(1990). One of the crucial differences compared to a typical Solow model is that 
one usually assumes the existence of some form of positive externality in the 
production function. For instance, Romer (1986) employs the concept of broadly 
defined capital as a factor producing positive spillovers. The important implica­
tion of such models is that one gets an inefficiency, because private agents are 
not able to take account of the spillover effects when maximizing their objective 
functions. Often the social optimum implies a constant return on capital in those 
models, leading to positive per capita growth. Other forms of endogenous growth 
models such as Romer (1987) or Romer (1990) identify knowledge as an exter­
nality creating factor. It is beyond the scope of the dissertation to review the 
endogenous growth literature. The interested reader may wish to consult Gross- 
man and Helpman (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) or Aghion and Howitt 
(1998) who provide excellent introductions into and presentations of endogenous 
growth models.
At the same time this literature opened new avenues to address an old topic, 
namely, the question of how distribution and growth interact over time. That 
question has been empirically investigated in the seminal article by Kuznets 
(1955) who found an inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality 
and income growth in the course of development. However, the relationship has 
not been found to hold in general and there seems to be some evidence that the 
opposite relationship may hold. (See, for instance, Cline (1975), Fields (1987), 
Fields and Jakubson (1992), or Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992).)
Theoretically, there has been a certain tradition to argue that growth deter­
mines distribution. In a standard neo-classical, positive or optimal exogenous
2
growth model à-la Solow (1956), or Ramsey (1928) growth determines the distri­
bution of factor rewards in a steady state. That line of reasoning is most clearly 
presented in Kaldor (1956) and Kaldor (1957).1 In contrast, most endogenous 
growth models take a different, almost opposite route and argue that distribution 
determines growth as, for example, shown in Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Bertola 
(1993) or Persson and Tabellini (1994) to name only a few. It is then an inter­
esting question how growth reacts to changes in distribution. For instance, the 
researchers mentioned show that taxation leading to an income distribution that 
is more favourable to the non-accumulated factor of production such as labour, 
causes lower growth.
If one takes the view that distribution determines growth, it appears plausible 
to introduce welfare judgments to the analysis. That adds a normative element 
to the problem in that one may view the link between the income or wealth dis­
tribution and economic growth as an intertemporal trade-off. In the dissertation 
the welfare judgments are represented by governments, that is, the governments 
represent agents with different preferences. That raises the problem how one can 
succinctly represent the preferences of many, possibly very heterogeneous agents. 
Throughout the thesis I rely heavily on the assumption of representative con­
sumers and that markets are perfectly competitive for the private sector. The 
notion of a representative consumer may be misleading as has been shown by
Kirman (1992). In defence of employing that notion in macroeconomic models it
1It is possible to make distribution matter for growth in a neo-classical framework as has 
been shown in, for instance, Stiglitz (1969) or Blinder (1975). Suppose markets work perfectly 
and agents have different savings rates, e.g. due to non-linearities in the consumption function. 
A different income or wealth distribution may then affect the propensity to save and so invest­
ment, affecting growth. However, the rates of return of the production factors would still be 
determined by growth in a steady state, balanced growth equilibrium with perfect markets. In 
most endogenous growth models a positive externality is often introduced that fixes the rates 
of return, which in turn determine the growth rate. In that sense endogenous growth models 
take an opposite route, since distribution might matter even though all agents’ consumption 
functions are linear in income or wealth.
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has become standard to argue as follows: Firstly, under well-defined, but rather 
stringent conditions individual behaviour can be aggregated exactly, as shown by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), chpt. 6. Secondly, in international contexts, the 
assumption of differences between (typical) residents across countries is a useful 
and simple device to downplay differences within countries. (See, for instance, 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), chpt. 1.) Thirdly, in an intertemporal framework 
the macroeconomic relevance of preference heterogeneity would fade over time 
as relatively rich individuals become increasingly rich and ’representative’. (See 
Bertola (1997), ftn. 7.) Fourthly, if the private sector acts price-takingly, prefer­
ence heterogeneity does not affect the determination of rates of return and so - 
in many models - growth.
Heterogeneity is, however, present in the dissertation by analyzing the welfare 
of different groups in the economy. The governments are taken to represent the 
groups, sometimes in different proportions. The governments’ optimal policies 
are shown to determine the income or wealth distribution and growth. That 
describes the common thread which runs through the dissertation and explains 
the title.
The thesis comprises three parts that contain theoretical models on the op­
timal choices of governments that determine distribution and growth by some 
instruments in different economic environments. Although the three parts are 
linked by the common theme mentioned, the dissertation is really made up of 
four articles which are in principle separate entities. As they revolve around the 
same topic, the problem of unnecessary repetitions arises. I have tried to keep 
them at a minimum, but I have also endeavoured to enable the reader to consult 
each chapter separately. That has the disadvantage of allowing for some repeti­
tions on the one hand, but it has the advantage that one may read a chapter of
4
interest without too much recourse to another one. For the reasons mentioned I 
sometimes use the terms ’chapter’ and ’paper’ interchangeably.
Each part is self-contained so that no general conclusion or summary is nec­
essary. In order to aid the reader each part contains appendices relevant for that 
part only. That avoids skimming through a lot of pages. I have attempted to 
minimize repetitions so that the reader may find proofs close to where they be­
long. I have also tried to keep appendices to a minimum. The only thing that 
applies ’globally’ is the bibliography, which the reader will find at the end of the 
dissertation. The remainder of the introduction provides a brief overview of the 
contents of the chapters in each part.
Part I
In this part I investigate public policies and economic growth in a closed economy. 
I focus on two results that have been shown in the literature. The first one states 
that distortionary taxation that distributes too much income or wealth towards 
the non-accumulated factor of production (labour) slows down growth (Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994)) and the second one says that income taxation is not optimal 
for investment subsidy financing and so not growth promoting (Bertola (1993)). 
In chapter 1 I concentrate on the first point.
Chapter 1: Economic Growth, (Re-)Distributive Policies: A  Compar­
ative Dynamic Analysis
Chapter 1 consists of two parts that analyze the link between economic growth 
and (re-)distributive policies in closed economies. It also provides a model frame­
work used and referred to in the following two chapters.
In the first part I build on Alesina and Rodrik (1991) and present a theoretical
5
model which hypothesizes that redistribution is bad for growth. The structure 
of the model is such that a ’right-wing1 (entirely pro-capital) policy is growth 
maximizing. I conduct a comparative dynamic analysis, which allows me to use 
as much information as is provided by such a model. The analysis works with 
optimizing governments. All optimal policies represent examples of the fact that 
to some extent public policy is economically endogenous in that policy variables 
depend on fundamental economic variables that are given to an optimizer. I 
analyze various public policies and find - among other things - that other than 
’right-wing’ objectives may also lead to a growth maximizing policy. I show that 
an increase in technological efficiency generally raises growth, but it also raises the 
optimal steady state tax rates or lowers any optimal wealth redistribution. I show 
that this has interesting implications for the post-tax factor income distribution.
In the second part, I use the model’s theoretical results to interpret some 
findings in the cross-country growth econometrics literature. Many authors take 
averages of their data over time and run simple cross-country OLS regressions 
over these averaged data. A number of others use pooled time-series cross-country 
data to pay explicit attention to the time series dimension. The chapter’s analysis 
focuses on the large number of contributions which use the former approach. 
In particular, I use the model’s theoretical results to sign correlations between 
policy variables employed in simple OLS cross-country growth regressions and 
some important, possibly unobservable fundamental economic variables. Signing 
the correlations allows me to provide explanations for some puzzling findings 
in that empirical literature. For example, I show that in many cases the point 
estimates of the effect of redistributive transfer variables on growth may be biased 
downwards, suggesting that the hypothesis ’redistribution is bad for growth’ may 
be inherently untestable by simple OLS cross-country growth regressions. A
6
negative bias is, however, perfectly compatible with the signs found for that 
estimate in the literature and it is also compatible with the opposite hypothesis 
that redistribution is not bad for growth.
The model employs a capital tax scheme, which raises the question whether 
such a distortionary tax scheme really captures a necessary relationship between 
distributive taxation and economic growth in a world with optimizing govern­
ments. That problem is addressed in more depth in the next chapter.
Chapter 2: Economic Growth, Distributive Policies, and an Income 
cum Investment Subsidy Tax Scheme
In chapter 2 I employ a capital income cum investment subsidy tax to investigate 
if distribution towards the non-accumulated factor of production (labour) retards 
growth and if income taxes are bad instruments to finance subsidies. I identify 
conditions under which the tax scheme is better for growth than other distort­
ing tax schemes. I show’ that a ’left-wing’ (pro-labour) government acts growth 
maximizing and that distributing income towards labour may raise growth. A 
’right-wing’ (pro-capital) government’s preferred policy is not growth maximizing 
under the tax scheme, but may generate higher growth than its optimal, growth 
maximizing policy under another tax scheme. For growth maximizing policies 
the tax scheme’s post-tax factor income distribution is generally biased towards 
labour compared to other tax schemes.
Part II
I return to a wealth tax scheme in this part, but in contrast to chapters 1 and 2 I 
focus on the interaction of economic growth and public policies in open economies. 
The trade-off between distribution and growth is placed in a non-cooperative
7
setting which adds an interesting and empirically important dimension.
Chapter 3: Growth, Redistribution, Capital M obility and Tax Com­
petition  in Open Economies
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of redistributive policies on growth in open 
economies. In closed economies redistribution is taken to reduce growth. I show 
that in open economies tax competition leads optimizing, redistributing (’left- 
wing*) governments to mimic ’right-wing’ policies if capital mobility is very high. 
In the model ’right-wing’ governments are strategically passive and just maximize 
capital income and growth. For domestic left-wing governments it is shown that 
’left-right’ competition leads to more redistribution and lower GDP growth than 
’left-left’ competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and 
redistribution than one’s opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences ’left- 
wing’ governments are shown to have higher GDP growth when competing with 
other ’left-wing’ governments. Furthermore, I discuss some empirical implications 
of the model and compare them to those of chapter 1.
Part III
Part III presents a theoretical model that concentrates on the role, human capital 
plays in economic growth. The recent growth performance of some East Asian 
countries suggests that there is a positive link from the provision of public ed­
ucation to high economic growth and a rather equal income distribution. Part 
III complements the other chapters in that the focus is on labour rather than on 
capital. In the literature and in some OECD countries’ policy debates human 
capital is considered an important element for improving or maintaining inter­
national competitiveness. The chapter contributes to these debates by arguing
8
that education policy plays an important role when coping with the effects of 
’globalization1.
Chapter 4: Public Policies and Education, Economic Growth and In­
come Distribution
The chapter provides a theoretical analysis relating economic growth, human cap­
ital composition, income distribution and public education policies. In the model 
human capital is ’lumpy’ and only high skilled people carry it. The government 
chooses capital taxes to finance education, which directly affects growth, the num­
ber of high skilled people and wages. Growth and equality in the present value 
of lifetime wage earnings depend positively on the productivity of the education 
sector. The preferred policy of the unskilled is is shown to be growth maxi­
mizing, whereas that of skilled labour leads to less education, lower growth and 
more income inequality. A utilitarian government chooses more than the growth 
maximizing education, and less inequality than what the unskilled choose. The 
chapter’s public policy analysis offers an explanation for the recent observation 
of high growth and relatively low income inequality in some, highly competitive 
economies. '
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Conventions and Frequently 
Used Symbols
Variables depending on time are indexed by subscript t. Thus, x t means that 
variable x  depends on time. Changes of x t over time are written as x so that 
x ~  ^ . For all variables other than t the partial derivative of a function y with 
respect to variable x  is written as yx or |^ , which are used interchangeably.
Mathematical Symbols
<£> ’is equivalent to’
=> ’implies’
A logical ’and’
V logical ’or’
x € [a, b] a < x <b
x  € (a, b] a < x <b
x € [a, b) a < x <b
x  € (a, 6) a < x <b
(Z —> b a approaches 6
CL —¥ 6+ a approaches b from the right
£(•) expectation operator
cov(iyj ) covariance between variables i and j
10
Other Symbols
* index for variables in foreign country
Upper Case Latin Letters
A index of development
Cw consumption of workers
ck consumption of capital owners
F measure of total factor income inequality
G public inputs to production
H index of effective labour
K productive capital stock
L total labour supply
¿1 number of high skilled workers
l q number of low skilled workers
N size of population
V discounted utility stream
W(-) welfare function
Y output
11
Lower Case Latin Letters
avi ratio of tax revenues to tax base
av2 ratio of tax revenues to GDP
Co consumption of low skilled workers
Ci consumption of high skilled workers
g public inputs to production
h human capital
k capital stock
l number of workers
m  marginal tax rate
n number of capital owners
r (pre-tax) return on capital
tc consumption tax rate
w wage rate
wi wage rate for high skilled labour
wo wage rate for low skilled labour
x  percentage of high skilled people in population
y output
z measure of degree of capital mobility
12
Greek Letters
a  share of capital (income in total income), chpts. 1-3;
share of effective labour, chpt. 4 
¡3 social weight attached to the welfare of
the non-accumulated factor of production, chpts. 1-3 
7 rate of growth
7j rate of growth of variable j
f productivity of the education sector, chpt. 4;
any small number, chpts. 1-3 
(  social weight attached to the welfare
of a representative high skilled worker 
7] , capital adjusted wage rate, ^
6 tax rate on capital income
A degree of resource redistribution
u  share of domestically owned capital
that is employed in domestic production 
(j) share of domestically owned capital
that is productive in foreign production 
p rate of time preference
t  tax rate on wealth
Gothic Letters
b ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP
p ratio of government expenditure to GDP
q ratio of government expenditure to
total (private and public) investment
13
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Part I
Economic Growth and 
Distributive Policies in Closed
Economies
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Chapter 1
Economic Growth and 
(Re-)Distributive Policies: A 
Comparative Dynamic Analysis
1.1 Introduction
This chapter consists of two parts that investigate the link between economic 
growth and (re-)distributive policies in closed economies. In the first part (sec­
tions 1.2 to 1.5) I employ a common theoretical formulation on the interplay of 
public policy and economic growth, using as much information as is provided by 
a model. More specifically, I conduct a comparative dynamic analysis to study 
the effect of once-and-for-all changes in underlying fundamental economic vari­
ables on optimal steady state policies and growth. The focus in the first part is 
as much on theoretical as on normative predictions of the effects of distributive 
policies and policy changes on growth. The second part (section 1.6) uses the re­
sults of the comparative dynamic study to offer explanations of some, sometimes
15
puzzling empirical findings in the literature.
Part 1
Recent contributions on the interplay between economic growth and distributive 
policies in a closed economy such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Bertola (1993) 
suggest that increasing taxes for redistributive purposes slows down growth. The 
reason why that conclusion is reached is given by the following line of argument: If 
a government taxes the income or wealth of the accumulated factor of production 
at a level that is higher than that which is optimal for growth, the government 
may redistribute resources towards the non-accumulated factor of production, 
but will exhibit lower steady state growth. The result crucially depends on the 
tax arrangement as is shown in the next chapter.
In this chapter, however, I use the structure of models in which the optimal 
policy of the accumulated factor maximizes growth. The model below follows 
Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) who study the impact of gov­
ernment spending on the private return on capital in growing economies using an 
endogenous growth set-up. Their results suggest that the government has room 
to influence the private return on capital and through that the growth rate.
Alesina and Rodrik have analyzed how a benevolent government in a closed 
economy with wealth taxes solves the problem posed by a trade-off between growth 
and redistribution. The chapter mainly builds on Alesina and Rodrik (1991). Al­
though wealth taxes are only one particular policy instrument, I follow their 
argument that the wealth tax scheme is meant to capture a broad set of redis­
tributive policies. In order to fix ideas and in line with most of the literature 
on capital taxation I abstract from taxation of the non-accumulated factor of 
production (labour). That facilitates the analysis and allows me to focus on
16
the problems associated with taxing capital. I also assume that expropriation of 
capital is ruled out for the governments. Although a command optimum in the 
model would involve expropriation of capital even for a government maximizing 
the welfare of the capital owners, I rule it out since it is not very common in the 
real world. Modelling why and when expropriation may come about is outside 
the scope of the chapter.
The economy is assumed to consist of two classes, namely ’capitalists’ who 
own the accumulated factor of production (capital) and ’workers’ who represent 
the non-accumulated factor of production (raw labour). To formulate the model 
in terms of classes serves to keep matters simple and allows one (1) to concentrate 
on the problem of growth and redistribution and (2) to relate to the literature 
on majority voting on tax rates.1
In their 1994 article Alesina and Rodrik define redistribution as any policy 
that distributes income to the non-accumulated factor of production vriiile re­
ducing the incentive to invest. Thus, they assess income distributions relative 
to growth maximizing policies. Such policies seem somewhat unattractive as 
benchmark policies for analyzing income distributions. Therefore, I follow their 
1991 paper which analyzes the trade-off between growth and wealth redistribu­
tion. Thus, I define redistribution as any policy that takes real resources from 
the accumulated factor of production by giving them to the non-accumulated 
factor of production. That allows me to investigate income distributional issues 
separately, using a different and more natural benchmark policy.
Given the optimal tax policies of a government I analyze what post-tax fac­
tor income distribution a policy induces. For instance, a government may be 
’right-wing’ and only care about the owners of capital, or it may be Heft-wing’ *
^ee e.g. Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Scott (1981), and Mayer (1984).
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caring only about the owners of raw labour. As a benchmark policy I take an ’in­
come egalitarian’ policy. The reason for introducing the rather special egalitarian 
objective of granting all agents an equal income is the following:
Firstly, many people tend to associate left-wing with egalitarian, especially in­
come egalitarian objectives. The two objectives are clearly distinct, because egal­
itarian objectives are mainly concerned about the relative well-being of agents, 
whereas the model’s left-wing objective cares about the absolute welfare of the 
workers. However, this difference in objectives has interesting implications for 
tax policy, income distribution and growth comparisons.
Secondly, a policy that would grant equal income to all agents induces a post­
tax factor income distribution that most people would agree on as a benchmark 
distribution, that is, it seems natural to compare any policy’s post-tax factor 
income distributions relative to a policy that gives all agents equal incomes.
Thirdly, among all possible egalitarian objectives income egalitarianism in­
volves the observable variable income which is more readily obtainable than in­
formation on such things as ’utilities’.2 Where appropriate I discuss possible 
implications for other egalitarian objectives.
In the model the ’right-wing’ government chooses the growth maximizing 
tax rate in the optimum. The ’left-wing’ government sets higher taxes in the 
optimum in order to redistribute capital or secure a high steady state wage to 
capital ratio. Thus, even if the left-wing government does not redistribute wealth 
it will generally set its tax rate higher than the growth maximizing one. That 
means that one may distinguish between a redistributing, left-wing and a non­
redistributing, left-wing government.
Given the optimal choices I analyze steady states varying some fixed param­
2 For a discussion of egalitarian objectives see Sen (1982) or Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
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eters that represent fundamental economic variables. The procedure may be jus­
tified by appeal to the ’Correspondence Principle’, which roughly speaking states 
that there exists a mutually supportive relationship between economic dynamics 
and comparative statics. See Samuelson (1941) or Samueslon (1942), Thus, I 
implicitly assume that there exist convergent processes leading from one steady 
state equilibrium to another.
I show that all policies in the model depend on three fundamental economic 
variables that do not follow an explicit time path: the rate of time preference, an 
index of the technological efficiency of the production process and the (pre-tax) 
share of capital (income in total income).
In the model aggregate production is of the Barro (1990), Cobb-Douglas type 
so that the (pre-tax) share of capital equals the elasticity of output with respect 
to (privately owned) capital. The index of technological efficiency is meant to 
capture such diverse things as purely technological, or cultural, or institutional 
factors bearing influence on the way production is undertaken. Sometimes I 
interpret an element of the index as representing the state of the technology, 
permitting me to speak of technological change if that element changes. Within 
this framework the main results of the first part of the chapter are the following:
1. Growth maximizing and left-wing policies may be observationally indistin­
guishable, if the workers as a group are suificiently patient. Thus, one may 
not be able to differentiate right-wing and left-wing policies by observation 
only.
2. Under a left-wing policy the conditions for wealth redistribution and posi­
tive growth are restrictive. In the model wealth transfers take place only if 
the share of capital is large, that is, if the pre-tax factor income distribution
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is biased towards capital.
3. Under the optimal redistributing, left-wing policy an increase in technologi­
cal efficiency leads to less resources being transferred to the non-accumulated 
factor of production. That is a testable implication of the model which 
is discussed in part 2. Normatively, it implies that if one compares two 
economies that are lead by redistributing governments, the one with a more 
efficient economy redistributes relatively less wealth per units of taxes col­
lected in steady state, but it has higher growth. Thus, there is an interesting 
trade-off between growth, redistribution and technological efficiency in the 
model. If one interprets an increase in technological efficiency as technolog­
ical progress, the model predicts that redistributing governments of more 
advanced economies grant less wealth transfers per units of taxes collected 
and place more weight on growth.
4. For all policies considered, higher technological efficiency leads to higher 
growth and either higher tax rates or no change in taxes, but lower redistri­
bution. The reason for the result lies in the externality productive govern­
ment expenditure exerts on the private return on capital. An increase in 
efficiency for given taxes raises growth. For given efficiency an increase in 
taxes lowers growth. But in the model public policy is endogenous in that 
all optimal steady state tax rates depend on fundamental economic vari­
ables. The combined effect of an increase in efficiency is to raise the growth 
rate and the tax rates. Thus, higher tax rates per se do not indicate that 
growth is lower. Possible implications of the result for empirical research 
are discussed in part 2.
5. A change in efficiency does not change the post-tax factor income distribu­
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tion under right-wing and income egalitarian policies and shifts relatively 
more post-tax factor income to the accumulated factor of production (cap­
ital) under redistributing and non-redistributing left-wing policies. The 
result looks a bit odd and is explained by the fact that ’left-wing’ gov­
ernments are only concerned about the welfare level of the workers. An 
increase in efficiency raises the workers’ wages and their welfare. A left- 
wing government does not care about relative incomes. That explains why 
it may be optimal for a left-wing policy to choose a policy that raises the 
workers’ welfare and makes the capital owners get relatively more after-tax 
income.
6. There exists a particular (low) share of capital where an income egalitarian 
policy maximizes growth. Thus, income egalitarianism is not necessarily 
bad for growth. The result is interesting, because it shows - contrary to 
conventional wisdom - that other than ’right-wing’ objectives may lead to 
growth maximizing policies.
7. There exist instances where left-wing and income egalitarian policies co­
incide. However, in general left-wing and income egalitarian policies are 
different in the model and induce different combinations of growth and 
post-tax factor income distributions. Furthermore, it is generally ambigu­
ous whether a left-wing or an income egalitarian policy induces higher or 
lower growth in comparison to the growth maximizing policy.
8. An increase in the share of capital unambiguously raises the growth rate 
under all, but the income egalitarian policies. Taxes increase under an 
income egalitarian policy, do not change under a redistributing, left-wing 
policy and respond in an ambiguous way under all other policies considered.
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The theoretical results of the chapter are based on the assumption that public 
policy is economically endogenous. That means that optimizing governments 
take fundamental economic variables into account when making their decisions. 
The implications of that assumption and of the theoretical results for empirical 
research are investigated in the next part of the chapter.
Part 2
In the cross-country growth empirics literature some authors use pooled time- 
series cross-country data to pay explicit attention to the time series dimension. 
However, a large number of authors takes averages of their data over time and runs 
simple cross-country OLS regressions over these averaged data.3 For instance, 
Koester and Kormendi (1989), Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992) or Easterly 
and Rebelo (1993a) have used simple cross-country OLS regressions to study the 
effect of public policy on growth. All these papers assume that public policy is 
exogenous. In contrast, in this chapter it is assumed that public policy contains an 
element of economic endogeneity in that public policy takes account of country- 
specific, fundamental economic variables that may or may not be included in the 
regressions. The assumption of endogenous policy implies that the OLS estimates 
of the effect of public policy on growth are generally biased, implying that correct 
statistical inferences are not possible. Instead of focussing on the exact source of 
a bias, I use the theoretical results, that is, the theoretically derived correlations 
between public policy variables and fundamental economic variables of part 1 to 
sign the biases. That allows me to explain some empirical findings that seem 
puzzling from a theoretical viewpoint.
3In the chapter ’simple cross-country OLS regression’ is meant to reflect that procedure of 
handling the time series dimension of the data. Of course, ’simple’ does not mean simplistic, 
since the availability of data may not allow for another or better method of analysis.
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I show that the estimated coefficients of the effects on growth of average or 
marginal tax rates, measured by variables closely related to the tax base most 
relevant for growth, are generally overestimated. In particular, the average tax 
rates, defined as the ’ratio of tax revenues to tax base’, or marginal tax rates, 
defined as ’the ratio of the change in tax revenues to the change in tax base’, are 
generically biased upwards. The result suggests that any reported negative effect 
of taxes on growth is understated, if measured by these variables.
However, the determination of the tax base that is of primary importance for 
growth is very difficult and in the literature taxes are usually measured by vari­
ables related to GDP or aggregate income. It is then shown that estimates of the 
effect on growth of average tax rates, measured by ’the ratio of tax revenues to 
GDP’, or marginal tax rates, measured by ’the ratio of the change in tax revenues 
to the change in GDP’ and obtained by regressing tax revenues to GDP, are bi­
ased downwards unless all governments in the sample pursue growth maximizing 
or income egalitarian policies. In that case any reported negative (positive) effect 
of taxes on growth would be overstated (understated), if measured by those vari­
ables. The systematic underestimation of the effect of these variables implies that 
the theoretical prediction that taxes negatively affect growth may be inherently 
untestable. Hence, it matters what variables one uses for taxes when running sim­
ple cross-country growth regressions. For instance, suppose a researcher starts 
with initial income included in a growth regression and then adds the variable 
’tax revenues to GDP’. Most people find that the point estimate of the effect of 
that variable on growth is close to zero, insignificant and negative. A downward 
bias in that estimate means that the ’true’ value of the reported coefficient on 
that variable may be positive and significant, when controlling for initial income. 
Usually the insignificant value of the estimated coefficient is attributed to the
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high correlation between taxes and initial income. In that sense the chapter 
provides a different explanation why one may find such a point estimate for the 
effect of the variable ’tax revenues to GDP’ in a growth regression that controls 
for initial income.
If public policy is assumed to be exogenous, estimated coefficients of the 
effect on growth of the ratio of productive public expenditure to total investment 
or GDP are biased downwards under all polices considered. If public policy is 
assumed to be endogenous, the point estimates of the effect on growth of the 
ratio of public investment to total investment are biased downwards.
That has interesting implications for any hypothesis that claims that the 
breakdown of total investment between public and private investment does not 
materially affect growth. It also casts doubt on the hypothesis that a typical 
country comes close to the quantity of public investment that maximizes growth. 
(See Barro (1990), p. S124.)
Under the assumption of endogenous policy, the estimated coefficients of the 
effect on growth of the ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP are generically 
biased downwards. That renders the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for 
growth untestable for the following reason: The theoretical prediction of part 1 
is that redistributive transfers are bad for growth. However, in the model an 
increase in efficiency makes an optimizing, redistributing government grant less 
transfers to the non-accumulated factor of production. This last effect is ignored 
in cross-country growth regressions when one assumes that public policy is ex­
ogenous. For theoretical reasons many researchers expect a negative coefficient, 
when measuring the effect of redistributive transfers on growth. However, many 
people find positive coefficients (for example, for the effect of social security con­
tributions on growth, see Sala-i-Martin (1996)). As any downward bias of the
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estimated coefficient on redistributive transfer variables may be as large as minus 
infinity, a reported negative coefficient cannot corroborate the hypothesis that 
redistribution is bad for growth. On the other hand, any downward bias, found 
in these kinds of studies, is perfectly consistent with many empirical findings and 
the alternative hypothesis that redistribution is not bad for growth.
The chapter is organized as follows: In the first part, section 1.2 presents 
the model set-up, derives the market equilibrium and some of its properties. 
Section 1.4 presents the optimal policy choices of the governments. Section 1.5 
provides a comparative dynamic analysis of the optimal policies. It contains 
the chapter’s major theoretical results which are stated in propositions. The 
second part (section 1.6) uses theoretical correlations derived from the model to 
analyze the effect of tax, public investment and redistributive transfer variables 
on growth. Section 1.7 provides concluding remarks for the whole chapter.
1.2 The Model
There are two types of many identical individuals in the economy who are all 
equally patient and have the same rate of time preference p. One type of in­
dividuals owns capital equally and does not work. The other type owns (raw) 
labour equally, but no capital. Call the latter group ’workers’ (VP) and the for­
mer group ’capitalists’ (k). Population is stationary and consists of l workers and 
n capitalists of whom there are less, that is, l > n. Capital is broadly defined 
and human capital is taken to be strictly complementary to physical capital. So 
in the model capitalists who, for instance, own computers know how to operate 
them as 'well. That eliminates a separate treatment of how human capital is ac­
cumulated and entails that the return on human capital services equals that of
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physical capital services in a perfectly competitive economy. For a justification of 
such an approach in a different context see Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). The 
simplification allows one to concentrate on the distributional conflict between the 
accumulated and the non-accumulated factor of production.
The group of workers and the group of capitalists derive logarithmic utility 
from the consumption of a homogeneous, malleable good. That means that the 
individual preferences of the members of each group can be aggregated and repre­
sented by a single utility function. I ignore problems associated with aggregation 
within classes that are clearly important, but beyond the scope of the paper.
There are many price-taking, profit maximizing firms which are owned by the 
capital owners.4 Aggregate output is produced according to the following Barro 
(1990) production technology
yt = A k f  gl~a L\~a , 0 < a < 1 (1.1)
where yt is output, kt the installed real capital stock, L t is labour supplied, 
and gt are public inputs to production. Like Barro one may assume that the 
government owns no capital and that it buys a flow of output from the private 
sector and makes it available to the individual firm in the form of productive 
services. Then public inputs to production would be rival. Alternatively, total 
government expenditure may be taken to affect private production in a non­
rival way. By assumption this empirically relevant distinction does not matter 
analytically in the model. It may be interesting to note that in the absence of a 
government, for instance, due to civil war or other forms of unrest, the economy 
breaks down and the workers and the capitalists ’starve’.
4 The reason for proceeding in this fashion is to formulate the problem in a decentralized 
economy framework with perfect competition as in Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965).
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The variable A  is an efficiency index, which depends on cultural, institutional 
and technological development. I eliminate all exogenous factors that may play 
a role in the growth process by assuming that A is constant over time.
Furthermore, I assume that each worker inelastically supplies j  units of labour 
at each point in time. Thus, the total labour endowment is equal to unity, that 
is, Lt =  1 because there are l workers in the economy. I abstract from problems 
arising from the depreciation of the capital stock so that output and factor returns 
are really defined in net terms. That has no consequences for the price-taking, 
market clearing logic of the model. (See, for instance, Bertola (1991).)
The Cobb-Douglas technology implies that the elasticity of output with re­
spect to (broad) capital ( $ ^ )  is constant over time. Later on I couple this with 
the assumption of perfect competition and profit maximization. Then a  also 
denotes the (constant) share of capital (income) in total income Thus, a  
allows for two interpretations in the model, one referring to technology and one 
referring to factor shares, that is, distribution.
1.2.1 The Public Sector
The government taxes wealth at the constant rate r  and redistributes a constant 
share A of its tax revenues to the workers.5 Thus, r  is levied on kt, that is, the 
capital owners’ wealth at time t. The tax on capital is to be viewed as a tax 
on all resources that are accumulated, including human capital. The unskilled 
labour force, which is constant in the model, is not subject to taxation. I use 
the assumption to allow the government to discriminate between the two types
5Given the structure of the model the optimal t  and A would be constant over time as 
is e.g. shown in Alesina and Rodrik (1991). I impose the restriction here to facilitate the 
analysis. A possible justification is that one does not usually observe changes in fundamental 
tax arrangements and policies for long periods of time.
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of factors of production and to undertake (re-)distributive policies.
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) do not explicitly analyze wealth redistribution, that 
is, their model assumes A =  0. Instead, they call ’redistribution’ any policy that 
distributes income to the non-accumulated factor of production while reducing 
the incentive to accumulate. Hence, they assess income redistribution relative to 
a growth maximizing policy. In terms of income distribution it is far from clear 
why a growth maximizing policy should serve as a benchmark. For example, 
it may well be the case that moving from a growth maximizing policy to some 
other, e.g., left-wing policy increases income inequality and decreases growth. 
Most people assess such an income redistributing policy shift with reference to 
a policy that grants equal incomes. Thus, I define redistribution as taking real 
resources (wealth) from the accumulated factor of production by giving them to 
the non-accumulated factor of production. That is captured by the variable A.
Given the Barro-type production function the government faces the following 
budget constraint, which is taken to be balanced at each point in time
rkt =  gt +  Ar&f.
The LHS depicts the tax revenues and the RHS public expenditures. The workers 
receive Ark t as transfers and gt is spent on public inputs to production. As 
human and physical capital are strict complements by assumption, a strong from 
of redistribution is contemplated. It implies that if a capital good is given to the 
workers the corresponding services necessary to operate that good are also given 
to them. As a one good economy is contemplated, giving the capital good to 
the workers for consumption does not cause a problem, however. Rearranging I,
28
therefore, contemplate
9t =  (1 — A)rfc, (1.2)
as the government's budget constraint.
1.2.2 Property Structure and Firms
There are many identical, profit maximizing firms which operate in a perfectly 
competitive environment. The firms are owned by the capital owners, who rent 
capital to and demand shares of the firms which are collateralized one-to-one by 
capital. The markets for assets and capital clear at each point in time. The 
representative firm faces a given path of the market clearing rental rate, { r j ,  of 
capital, kt, and takes the amount of productive government services, gt, as given.6
The firms rent capital and hire labour in spot markets in each period. The 
output price of yt is employed els numeraire and set equal to one. Given constant 
returns to capital and labour, factor payments exhaust output. Profit maximiza­
tion entails that firms pay each factor of production its marginal product,
Thus, from equation (1.2) one obtains
t = aj4[(l — AJt]1' "  (1.3)
wt = t? ( t , A)kt =  (1 -  f*M[(l “  A)r]1”aA:t. (1.4)
6The assumptions that assets are collateralized one-to-one and the rental rate of capital is - 
later on - uniform and for simplicity constant can be relaxed without altering the results. For 
a justification of these assumptions cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Chpt. 2.
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Hence, the tax rate has a bearing on the marginal product of capital and the wage 
rate. Notice that in contrast to the return on capital, wages are not constant over 
time and increase with the capital stock.7
For this and subsequent chapters let E  =  (1 — a)A  (g-) a. Analyzing how 
the rate of return on capital and the wages are affected by changes in government 
policy, I use (1.2), (1.3) and E  =  (1 — a)A[(l -  A)r]"°. Then
^  = 1 - A ) > 0  , ~  =  a E (—r) < 0. (1.5)
Thus, redistribution has a negative effect on the rate of return and increases in 
the tax rate raise the rate of return. For the wage rate, (rçfcf), and a given capital 
stock I obtain
=  (1 -  a)E (l — A) > 0 , ^  =  (1 -  a )E (- r )  < 0 . (1.6)
Hence, for a given capital stock an increase in r  leads to a positive change in the 
rate of return on capital and in wages. Redistribution lowers each of them.
1.2.3 Capital Owners
There are many capitalists who choose how much to consume or invest. They 
have perfect foresight about the prices and tax rates. The capitalists as a group 
maximize their intertemporal utility according to the following programme taking *1
th ro u g h o u t the dissertation and for simplicity ’return to capital’ is meant to be the pre-tax 
return to capital. Whenever it is necessary to distinguish between pre-tax and after-tax returns
1 make it explicit.
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prices and tax rates as given
max f InC ie ptdt
Ci Jo * (1-7)
kt = (r -  r)kt -  C\ (1.8)
k(0) =  ko, k( oo) — free. (1.9)
Equation (1.8) is the dynamic budget constraint of the capitalists. Note that the 
capitalists earn capital income rkt and pay taxes rkt. The necessary first order 
conditions for this problem are given by (1.8), (1.9) and the equations
c f  / i ,_ 0
(1.10a)
II £ 1 £ -1 1 (1.10b)
lim ktfJ-te pt = 0,t—>oo (1.10c)
where \it is a positive co-state variable which can be interpreted as the instanta­
neous shadow price of one more unit of investment at date t. Equation (1.10a) 
equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow price of more invest­
ment, (1.10b) is the standard Euler equation which relates the costs of fore­
gone investment (LHS) to the discounted gain in marginal utility (RHS), noting 
^  — uty and (1.10c) is the transversality condition which ensures that the present 
value of the capital stock approaches zero asymptotically. r
Depending on the after-tax return, the growth rate of consumption can be 
calculated in a standard way from (1.10a) and (1.10b) and it is given by ,
Ck7 =  ^  =  ( r - T ) - p .  (1.11)
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Growth of consumption is increasing in the after-tax return on capital and con­
stant over time. Furthermore, equations (1.8), (1.10c) and (1.11) imply that in the 
optimum the instantaneous consumption of the capitalists is given by C? =  pkt. 
Hence, 7* =  7 so that the capitalists’ wealth and consumption grow at the same 
rate in the optimum.8
1.2.4 Workers
The workers derive a utility stream from consuming their entire wages and gov­
ernment transfers. They do not invest and are not taxed by assumption. Their 
intertemporal utility is given by
[  InC™ e~ptdt where C™ =  r/(r, X)kt +  Xrkt. (1.12)
Jo
This assumption is reminiscent of growth models such as Kaldor (1956), where 
different proportions of profits and wages are saved. In the extreme case capital­
ists save and workers do not, which is the ”Classical Savings Rule”. In Kaldorian 
models the capitalists’ investment decision is determined by the exogenously given 
growth rate. Recently, Bertola (1993) has derived the ” Classical Savings Rule” 
result from utility maximization, which endogenizes the investment decisions and 
therefore the growth rate. In that sense the model’s set-up reflects that result. 
However, Bertola does not use a two-class model and there are important dif­
ferences to post-Keynesian models of growth, the most important of which is 
that the causality in both approaches is running in opposite directions. Whereas 
in Kaldorian models growth determines the factor share incomes, in endogenous 
growth models the direction is rather from factor shares to growth.
8The optimal choices are derived in Appendix A.l.
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1.3 M arket Equilibrium
The constancy of r  implies constancy of r  and hence 7. The overall resource 
constraint in the economy is It = yt — gt — Ct and given by
It ~  kt ~  (r -  r)kt +  (77 + Ar)kt -  C* -  C™. (1.13)
As the workers’ consumption is C™ =  (y + \r )k tl this constraint is binding so 
that 7Cw — 7*. The capitalists’ consumption and wealth optimally grow at the 
constant rate 7 =  7*. In steady state all variables grow at the same constant rate. 
To verify that consider (1.1). Use the definition of gt} that is, g% =  (1 — A)rk t, 
and substitute in (1.1). Recalling that Lt — 1 and taking logarithms and time 
derivatives yields 7 r =  7*. Hence, the steady state is characterized by balanced 
growth with 7^ =  7* =  7 =  j c w • That describes the dynamic market equilibrium 
of the economy.
1.3.1 Properties of the Market Equilibrium
The steady state growth rate is given by 7 = (r—r) —p where r — aA[(l —A)r]1_°. 
The (t,A) combination that maximizes growth must satisfy r\ < 0 and rT =  1. 
From (1.5) r* < 0 so that A =  0 and from rT —1 = 0 one obtains f  ~ [ a ( l - a )A ] i  
as the growth maximizing (r, A) combination.
Lemma 1.1 The (r, A) combination that maximizes growth is given by A =  0 
and f  = [a(l — a)A]° where t  solves rT =  1.
The relationship between wealth taxes and growth is visualized in Figure 1.1.
At f  the growth rate is maximal. If higher taxes - for example for wealth redistri­
bution - are levied, the growth rate is lower so that growth is traded off against
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Figure 1.1: The relationship between 7 and r
7
redistribution at a point such as f  with A > 0.
Notice that r —r  =  orj4[(l—AJr]1" “ —r  =  r  (aA[(l — A)r]-Qi — 1). Substitution 
of the growth maximizing (r, A) combination establishes that f — f  =  f  
The effect of a marginal increase in efficiency on maximum growth is given by 
=  ( it s ) ¿s where Is  =  f Ml-1 > Thus,
Lem m a 1.2 The maximum after-tax return is given by r — f  = f  ( j “ )- -drc 
increase in efficiency raises the maximum growth rate, the maximum after-tax 
return and the growth maximizing tax rate, that is, ^  >  0, j  = 7, (r — r ) , f .
The result that a more efficient economy has higher maximum growth corresponds 
to common economic intuition and is hardly surprising. However, notice that 
under the model’s growth maximizing policy higher efficiency implies higher taxes 
and a higher after-tax return on capital. In terms of Figure 1.1 one may think 
of an increase in A  as an upward shift of the concave relationship between taxes 
and growth.
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1.4 The Government
As in Alesina and Rodrik (1991) consider a government that cares about the two 
groups in the economy. Respecting the right of private property, it chooses r  and 
A in order to maximize the welfare function
max (1 — /?) V T +  p V1 s.t. A > 0
t ,A
where V r and V T denote the intertemporal utility of the capital owners and the 
workers, respectively, and are given by
r  =  +  i  and v . =  +  7 (U 4 )
p p* ' p p
These expressions are obtained by integrating the utility functions in (1.7) and 
(1.12). For a derivation see appendix A.2. The condition A > 0 restricts the gov­
ernments in such a way that even a right-wing government does not tax workers. 
In that sense even a right-wing government is ’nice’ to the workers. A negative A 
would effectively amount to a tax on wages. The parameter (3 G [0,1] represents 
the welfare weight attached to the two groups in the economy. If ¡3 — 1,(0) the 
government cares about the workers (capitalists) only. The constancy of (3 may 
be justified by interpreting ¡3 as reflecting the socio-economic institutions in an 
economy. Then the fact that governments alternate in office becomes less of an 
issue since institutional features are usually constant for long periods of time.
The solution to the government’s problem is derived in appendix A.3 and it 
is given by
If /5p > [(1 — a)A]i then:
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T = 0P, A =  1 — [(1 -  o ) A ] i  Pp
If 0p <[( 1 — a)A]* then:
r [ l  — a (l  -  a)Ar"°] — 0p( 1 — a), A =  0.
From the last equation it follows that a right-wing government, 0 =  0, is only 
concerned about the after-tax return on capital and therefore growth in the model. 
It chooses A =  0 and f  = [a(l — a)A ]i, that is, the growth maximizing (r, A) 
combination. (See Lemma 1.1.)
For 0 > 0 it follows that r  > f  when A > 0 so that growth is not maximized. 
That can be visualized using Figure 1.1 on page 34. At f  the growth rate is 
maximal. If higher taxes are levied for wealth redistribution (A > 0) then the 
growth rate decreases. Thus, such a government trades off growth against wealth 
redistribution. It is interesting to note that 0  is inversely related to the growth 
rate. (For a proof see appendix A.3 or Alesina and Rodrik (1991).)
P roposition  1.1 (Alesina and  R odrik ) The growth rate 7 (r) is inversely re­
lated to 0, the social weight attached to the welfare of the non-accumulated factor 
of production.
Hence, under the model’s wealth tax scheme placing more social weight on the 
welfare of non-accumulated factor of production causes optimizing governments 
to choose high tax rates and thereby relatively low growth.
Another implication is that there is a wide range of values where no wealth
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redistribution takes place. Note that if p is a lot lower than 0 and the agents are 
patient, then the government does not redistribute.9
In order to concentrate on the distributional conflict I restrict the subsequent 
analysis to entirely pro-labour, ’left-wing’ (0 = 1) and entirely pro-capital, ’right- 
wing’ (¡3 =  0) governments. Thus, I assume that a government once in power is 
either right-wing or left-wing, so either 0  = 0 or 0 — 1. For that case denote the 
(r, A) combination, solving the equations above, by A =  A and f.
The left-mng government chooses
does not redistribute and acts growth maximizing in the model.
9It is also worth noting that the optimal tax rates are non-zero. That is due to the as­
sumption that A is non-negative and labour supply is inelastic. As has been shown by Jones, 
Manuelli and Rossi (1993a) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993b) and in contrast to, for 
instance, Chamley (1986) this leads to non-zero tax rates on capital income.
If /> > [(1 — o)^4]“ then:
(1.15)
P
If p < [(1 — a)A]« then:
f[l — a (l -  a )A f  q] =  p(l — a), A =  0. (1.16)
The right-wing government chooses
(1.17)
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1.5 A Com parative Dynamic Analysis
If the time preference rate is very low, p 0 in (1.16), a non-redistributing, 
left-wing government will mimic a growth maximizing policy. Thus,
P roposition  1.2 A left-wing government will mimic a growth maximizing, right- 
wing government’s policy only if it is very patient.
This is a special, but interesting case. It shows that political preferences per 
se do not rule out the possibility of choosing a growth maximizing policy. In 
particular, a government placing maximal weight on the non-accumulated factor 
of production (¡3 =  1), but at the same time putting almost equal weight to 
the welfare of future generations (low p) may act like a growth maximizer.10 
Furthermore, in terms of observed tax and growth rates a sufficiently low p may 
make the measured tax and growth rates under an optimal left-wing or a growth 
maximizing policy indistinguishable.
Notice that f  in (1.15) is not affected by changes in efficiency. I now verify 
that that the tax rate in (1.15), call it fi, is higher than the one in (1.16), call it 
72- Equation (1.16) entails
x = t [ 1 — a ( l  — a)Ar~Q] — p( 1 — a) =  0, 
xT =  1 -  a (l -  a)2Ar~a > 0, for r  > f ; x p — —(1 — a)
so that x T > 0 and xp < 0 where p < [(1 — a)v4]i in (1.16). By the implicit
function theorem this implies > 0. Substitute in (1.16) a particular (optimal)
10Of course, theoretically the two policies coincide only if p —> 0 which causes problems for 
the convergence of the utility indices. For the observability argument it suffices that p is very 
low while the utility indices still converge.
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f . If one finds that
r[l — a ( l  -  a)A r  Q] < p( 1 — a)
then xT > 0 implies that any optimal f  would have to be higher to satisfy (1.16). 
The converse holds if the inequality sign is reversed. Setting the minimum tax 
rate in (1.15), that is, f\ =  [(1 — a)^ ]?  equal to t2 in (1.16) I obtain
[(1 — a)A]° (1 — a) > p{ 1 — a)
so that T2 would have to be lowered. Hence, f\ > f 2.
Lemma 1.3 The tax rate chosen by a non-redistributing, left-wing government 
satisfies f  < [(1 — a)A ]i and increases with the rate of time preference, ~  > 0.
The result is not surprising, but the lemma is useful below.
In this model a right-wing government is only concerned about guaranteeing 
the maximum after-tax return on capital and therefore maximum growth. The 
growth maximizing tax rate f  = [a(l — a)^4]o is increasing in A.
Suppose the left-wing government redistributes wealth in the optimum. Then 
equation (1.15) applies. I will now check under what conditions 7 > 0 with A > 0. 
If (1.15) holds then (1 — A)f =  [(1 — a)yl]“ . If T  =  (1 — a )A , then
r  =  <*¿[(1 -  A)f]1-" =  a A T ^ r  = T * .
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Equation (1-15) requires t = p > T * ,  and 7 > 0 implies r  — f  — /? > 0. So f  =  p 
has to satisfy
f  > t - a ( V f  ( - 2 —W i > r £  2f « . o > | .
V I - a /  VI - a /  3
Thus, the share of capital has to be sufficiently more important than that of 
public inputs or labour. Furthermore, for an increase in A  I find < 0 so that 
A would be lower in a new optimum.
Proposition 1.3 For a redistributing (X > 0), left-wing government 7 >  0 only 
if a  > | .  An increase in efficiency makes the left-wing government redistribute 
less wealth given its optimal policy, that is, ~~ <  0.
This is an interesting implication of the model in Alesina and Rodrik (1991), 
which they do not discuss. The proposition is empirically relevant and testable. It 
entails that an increase in efficiency causes a left-wing government to redistribute 
less resources and place more weight on growth. Empirical implications of the 
result are discussed in the chapters second part. Theoretically, it suggests that 
there is an interesting trade-off between growth, redistribution and technological 
efficiency.
Next, I turn to a non-redistributing, left-wing government, i.e. , A =  0, f  > f . 
The effect of an increase in efficiency on the tax rate in (1.16) is
( l  — a ( l  -  a)2Ar~Q>j dr — (a ( l -  a ) r 1_a) dA =  0
=  a ( l  — a ) r  ( rQ — a ( l  — a )2A^ 1. (1*18)
liMmiMtJUiW MMltJ UWH,
From (1.15), (1.16) the left-wing government chooses a policy t > t . Thus, ~  is 
positive.11 Hence, an increase in efficiency makes a non-redistributing, left-wing 
government increase its optimal tax rate. Recall that
r = aA[(l -  A)r]1_a , 77 =  (1 — a)A[(l -  A)r]1_Q = -— -  r.
a
For the effect of higher A on growth I check if =  rA 4* (rT — 1) > 0 , that is,
whether
r ^1"
a r 1-° > (l — a(l — a)Ar_Q) a (l — a)r (ra — a( 1 — a)2A^ j
1 > (rQ — a (l -  a)A) (1 -  a) ( r0 — a( 1 -  a )2A)
r Q -  a 2(l -  a)2A > (1 — a )ra -  a 2(l -  a)2A
1 > 1 — a,
which is true since a  < 1. Thus, > 0 if A = 0 in (1.16).
Suppose the left-wing government redistributes. Proposition 1.3 and equation 
(1.15) imply that = 0 and ^  < 0. Then =  rA +  rA $  > 0 since r\ < 0. 
Also, Lemma 1.2 implies > 0 for a right-wing government. That establishes
Proposition  1.4 The optimal policies of a right-wing or left-wing government 
imply that higher efficiency leads them to choose either higher taxes when there is 
no redistribution A =  0, or the same taxes and reduce redistribution. An increase 
in efficiency leads to higher growth under a right-wing or a left-wing government’s 
optimal policy. *
n To see this notice that ^  > 0 requires r “ > a ( l—a)2 A  which is equivalent to r  > f ( l - a ) « 
and always satisfied since f  > f  and (1 — a) » <1.
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1.5.1 The Factor Income Distribution
The optimal right-wing and left-wing policies lead to different steady state distri­
butions of income. I define the following ratios as measures of total factor income 
inequality:
i
pg _  total Pre’tax capital income __ rk t __ a  
total pre-tax wage income T]kt 1 — a
Thus, steady state pre-tax factor income inequality in the economy is the same 
under either government, and it is constant over time and independent of the 
capital stock. Notice that F9 is increasing in the share of capital a. Similarly, I 
define the post-tax total factor income inequality as
F (t , A) total post-tax capital income __ (r — T)kt 
total post-tax wage income (77 -I- Ar)k t
( r - r )  
(jj +  At ) '
(1.19)
This measure is also independent of the capital stock and constant over time, 
but depends on the government’s optimal policy. By assumption there are more 
workers than capital owners in the economy, and the capitalists own the capital 
stock equally, implying no inequality in intra-group capital income. Also the 
workers supply labour in equal amounts so that there is no intra-group inequality 
in wage income.
Obviously, these ’inequality measures’ are extremely crude. They ignore intra­
group inequality, the population composition and other things. The justification 
for employing them lies in the following argument: In the model any policy 
change affects the personal and the factor income distribution. Thus, changes in 
tax policy have a direct impact on total factor income inequality between people 
which is not always the case when analyzing total personal income distributions.
42
rw w ™ w T r n r a T i¥ in r n r i r ' '~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ----------- —  1
Suppose person i gets income 10 and person j  gets income 20. If the government 
gives 10 to i and takes 10 from j , person i and j  would swap places in the total 
personal income distribution. That is sometimes not recorded as a change in total 
personal income inequality, especially if i and j  have the same utility functions. 
In the model, however, such a transfer would affect factor income inequality since 
j  may be a capital owner and i may be a worker. The income transfer would 
make one worker better off and increase total wage income, and it would make 
one capitalist worse off and reduce total capital income. Of course, if one used a 
personal income inequality measure that is decomposable so that one can group 
capital income and wage income recipients, where the groups are weighted, an 
income transfer from a capitalist to a worker would be recorded as a change 
in inequality, because intra-group and inter-group inequality would change. On 
the complexity of moving from a factor share to a personal income distribution 
analysis see, for example, Atkinson (1983).
Thus, by working with the factor income distribution I concentrate on situa­
tions where policy changes have a direct impact on measured income inequality 
via changes in post-tax factor shares. Furthermore, I am only interested in how 
different policies compare to each other in terms of growth and post-tax factor 
shares. The simplifying framework, therefore, serves to focus on the implications 
of different policies on the income distribution and growth.
In what follows I analyze how the optimal left-wing or right-wing policies com­
pare to a (strictly) income egalitarian policy. Such a policy is strictly committed 
to granting equal after-tax incomes to workers and capitalists.12 The reason for 
introducing this policy is twofold.
Firstly, it allows one to compare the left-wing and right-wing policies’ induced
12Below I will loosely refer to such a policy as income egalitarian with the implicit under­
standing that it is strict.
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after-tax factor income distribution to one where all agents get the same income. 
In that sense, the strictly income egalitarian policy provides a benchmark from 
which one may assess how much income inequality a left-wing or right-wing policy 
entails. However, for consistency with the paper’s definition of ’redistribution’, 
which is restricted to wealth, I make it explicit which benchmark I use for com­
parisons of alternative distributive policies.
Secondly, many people tend to associate left-wing with income egalitarian 
policies. The two clearly involve distinct objectives. A left-wing policy represents 
the interests of one particular group in the economy. In this model it tries to 
maximize the welfare of unskilled labour and it is therefore concerned about the 
welfare level of labour. In contrast, the income egalitarian objective is relative 
in nature in that it compares a worker’s and a capitalist’s income. Thus, levels 
do not feature as an objective for an income egalitarian. The model brings out 
that the two objectives may lead to very different tax, income distribution and 
growth combinations. However, one has to be careful with the paper’s egalitarian 
objective. Many other egalitarian policies are possible and interesting to analyze. 
For example, a utilitarian attempts to equalize marginal utilities of the agents. 
A strictly utility egalitarian government tries to make everybody equally happy 
in terms of total individual utility. Furthermore, a Rawlsian objective involves 
comparing utilities of the least well-off. Also, the complicated issue arises whether 
the objectives require equality at each point in time or equality of intertemporal 
welfare. These issues and other egalitarian objectives are discussed in more depth 
by, for instance, Sen (1982) or Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), chpt. 11.13 The
13Furthermore, these authors show that under some conditions the utility Rawlsian and the 
utility egalitarian solutions coincide. However, if the social welfare function takes individual 
utilities as its arguments but is no longer monotonically increasing in them, that is, if it is 
individualistic, but non-Paretian, the Rawlsian objective will no longer necessarily satisfy the 
egalitarian principle of equalizing utilities.
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reason for not considering such policies lies in the aim to analyze the factor 
income distribution. As data on income are more readily available, everybody 
getting equal factor incomes is a natural reference point for policy assessment. 
In comparison, a factor income distribution that would make everybody equally 
happy, requiring knowledge about the exact form of the welfare function, appears 
far more difficult to determine - even in this simple model. That may justify 
restricting the analysis to strictly income egalitarian policies.14
To facilitate the analysis I assume that a government which pursues a strictly 
income egalitarian objective is unable to redistribute wealth to the workers. That 
does not affect the qualitative results below. For all governments that do not 
redistribute (A =  0), the post-tax factor income ratio F  is given by
. r  — r  a ra
77 1 — a  A (1 — o )
and decreases in r . In the model an increase in taxes raises the total wage income, 
and shifts relatively more income towards labour, reducing F.
As there are many more workers (/) sharing the total wage income equally 
than capitalists (n) sharing total capital income equally, the strictly income egali­
tarian government chooses a policy that grants each individual an equal after-tax 
income. That is achieved if
rjkt _  (r -  r)fct 
l n
Thus, it does not matter in the model whether the income egalitarian objective
14 The clarification is important since the results presented below apply only to the income 
egalitarian policy. Other egalitarian objectives may lead to different results. Furthermore, 
notice that in the model a strictly income egalitarian policy coincides with that of an income 
leximin policy, which may not be the case for total utility egalitarian and utility leximin policies.
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requires equality of income at each point in time or over the entire planning 
horizon. Notice that the objective is directly related to F  and fixes it at
F* n
I where n < l.
The income egalitarian government’s objective is satisfied when setting taxes such 
that F ( t ) equals its target F *.15 The tax rate re that satisfies this is given by
re =  [.A(a -  (1 -  a)F*)]* (1.20)
Note that F* depends on the number of agents in each group. For consistency 
I require that F* < m in { l,F 9} which is easily met for l «  n and reasonable 
values of a. If there are only a few capital owners, then the income egalitarian 
government chooses a very low F*, and a high re. At the other extreme, assume 
that there are as many capitalists as workers. That would correspond to a rep­
resentative agent economy where each household would derive equal income and 
under intra-group income equality would get equal wage or capital income. A 
(strictly) income egalitarian government would charge relatively lower taxes in 
that case. The income egalitarian policy implies
^  = -  -  (1 -  a)F')\i~i (a -  (1 -  a)F‘) = re [aA]"‘ > 0
d A  oc
so that an increase in A  leads to a higher choice of re. For the growth rate I find
I t  =  Tt \aAr~a -  l]
15 The reason for working with F* rather than with I f n  directly is to avoid confusion with 
the distribution of groups in the economy. Of course, they coincide in the model.
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=  T .
aA
A(a  — (1 -  a)F*)
- 1
and ¡^jf > 0. Thus, as under a right-wing or a left-wing policy an increase in A 
also increases the growth rate under the income egalitarian policy.
P roposition  1.5 Under a strictly income egalitarian policy > 0 and > 0.
Consider the optimal right-wing policy with f  = [a(l — a)4 ]°. Denote F  
under a right-wing policy by F . Then
F  = or1 - a
(1.21)
which depends positively on the share of capital (elasticity of output with respect 
to capital). Thus, as the share of capital increases, the optimal policy of a 
right-wing government shifts more total income towards capital. Note that F  is 
independent of the level of development A.
Depending on the rate of time preference the left-wing government chooses 
to redistribute or not in the optimum. Suppose A > 0. From (1.15) f ( l  — A) = 
[(1 — a)^4ji and f =  a^4[(l — a ) A ] ~  so that f and f\ are independent of A. Thus,
t] +  Xf ~  (1 — q)^4[(1 -  q)^ ]1^  + p -  [(1 -  a)A]° =  p
so that the inequality measure (1.19) in the optimum becomes
F(X > 01 =  llli =  ~ P  _  a[(l -  a ) A]i _
P P { l -  a)  p
where p > [(1 -  a)^]«  and a > § if 7(A > 0) > 0. Clearly, > 0.
( 1.22)
47
Next, suppose / ? < [ ( ! -  <*)>!]« so that A =  0. Then t  in (1.16) solves
t[1 -  a ( l  -  o)A t q] =  p(l -  a)
and is only implicitly defined. However, we know that f  > t if p > 0. Income 
inequality is therefore given by
F(X =  0) = a
1 — a  A(1 — a) (1.23)
and such that F(X = 0) < F  for f  > f . For the effect of efficiency (higher A) on 
F(X =  0) I calculate
dF(X =  0) a f a- ' ( l  -  a)A%r -  (1 -  a ) f a
dA (-4(1 "  a ))2
Simplifying and substituting for ^  from (1.18) yields
dF( A =  0) (1 — a ) fQ af*i—i
dA ( ( 1 - a M ) 2 a - a) A
(1 — a ) fa a f (i—i
((1 -<*)AY a - a)A
(1 -  a ) fQ a 2f° ( fa
((1 -  a)A)2 A ■ V
The expression is positive if
(1 — a )fa 
( ( l - a ) / l ) 2 >
a 2f c
A >
d f
-l
( fa — t*(l — a)2A j  1.
1
-  a ( l  — a)2A )
( ( l - a ) A )  > “ 2 ( ^ - « ( l - a )2^ ) " 1
f a >  a ( l  — a)2A 4- a 2(l  — a)A
f a > a ( l  — a)j4[(l — a) +  a]
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f  > f  .
As a left-wing government chooses t  > f , is positive. I summarize in
Lemma 1.4 Under the optimal right-wing or the income egalitarian policy tech­
nological progress does not change the steady state total post-tax factor income
distribution, ~  =  0 and ^  = 0.
Under the optimal left-wing policy technological progress shifts the steady state
It is noteworthy that an advance in development (higher A) causes the optimal 
left-wing government’s policy to shift income towards the accumulated factor of 
production. As > 0 and ^ > 0 that holds no matter whether the
left-wing government redistributes or not.
1.5.2 Comparative Dynamics under Different Policies
In this section I hypothetically compare the effects of the different policies on an 
otherwise identical economy. It is then an interesting question how the income 
egalitarian policy compares to that of a growth maximizing government. For 
7e = 7 one needs re =  f  which is satisfied if
total post-tax factor income distribution towards capital, —^  °) > 0, dF^ >0^  > 0.
A [a — (1 — a)F*] =  a (l — a)A
a*
2
Proposition  1.6 I f  a* = V^4F*+F*2-F *2 , then re = f ,  7c = 7 and F* =  F.
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Thus, there exists a particular value of the share of capital where 7« =  7 so 
that the income egalitarian policy is equivalent to a growth maximizing policy. 
Under that condition income egalitarianism is not bad for growth. The result 
crucially depends on the income egalitarian government’s target F \ 16 Of course, 
the result allows for another interpretation in the model. If the share of capital 
is equal to a*, then a growth maximizing policy leads to minimal post-tax factor 
income inequality. Seen from that angle, the model provides an example that 
there may be instances where efficiency and equity orientated policies lead to the 
same outcome.17 For all other a ’s it follows that
a  ^a* <=> rc ^ f  «=> 7e < 7 .
so that in general the income egalitarian government does not maximize growth.
Suppose a  < q*. Then re < t  < f ,  because a left-wing government chooses 
t > f. As F( t ) is decreasing in r ,  it follows that F < F  < F*, implying that the 
average capital owner would have lower income than the average worker. It would 
also entail that the right-wing government chooses a policy that would grant more 
income to a worker than to a capitalist. That is consistent with the model’s right- 
wing government’s objective, which is not concerned with relative income, but 
seems very implausible and unrealistic. I will therefore not investigate that case 
any further.
16It may be interesting to note that if there are as many capital owners as workers, then 
strict income egalitarianism calls for F* = 1 in which case a* = This means that a*
wrould correspond to the golden ratio.
17In general, the two interpretations are not equivalent, however. There may be instances 
where an income egalitarian policy leads to maximum growth. This may be so if that policy 
targets a particular personal income distribution, which implies a particular factor income dis­
tribution which may lead to maximum growth, as the proposition shows. The growth maximizer 
targets growth, implying a particular factor income distribution, implying many, possibly dif­
ferent personal income distributions. Thus, to get equivalence more assumptions are required. 
In the model the equivalence is due to the assumption of no intra-group inequality.
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Suppose a > a*. Then re > f  and one gets
f  < re < f  <=> F > F* > F  <=> 7 > 7 e > 7
f  < f  < re <=> F  > F  > F* <=> 7 > 7 > 7 e *
Thus, in this case the income egalitarian policy may be closer to the optimal 
policy of a left-wing government. The two policies coincide if there exists a p, 
call it pc, such that f  =  rc. In general, however, the exact relationship between 
the growth rates under the income egalitarian or the optimal left-wing policies 
are ambiguous. Also, it is ambiguous whether the left-wing or the right-wing 
policy is closer to the income egalitarian government’s policy in terms of post-tax 
income inequality. In either case the right-wing policy shifts more income towards 
capital in comparison to the income egalitarian government. That is what one 
would expect. In contrast, the left-wing government may shift relatively more 
income to capital or labour depending on how patient the workers are. If they are 
very impatient, re < f  and they will shift relatively more income to the workers, 
leading to lower growth than under the income egalitarian policy. If they are 
patient, the left-wing government will choose to shift relatively more income to 
capital and there will be higher growth than under the income egalitarian policy. 
With d > 0 and d^ >0^  > 0 the effect of technological progress under a left- 
wing policy is also ambiguous. It is inequality reducing if F < F* and inequality 
enhancing if F > F*.
Proposition  1.7 I f  a > a* the right-wing government always grants more in­
come to the capital owners in comparison to the income egalitarian government.
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The optim al polices imply
1. p>  pe : f  <Te < f  F  > F* > F  &  7 > 7 e > 7
or
2. p < pe : t < f  < re F  > F > F* 7 > 7 > 7 e.
Thus, the left-wing government grants relatively more or less income to the work­
ers, and it has lower or higher growth than the income egalitarian government. 
Technological progress may reduce or increase income inequality under the left- 
wing policy compared to the income egalitarian policy. All these results depend 
on how patient the agents are. Interestingly, for patient workers the optimal left- 
wing policy leads to a post-tax factor income distribution that is more favourable 
to capital in comparison to the income egalitarian policy. The workers are, how­
ever, compensated for that by higher income growth.
That brings out clearly that the objective of an income egalitarian govern­
ment is strictly concerned about relative incomes, whereas the left-wing govern­
ment cares about the welfare of the workers. Thus, F  > F*t implying that the 
capitalists get relatively more income than the workers under a left-wing govern­
ment, is consistent with that government’s objective, because it gives the workers 
the highest welfare. According to Proposition 1.2 the left-wing government may 
mimic a right-wing, growth maximizing policy if the workers are very patient. 
Therefore, the workers do not prefer an income egalitarian policy, although it 
would give them relatively more income at each date t. That is so, because 
growth is higher under the left-wing policy, granting them higher consumption 
in the future which they prefer if they are patient. That shows how misleading
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it may be to identify income egalitarian with left-wing policies.
It is worth reiterating that the income egalitarian is a very special egalitarian 
objective. Suppose a utility egalitarian chooses a tax policy somewhere between 
those optimal for the income egalitarian or a Rawlsian. Suppose further that 
one compares policies relative to the strictly income egalitarian policy F*. If 
an outcome with some income inequality is better for the worse-off group than 
a strictly income egalitarian outcome then it is better according to a Rawlsian 
(utility leximin) policy. Thus, if F > F* and the workers are worse off than the 
capitalists under a left-wing policy, then a Rawlsian would choose lower taxes 
and move closer to the workers’ preferred, left-wing policy. That is so, because 
such a move would be Paretian as all agents would prefer an F  such that F  > F*. 
Thus, a (total) utility egalitarian objective satisfying the Pareto-principle would 
also imply a policy F > F*. Thus, for patient agents a large class of egalitarian 
objectives satisfying the Pareto-principle would shift relatively more income to 
capital than to labour. The argument is different when F < F* < F, and the 
income egalitarian policy leads to higher growth than the left-wing policy. If 
evaluated relative to F*t it is not so clear what a utility leximin policy entails, 
that is, whether it would be closer to F  or F. A precise analysis would require 
whether that policy is concerned about the worst-off at any point in time or the 
worst-off, intertemporal welfare of the agents. In either case any policy away from 
F* would violate the Pareto-principle, because it would make one group better 
off and another group worse off. In that case it is also unclear what a total utility 
egalitarian would choose relative to a Rawlsian.
For the purpose of the paper’s analysis, however, it suffices to conclude that 
strictly income egalitarian and left-wing policies are generally not the same and 
lead to quite different post-tax factor income distributions and growth rates.
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From the discussion so far it is clear that a  plays a major role in the model’s 
analysis. The importance of the share of capital for the relationship between taxes 
and growth has, for instance, been emphasized by Stokey and Rebelo (1995). In 
appendix A.4 I find the following reactions of 7, r  and F  due to changes in a.
Proposition 1.8 An increase in a leads to
dT dy dF1. —— ^ 0, -7— > 0 and —  > 0 under the right-wing policy,
da < da da
dr dy dF*2. > 0, ~~r—r ^ 0 and —— = 0 under the income egalitarian policy,da da ^ da
d f dy dF
3. —  ^ 0, -— > 0 and —  >  0 under a left-wing, A =  0 policy,
da ^ da da
4 . ^r~ — 0, ^  § 0, ^  > 0 and ~ 0 under a left-wing, A > 0 policy.da da da da ^
According to the proposition unambiguous responses of policy variables to changes 
in the share of capital do not exist in general. For instance, a plot of the growth 
maximizing tax rate f  for different a  and A reveals a pattern as in Figure 1.2. 
Thus, it is possible for given A  that two values of a  lead to the same f, but
Figure 1.2: The growth maximizing r  for different a  and A
different growth rates 7, because ^  > 0. Similar reasoning applies for the non­
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redistributing, left-wing government. That suggests that information about tax 
rates alone may not explain growth rates in a cross-country OLS analysis.
Up to this point the comparative dynamic analysis has emphasized normative 
issues about growth and the income distribution. In terms of positive economics 
the model endogenizes public policy in that optimal policy variables are func­
tions of underlying economic variables. Except for F* of the income egalitarian 
government all policy variables are functions of a and A in the chapter. Endoge­
nous fiscal policy has important implications for estimating the effect of fiscal 
policy on growth by cross-country OLS regressions. I turn to the implications 
for these empirical models below. To that end I assume that policy has a certain 
element of endogeneity and I use this model with complete endogeneity to point 
out some difficulties that have been encountered in the literature and offer some 
explanations why these difficulties arise when assuming that policy is exogenous.
1.6 Implications for Empirical Research
The presence of endogeneity elements in fiscal policy raises various problems 
for estimation in any cross-country growth regression as has been mentioned in 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993a), section 4. Instead of addressing the fundamental 
problem associated with endogenous regressors I will focus on some empirical 
findings in the simple cross-country OLS regression literature that appear to be 
at odds with theoretical results. Throughout this section ’simple (cross-country) 
OLS regression’ refers to the very common procedure of taking averages of data 
over time and running cross-country OLS regressions over these averaged data.
Many authors have analyzed the effects of taxes or other fiscal variables on 
growth. For instance, Koester and Kormendi (1989), Barro (1991), Levine and
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Renelt (1992), Easterly and Rebelo (1993a), or Sala-i-Martin (1997) have run 
simple cross-country OLS regressions to investigate the issue. Most of them find 
that tax rates or some other, tax financed fiscal variables have a negative, but 
- when controlling for initial income - insignificant effect on growth. That casts 
some doubt on theoretical findings such as Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala- 
i-Martin (1990) who show that some of the tax financed, fiscal policy variables 
should have a significant and sometimes positive effect on growth. The reason 
for the discrepancy may be due to the fact that policy is endogenous to some 
extent and that treating tax variables as exogenous causes simple cross-country 
OLS regressions to give a misleading picture of the relationship between fiscal 
policy and economic growth.
In what follows I set empirical findings in the literature against implications of 
the model above when running simple OLS regressions. According to the chapi­
ter’s theoretical model the empirical steady state relationship between growth 
and public policy for a country i is of the form
7* =  ƒ ("^ »(^ ¿i A,), Aj(o!*, Aj), Of*, Ai, pi) =  ƒ (c*i, j4j, pi) (1.24)
where ƒ(•) is a highly non-linear function of the fundamental variables a,-, A, and 
Pi. Most authors assume that policy is exogenous which would mean that
7* =  9iTt, A,, a*, A,-, Pi)
where r* and At- are independent of the other variables included in «?(•). The 
important point to notice is that ƒ (*) and <?(•) may be observationally equivalent 
when particular combinations of or,-, A,-, and pi lead to the same growth rate under 
either assumption. To capture this feature I assume that empirical and theoretical
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researchers agree that the Data Generating Mechanism (DGP) can be expressed 
theoretically by the joint probability distribution £>(7,7, A,a, A,p). Notice that 
the probability distribution is expressed in terms of steady state variables and 
thus ignores any time dependence. That reflects the common procedure by em­
pirical researchers to take averages over time of variables they consider of interest. 
Furthermore, most researchers would agree that p is a soft variable which is al­
most impossible to observe. Therefore, I ignore any impact the time preference 
rate p has on growth. Concerning the fundamental variables a* and Ai I assume 
that they are country-specific, that is, independent and thus uncorrelated across 
countries.
In the rest of the chapter I discuss implications for running simple OLS regres­
sions under the assumption that policy is exogenous when in fact it is endogenous. 
The following table presents a summary of what has been shown in the previ­
ous sections, that is, it summarizes theoretical correlations between the growth 
or tax rates and the share of capital or the state of technology under different 
(endogenous) policy regimes.
Table 1*. Growth and Policy Effects
(—) - negative, (?) - ambiguous 
If policy is endogenous and the true model is as in (1.24), then a linearized
Right-Wing
f 7 F
A + + 0
Q ? + +
Left-Wing, A =  0
A =  0 f  1 7 F
A +  + +
a ? 1 +
sign: (+) - positive,
Income Egalitarian
Te 7e F*
A + + 0
a + ? 0
Left-Wing, A >  0
f A 7 F
A 0 - + +
a 0 ? + ?
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version of it leads to the OLS regression
7» =  P q +  P i° t i +  02Ti ( a ii -4») +  ^¿) +  P aA i +  e*
where is a country-specific disturbance term which is assumed to be uncorre­
lated with each of the regressors and ¿'(ci) =  0. If that model were estimated by 
OLS, problems of identification and multicollinearity would arise. But there are 
other problems. In the model Ai captures the level of development. One could 
in principle construct indices that would reflect the level of development using 
some economically meaningful criteria. On the other hand, it makes sense to 
assume that Ai changes over time. The model has analyzed the effect of exoge­
nous, once-and-for-all changes in A j. An analysis of that kind is similar in spirit 
to models with exogenous technological change, which is commonly thought to 
be unobservable. The discussion about the Solow-Residual reflects these difficul­
ties. (See, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chpt. 10.4.) Therefore, 
I assume either that countries differ widely in the level of development, which is 
hardly disputable, and that data on Ai are not available, or that development 
changes over time so that correct information about the level of Ai over time 
would be unobservable. Both assumptions imply that information on Ai would 
also be contained in the disturbance term and that Ai would not feature in the 
OLS regressions. If that is the case, the estimated coefficients in the regression 
above are generally biased.18 Instead of analyzing the ’true’ model further, I will
18To be more precise, the estimates of 0j , j  = 2,3 will surely be biased unless 0'4 — 0, that is, 
unless Ai is weakly exogenous, in which case it need not have been in the model to begin with. 
See Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983). By assumption Ai plays a role so that 0\ 0. Under
what conditions the assumption of endogenous policy produces biased estimates in simple OLS 
cross-country growth regressions has been analyzed in a more general framework in ’Why Run 
a Million Regressions? On Some Difficulties of Doing OLS in Cross-Country Growth Analyses’, 
mimeo, TU Darmstadt, Nov. 1997.
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investigate the implications for simple OLS regressions that have been presented 
in the literature and interpret the results in the light of this model.
Given the measurement problem of I simplify the analysis by analyzing 
the second-best, but operationally viable model
7» =  A> +  A o. +  & fi(af-, Ai) +  A  A ¿(a*, A{) +  v{ (1.25)
where Vi =  e*) is a country-specific disturbance term which depends on
Ai. If that model were estimated by OLS, multicollinearity and the omission of 
a relevant variable would be a problem. However, I will focus on the problem 
caused by assuming that policy is exogenous. A standard justification for treating 
policy as exogenous is given by a randomization argument. For example, Barro 
(1989a) argues that in a large sample the optimal policies of governments may be 
treated as randomly generated. That comes close to saying, the optimal policies 
are exogenous. But in light of this paper’s model the argument would not hold. 
Even if all countries had different governments with different welfare functions 
so that e.g. the tax rates looked randomly chosen, the model predicts that all 
policies would be influenced by fundamental economic variables included or not 
included in the sample. Below I focus on exactly that problem.
1.6.1 Taxes
Most studies investigating the relation between taxes and growth use the variables
T A R  dTAR TA R  dTAR
aVl ~  T A B ' m ' ~  dT A B ' "  GDP' m2 "  dGDP
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where T A R  denotes the total tax revenues in a country, and T A B  denotes the 
tax base. Usually, avi and av2 are taken to be indicators of the average tax rate, 
whereas m* and m2 are often used as proxies for the marginal tax rate. All these 
variables are problematic representations for aggregate relationships between fis­
cal policy and growth. For instance, the ’marginal tax rate’ m2 is commonly 
obtained by regressing tax revenues on GDP, where the resulting regression coef­
ficient is then interpreted as the ’marginal tax rate*. (See, for instance, Koester 
and Kormendi (1989) or Easterly and Rebelo (1993b).) That raises the question 
whether GDP really is the relevant tax base.
In terms of the theoretical model the constant capital tax rate r  is equal to 
both av\ and mi, because the latter are directly proportional to the level of and 
the change in the tax base. That appears problematic as most researchers would 
in general expect the average and the marginal tax rates to differ, in particular 
one would often expect that marginal tax rates (m) are not lower and often 
higher than average tax rates {av). One should bear in mind, however, that for 
economies with flat-rate tax systems, which are often analyzed and sometimes 
advocated to be adopted in the theoretical literature, av =  m would certainly 
hold. Thus, a discussion of the effect of such tax variables on growth in simple 
OLS cross-country growth regressions may be worth for that and for theoretical 
reasons. Furthermore, the theoretical model has the advantage that the expected 
correlations between av 1 or mx and A or a  are of the same sign. These signs are 
of primary interest in this section and are succinctly captured by the properties 
of r . For these reasons I will concentrate on regressor variables related to the tax 
base, that is, on av 1, mi and r  first.
60
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Suppose the simple cross-country OLS regression
7» =  io +  i iT< +  “J (1.26)
is run, treating t* as exogenous, when in fact it is endogenous as in (1.25). The 
superscript 1 indicates that the regression is run on tax variables related to the 
tax base. The OLS estimator of 5}, call it dj, is in general biased. Note that the 
OLS estimator is given by
.i _  E i(n  -  ? H  
1 & (n  -  f ) 2
Substituting in the ’true’ model (1.25) yields
dil
£ i ( r t ~  t ) {0o +  f tQ j  +  f iz T ifa , Aj) +  + # ^ ( 0 !,, i4f) +  Vj)
E i ( T i - T ) 2
/?2 +  A CiQfj +  A  + Cit;*
i i i
where c* =  ^ ' T, and vi — vi{J4t, e*). Taking expectations under the assump­
tion that policy is in fact endogenous I obtain19
E(d\) =  fo + PiE + h E IH + E
Hence, the OLS estimator d\ is generally biased because the sum of the expec­
tations of the expressions on the RHS is non-zero. The bias is due to three 
factors. First, the expression is positive for all non-redistributing gov­
ernments since covfaA i) > 0 from Table 1. Second, cov(Tj,Ai) > 0, which is
19Notice that under exogenous policy the expectation would be conditional on (t^ , A¿, ^ a * ) ,  
since all researchers agree on the ’true’ DGP by assumption. Under endogenous policy the 
expectation is only conditional on (^¿,0 ,-), of course.
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zero if all governments do not redistribute wealth, or positive if they do. Third, 
for economies with A*, a* such that cov(r^ai) > 0, the bias is clearly positive. 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), ftn. 7, cite theoretical support for the prediction that 
an increase in a  raises redistributive pressure leading to higher taxes. However, if 
cov(ri, a*) <  0 the sign of the bias may be ambiguous. I conclude that for a large 
class of policies the reported OLS estimate of the effect of tax rates on growth is 
biased upwards, when the tax rates are measured by variables like r , avi or mi, 
whi 'h are exactly related to the tax base. Thus, in many cases any reported bad 
ef: T of taxes on growth may be understated. It is, however, also possible that 
t:. coefficients are biased downwards so that any reported bad effect would be 
overstated. That is the case when cov(ri,ai) is negative and larger in absolute 
value than cov{t^  A*) and cov{r^Vi).
As the error term correlates with the regressor riy or any transformation of r, 
depending on a  or A, the conditions of weak exogeneity in the sense of Engle et 
al. (1983) are violated. (See also Spanos (1986), chpts. 19.3.) Hence, statistical 
inferences on d} are not really possible. So reported ¿—statistics on d\ will not 
report the true significance of the estimated coefficient if one wants to know 
whether d\ is significantly different from zero. It is also known that for omitted 
variable or misspecification problems the estimator may have lower or higher 
variance than another estimator, if one knows the true variance of u,. (For that 
see, for instance, Greene (1991) chpt. 9, or Johnston (1984), chpt. 6.) But Vi is 
estimated with d\ when doing OLS so that the estimated sum of squared residuals, 
used for hypothesis testing, may be higher of lower than the true variance of the 
residuals. That provides another reason why the var(d{) may be affected by the 
bias.
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P roposition  1.9 Let the average tax rate avj (the ratio of tax revenues to tax 
base) or the marginal tax rate mi (the ratio of the change in tax revenues to the 
change in tax base) have the same properties as r. Simple cross-country OLS 
regressions of the growth rate on t , avi or mi assuming that policy is exogenous, 
when in fact it is endogenous, yields genetically biased estimates for the effect 
of taxes on growth. In many cases and definitely if  cov(r, a) > 0, the bias is 
positive. In the model correct statistical inferences of the effect of taxes on growth 
are not possible when using OLS estimators.
A positive bias in regressors like r , avi or mi implies that coefficients mea­
suring the effect of these variables on growth are overestimated. Thus, either any 
reported negative effect of these tax variables on growth is understated or any 
reported positive effect is overstated.20 In the theoretical literature taxes usually 
negatively affect growth. Hence, if one found a negative effect in empirical stud­
ies (simple OLS cross-country growth regressions) using regressors like r , av\ or 
mi, with the properties derived in this chapter’s theoretical model, one could be 
’sure’ that the effect is indeed negative. Even a reported positive effect would not 
invalidate the theoretical prediction that the ’true’ effect may really be negative. 
In that sense Proposition 1.9 provides a negative result for hypothesis testing, 
but it offers an important ’positive’ link to empirical research in that it pro­
vides an argument that the theoretically postulated relationship between taxes 
and growth is ’true’, if the regressors are r, a^i or mi and have the theoretical 
model’s properties.
However, Proposition 1.9 rests on some strong assumptions. The determi­
nation of a country’s most relevant tax base for growth is extremely difficult.
20Notice that from the statistical literature a positive (negative) bias in /? is equivalent to a 
systematic overestimation (underestimation) of the ’true’ value /? 6 M.
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Usually governments raise all sorts of taxes on different tax bases. Furthermore, 
countries do not necessarily use the same tax bases and for some tax bases data 
are difficult to obtain. Thus, for researchers working with aggregate data it has 
become common and it is convenient to relate tax revenues to GDP or aggregate 
income, on which data are most commonly available. In fact, the vast majority 
of cross-country growth regression analyses use av2 or m2 as an indicator of taxes 
or tax policy. (For instance, all authors quoted so far use at least one of these 
variables.) However, the choice of regressor variables may affect the underlying 
structure of the estimated and the statistical model. Going from r  or av2 to 
m2 often entails a non-linear reparametrization of an original estimated model 
or a different model altogether.21 For instance, the choice of av2 as a regressor 
variable means that
7 =  / 2(— , a iy Aiy pi) =  f ( a iy Aiy pt)
Vt
which is usually not the same as ƒ(*) in (1.24). Instead of trying to find a 
reparametrization of the original model I assume all policy variables react to the 
fundamental variables as in Table 1 and f 2(av2,*) can be linearized as
7t =  P i + P \& i + P\ av2i +  v2(Ai, e<).
The same assumptions and arguments apply for m2 and / 2(m2, •). From the
21 It should be borne in mind that the theoretical model has been assumed to capture a broad 
class of tax structures. In that sense the results derived from the simple theoretical model are 
supposed to capture essential properties of the relation between taxes and growth in general. 
Thus, it is perfectly valid and common scientific procedure to reduce a problem to a simple 
model and use some, but not necessarily the closest estimable and statistical models to test the 
theoretical results. On this point see, for instance, Spanos (1986), chpts. 1.2 and 26.
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theoretical model it is not difficult to verify that22
rk tav 2 =  —  
Vt A( 1 -  A)1“®
and =  =  (1.27)
d& 1 -  a
Thus, m2 > flU2 which is a property most researcher would expect. For instance, 
Koester and Kormendi (1989), p. 370/1, find that marginal tax rates m2 are sig­
nificantly different from average tax rates av2 and that ’across countries marginal 
tax rates average about one-and-one-half to two times average tax rates’.
For the growth maximizing policy a v 2( f )  = q (1 — a), m2(f) =  a  and so 
davj j T^ = -m,2P  — 0. For all non-redistributing polices I find
dav2 _  r a qA dr 
dA A2 r dA
and dm2Ha
dav2 
~dA '
Consider the non-redistributing, left-wing government with given by (1.18). 
The expression -  1 is negative if
a 2(l -  a)A (ra -  a ( l  — a)M )-1 < 1 
a(l — a)2A +  a 2(l -  a)A < ra 
a ( l  -  a)^4 < ra
T  <  T
(1.28)
which is true for a non-redistributing, left-wing government because t > t . 
Hence, davj]p- and dmjA ^ are negative. Under the income egalitarian policy av2 is 
given by av2 =  a  — (1 — a)F* and so independent of A. Hence, under that policy
rkt22Recall yt =  A k f g \ ~ °  and gt = (1 -  X)rkt . Then av2 = ^
Vt A k f  ((1 -  A)rfc()
which
reduces to the expression in (1.27). Furthermore, =  (1 -  a ) A k ? { l  -  A)l_Q(r/:i ) Q.dyrkt)
. drk t r a av2
Taking the inverse yields = (1 _ a)il(1 _  A), _  = ^
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m2 does not depend on A as well. For a redistributing government
av2 = ----------------rzr
A  [(1 — a)A\ a
which decreases in A. By a similar argument one verifies that m2 decreases in A  
under that policy. Hence, cov(av2u ^i) <  0 and cov(m,2i, A ) <  0- To keep matters 
simple I assume that the covariance of au2* (m2i) and a* is non-positive. For 
instance, for given tax policies of all non-redistributing governments an increase in 
a  reduces av2. Thus, the results below are conditional on that or that cov(av2i, Ai) 
(cov(m2i, Ai)) is more important than cov(av2i, a*) (cov(m2i, ai)). The condition 
is testable and any results derived from it are therefore falsifiable. By these 
arguments av2 co-varies with A  or a  in the same way as m2 does. To simplify 
I present the following arguments in terms of av2 with the understanding that 
they also apply for m2.
Suppose one assumes exogenous policy and runs the regression
7i =  do+<S? avx + uj.
where the superscript 2 indicates that model / 2(*) is being analyzed. Proceeding 
as above reveals that the estimate d{ is biased. If cou(au2i, a,-) < 0, then df is 
generically biased downwards, that is, it is biased down unless all governments are 
income egalitarian or growth maximizing and cov(av2i, »¿) =  0. Hence, for many 
data sets any measured negative effect of av2 on 7 may be overstated. Similar 
arguments hold for m2.
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P roposition  1.10 Assume policy variables react to fundamental economic vari­
ables as in Table 1, the DGPs for ƒ(•) and / 2(*) are the same, and cov(av2i,oti) 
and cov(m2 i,oci) are non-positive where av2 denotes the ratio of tax revenues to 
GDP and m 2 denotes the ratio of the change in tax revenues to the change in 
GDP. A simple cross-country OLS regression of 7 on av2 or m 2 yields generically 
biased estimates. Unless all governments in the sample pursue growth maximizing 
or income egalitarian polices, the estimates are biased downwards.
The theoretical model offers the following explanation for a positive bias: Tax 
rates higher than the growth maximizing ones lead to relatively lower growth. 
That explains why many authors find a negative point estimate of 6\. For in­
stance, Koester and Kormendi (1989) report d\ = -0.074 (—2.18) for a simple 
regression of growth on average tax rates.23 (All t-statistics are shown in paren­
theses.) However, in the model the bad direct effect of high taxes is compensated 
by the good effect of taxes channelled into production via public services. That 
good effect is larger when A is higher and it is ignored when assuming exogenous 
policy in simple OLS cross-country regressions.
Many authors include initial income yo in their regressions (see, for instance, 
Levine and Renelt (1992), Engen and Skinner (1992), or Sala-i-Martin (1997)) 
and find that controlling for initial income renders their estimated effects of taxes 
on growth insignificant. Notice, however, that having initial income in the regres­
sion first and then adding a tax variable often renders the estimated coefficient 
of the effect of initial income on growth insignificant. For instance, Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993a) find in their growth regressions that seven(!) out of thirteen tax 
variables render the estimated coefficients for the effect of initial income on growth 
insignificant. This possibility is often ignored, although it provides a rationale
23The reported coefficient on m2 was —0.025(—1.87).
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for not including either tax measures or initial income in growth regressions. 
Thus, from a statistical viewpoint alone there is no reason why some authors 
(e.g. Levine and Renelt (1992) or Sala-i-Martin (1997)) conclude that fiscal vari­
ables are mostly non-robust regressors when fiscal variables are highly correlated 
with initial income. Of course, insignificance is only a  statistical indicator that 
the point estimate of a variable is close to zero.
A downward bias of plays an important role in explaining why one is likely 
to obtain insignificant coefficients when including initial income in a regression 
such as
7» — fo +  i i av2i +  +(2Voi +  Wi- (1.29)
Elementary econometrics (see, for example, Johnston (1984), chpt. 3.4) tells one 
that the OLS estimator of is given by
c2 _  £ 2 13 £ 232
1 ~  f 223 i232
where reflects the simple regression of 7, on au2, and £213 the regression of 7,* 
on 2/oi) £223 the regression of av2 on jfo» and C232 the regression of r/o* on av2. For 
instance, Koester and Kormendi report the estimates
d\ =  -0.074 (-2.18) , H3 =  -0.053 (-3.52),
&  =  +0.293 (+6.32) , | 2 =  -0.005 (-0.11),
from which the imputed value of is 1.3389. The signs and magnitudes of 
the estimates are shared by many other papers. It is instructive to note that 
including initial income reduces the point estimate for the effect of taxes on
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growth (dj vs. £j) dramatically (by a factor of 14.8) and makes it statistically 
insignificant, that is, makes it assume a value close to zero.
Firstly, notice that taxes and initial income are positively and comparatively 
strongly correlated (£23)1 indicating that Wagner’s Law holds which asserts a 
positive relation between the size of the government and per capita income. Sec­
ondly, initial income is negatively related to growth, which is interpreted by some 
authors as indicating convergence in the growth process, that is, countries with 
lower initial income tend to have higher growth rates. The theoretical model 
implies that some of those simple regression coefficients are biased. For the ar­
gument I wish to make that is not a problem, though, because what matters are 
the signs of the simple estimates.
So suppose that ^3 and f32 were unbiased estimates. From Proposition 
1.10 it follows that any negative value of df is overstated so that the true 6\ is 
less negative than the value reported. If one fixes the other estimates one gets
d ? -  (-0.053) (+1.3389) 1
1 -  (+0.293) (+1.3389)
=  (d? + 0.0710) x 1.6455.
Underestimation means that a negative estimate dj would overstate a true (neg­
ative) value ¿2, which raises the problem of how big the bias is. Proposition 
1.10 implies that the ’true’ value may well be positive. For the moment suppose 
8\ = d1 x x where x  € (—00,1) and that the unknown ’true’ value is non-positive, 
51 < 0. The following table reports imputed ’true’ estimates of £2 for different 
magnitudes of the bias for the reported value of d\ — —0.074.
Table 2: Bias Effects on £2 when df = —0.074
X 0.99 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.80 0.5 0.10
i t -0.004 +0.001 +0.007 +0.013 +0.019 +0.056 +0.104
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From the table a five-percent bias raises the ’true’ point estimate of from 
—0.005 to +0.001. Thus, a slight bias in df pushes the ’true’ point estimate of
towards zero. That is interesting for the following reason: Many researchers 
start with growth regressions including initial income first and then add policy 
variables. Most of them find that variables such as av2 take on values close 
to zero. Given the bias in df the ’true’ point estimate of is likely to be 
positive and maybe statistically significant. Most authors argue that the reason 
they find insignificant values for variables such as av2 may be due to the high 
correlation between initial income and av2, that is, high £>3 or 632* that 
sense the above calculations provide a different explanation why one may get 
insignificant statistics. Estimates close to zero of may mean that the ’true’ 
value is positive and that the bias in d\ pushes that value down towards zero. 
Hence, one cannot exclude the possibility that a statistic such as the ratio of tax 
revenues to GDP may have a positive effect on growth.
The same holds for m2, of course, that is, one cannot exclude the possibility 
that marginal tax rates positively affect growth. For example, Perotti (1996) is 
puzzled to find positive and significant coefficients for the effect of marginal tax 
rates on growth in cross-country growth regressions using 2SLS.
A negative bias in the coefficients for av2 or m2, obtained in simple OLS cross­
country growth regressions, implies that the theoretical prediction that taxes 
negatively affect growth is inherently untestable. Any reported value of the effect 
of tax variables such as av2 or m2 on growth is always underestimated, that is, a 
reported negative effect would be overstated and a reported positive effect would 
be understated. As a reported negative effect may well be positive in that case, 
the theoretical prediction cannot be corroborated when using variables as such 
av2 or m2 and the chapter’s theoretical model captures general properties of the
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effect of taxes and policy on growth.
Recall that the argument runs in an opposite direction when employing the 
tax rate variables mi or av\. Proposition 1.9 tells us that the estimated effect 
of these tax rate variables on growth is biased upwards so that any measured 
negative effect of tax rates would be understated.
Hence, employing the chapter’s theoretical correlations implies that in often 
used, simple cross-country OLS growth regressions the estimated coefficients of 
the effect of tax rate variables like avi or m\ on growth are generally biased 
upwards and that the estimated coefficients of the effect of tax rate variables 
like av2 or m2 on growth are generally biased downwards. Thus, it matters a 
great deal which tax variables one includes in simple cross-country OLS growth 
regressions when one assumes that policy is endogenous and the most simple 
regressions produce biased estimates.
1.6.2 Public Investment
Sometimes growth is regressed on the ratio of government investment to GDP 
or total (private and public) investment to test how public investment such as 
changes in infrastructure affect growth. Theoretically, a positive relationship is 
expected. (See, for instance, Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990), Barro and Sala- 
i-Martin (1990), or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chpt. 4.4.) Surprisingly, 
in many empirical studies such as Barro (1989b), (1991), or Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1995) chpt. 12.3 the effect of these variables on growth turns out to be 
statistically insignificant. I analyze this somewhat puzzling phenomenon from 
the viewpoint of the chapter’s theoretical model in which steady state total in-
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vestment is given by it =  7 kt and
= g , _ 1 ( 9* y  ((i ~ A)r )°
 ^ yt A  \k t )  A
_  9t_ _  (1 -  A)r
q -  r/K 7
(1.30)
Note that gt are public services that are provided as a public input in produc­
tion. Barro (1991) uses public expenditure data to test his theoretical predictions 
which are based on gt arguing that it is a proxy for the change in the stock of 
public capital. That is a problematic assumption, possible implications of which 
he discusses. For consistency with empirical results, which are often based on 
that, I assume that gt is indeed a good proxy for public investment, that is, a 
proxy for the change in the stock of public capital for which data are difficult to 
obtain. Furthermore, in line with the previous discussion on taxes and for sim­
plicity I assume that the correlation between these ratios and a* is less important 
than that between the ratios and A{. Thus, all results below are conditional on 
that assumption. It is interesting to note, however, that for given tax policies 
(exogenous policy), that is, for given r  and A both p and q are decreasing in A or 
a , since 74, ya > 0 for given tax policies, so that the OLS coefficients measuring 
the effect of these variables on growth would be biased downwards even under 
the assumption of exogenous policy.
Lem m a 1.5 For given tax policies (exogenous policy), simple cross-country OLS 
regressions of the growth rate on p or q produce coefficients that are biased down­
wards.
For endogenous policy I will discuss the ratio of public investment to total
investment (q) first. To this end let b =  (1 — A)r. Then
db dX dr .
d A ~  d A T + d A ^ ~ ^
which is positive for all policies considered. I want to show that ^  < 0. Then
sgn
'd £
dA
db d'y db . f  dr d r \  ,
~ d A y  d A b ~  dA^T T ~ ^ ~ \ d A ~ d A )  6 ~ qi +  q2
where m = (^~ r -  ^  £>) and to = ( - r  -  p) + b. Clearly, q2 < 0, since
q2
with H  < 0 and ^  > 0 and at least one of the derivatives being non-zero for all 
policies considered. For qi I obtain
which is non-positive for all non-redistributing polices since for A =  0 one gets 
olA ^  < r  as has been shown in (1.28) for non-redistributing, left or right-wing 
policies. For the income egalitarian policy qj = 0 since b = [A(ct — (1 — 
and H  Also, for a redistributing, left-wing government b = [(1 -  a)A]«
and -tt =  A- so that qi =  0. Hence, qi +  to < 0 and so < 0.
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The ratio of government investment to GDP is p =  ^  so that
sgn = aAba- 1
db aA  
dA b
which is zero for growth maximizing, income egalitarian and redistributing, left- 
wing policies from what has been shown above. For non-redistributing, left-wing 
policies it is negative.
P roposition  1.11 Assume policy variables react to fundamental economic vari­
ables as in Table 1, the DGP is the same as that for ƒ(•) and the growth rate is 
regressed on the ratio of public investment to total investment (q) or the ratio of 
public investment to GDP (p). The theoretical model predicts that if cou(qi,a,) 
and cov(pt,aj) are non-positivef then in simple cross-country OLS regressions
Î. the estimated coefficients measuring the effect of q on growth are biased 
downwards under all policies considered.
2. the estimated coefficients measuring the effect of p on growth are biased 
downwards if all governments pursue non-redistributing, left-wing policies. 
The estimated coefficients may be unbiased if all governments pursue growth 
maximizing, income egalitarian or redistributing, left-wing policies and p* is 
uncorrelated with a i . e .  cou(pi,aj) — 0.
The proposition allows one to interpret some estimates of the effect of those 
variables on growth as presented in the literature. For instance, Barro (1991), 
Table IV, reports that the estimated coefficient for q was 0.014 (0.636) and that 
for p was 0.13 (1.3) for regressions that included many variables. When also 
including the significantly positive variable i f  y the estimated coefficient for p 
became negative and was —0.015 (—0.126).
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Barro (1990), p. S124, interprets the estimated coefficient for q as corrobo­
ration of his hypothesis that 'the typical country comes close to the quantity of 
public investment that maximizes the growth rate,' As violations of the standard 
assumptions for hypothesis testing make such an argument invalid, Proposition 
1.11 provides one reason why such a hypothesis may rest on shaky ground. As 
any measured positive point estimate of the effect of q on growth is underesti­
mated according to the proposition, it is likely that the ratio of public to total 
investment positively affects growth, even if all governments pursue growth max­
imizing policies. For a sample with heterogeneous policies and a ’true’ estimate 
that is likely to be significantly positive, a hypothesis compatible with the propo­
sition should be that a typical country that increases public investment, given 
everything else, is likely to increase the growth rate, no matter what policy is 
pursued.24 Given the downward biases for the measured effects of q on growth 
one is lead to conclude that an increase in q raises the growth rate.
Barro interprets the statistically insignificant, but negative coefficient on p, 
when the variable i /y  is controlled for, as an indication that ’there is no separate 
effect on growth from the breakdown of total investment between private and pub­
lic components'. That suggests the hypothesis that an optimizing public sector 
invests according to the same criteria as the private sector does. For instance, 
the public sector may wish to maximize the social return on its investment, just 
as private sector investors wish to maximize the private return on their invest­
ments. Barro implicitly assumes that maximization of the social return on public 
investment also maximizes the growth rate. <
' First of all, it is worth noting that by Lemma 1.5, that is, under the as­
24Notice that a significantly positive coefficient does not entail that it should be growth 
maximizing to push q up to 1 when tax base or collection constraints curtail such choices. 
Those and other provisos are meant by ’given everything else’.
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sumption of exogenous policy the estimated coefficients for the effect of p on 
growth are biased downwards, which suggests that the ’true’ effect of public in­
vestment may be significantly positive. Under the assumption of endogenous 
policy the estimated coefficients for the effect of p would be biased downwards 
if the sample contained non-redistributing, left-wing governments. Secondly, un­
der the assumption of endogenous policy the negative point estimate suggests 
that the breakdown matters. A reported value of —0.015 for the effect of p on 
growth means that holding total investment constant and raising public invest­
ment with a compensating cut in private investment reduces growth. Thus, a 
negative point estimate in that regression implies that a typical country’s policy 
that crowds out private (steady state) investment is bad for growth. That impli­
cation may be a valid result (unbiased estimates) for samples where, according to 
Proposition 1.11, all countries are lead by growth maximizing, income egalitarian 
or redistributing, left-wing policies and cou(p, or*) =  0. But given unbiasedness 
and statistical insignificance, it follows that other than growth maximizing poli­
cies would also lead to no crowding out of public and private investment. That, 
in turn, implies that a statistically insignificant value does not mean that gov­
ernments have maximized the social return on public investment. Thus, other 
welfare objectives are compatible with an insignificant coefficient.
Barro views his empirical results as ’ongoing research’ and is aware so some of 
the econometric problems mentioned above. However, he does not investigate the 
implications of endogenous policy in depth. From the chapter’s theoretical model 
it follows that under endogenous policy the estimated coefficients for the effect on 
growth of the ratio of public investment to total investment are generally biased 
downwards. The estimated coefficients for the effect on growth of the ratio of 
public investment to GDP may be unbiased if that ratio is uncorrelated with the
76
share of capital and other than non-redistributing, left-wing policies are pursued. 
Otherwise, there is a downward bias in the estimated coefficients. Interestingly, if 
one assumes exogenous policy, the coefficients measuring the effect of that variable 
on growth are definitely biased downwards. Hence, reported insignificant negative 
point estimates for that coefficient in simple cross-country OLS regressions may 
be either biased downwards and so the ’true’ coefficient may really be significantly 
positive or they are unbiased, but provide no corroboration of the hypothesis that 
all countries are lead by growth maximizing policies.
1.6.3 Redistributive Transfers
Some researchers test the effect of redistributive transfers such as social benefits, 
social security contributions etc. on growth. Transfers of that kind are political 
instruments to correct for socially unwanted pre-tax income inequality. In that 
context the growth rate is often regressed on the ratio of redistributive transfers 
to GDP, which - in this model - is given by25
Ark t _  Arkt _  rh  (¿7) _  A ((1 -  A)r)Q
Vt Akfg]~a Agt A( 1 -  A)
where r  = p from (1.15) and gt — (1 — A)rkt. I assume that some governments 
in the sample are redistributing, left-wing governments so that data on redistri­
bution (A) are actually available. Then a regression of the growth rate on
b =  A(1 -  A ^ - W ’ 1
25 Notice that the arguments below and Table 1 imply that a regression of the growth rate 
on the ratio of transfers to tax revenues, that is, A would also yield coefficients that are biased 
downwards.
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would produce biased estimates for the effect of b on growth by the following 
reasoning: Firstly, for given policy and cov(bi, a,) < 0, the estimated effect of 
ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP (b) on growth are biased downwards. 
Secondly, under the assumption of endogenous policy Table 1 implies that ^  
and so cou(bt, a t) are ambiguous in sign. Then > %
db dX . 
dA = b x d A + X A < °
since X& < 0, b\ > 0, < 0 (Proposition 1.3) and r  =  p which is independent
of A  by equation (1.15), suggesting that simple OLS estimates for the effect 
of b, on 7, are biased downwards, that is, if cov(bi, a,) < 0 in the sample or 
the covariance is less important than that of cov{bi, Ai) the estimated effect of 
transfers on growth are biased downwards.
P roposition  1.12 I f  cov(b^ai) < 0 and some countries in the sample are lead 
by redistributing governments the model predicts that in simple cross-country OLS 
regressions the estimates measuring the effect on growth of the ratio of redistribu­
tive transfers to GDP are biased downwards.
According to the proposition any reported bad effect of redistributive transfers is 
overstated and any reported good effect is understated. Notice that the downward 
bias would even be present if one assumed that policy was exogenous. The 
model’s prediction, which is shared by many other models in the theoretical 
literature, is that transfers are bad for growth. The reason for overstating any 
measured negative effect of redistributive transfers on growth in this model is due 
to the prediction that countries with more efficient economies and redistributing 
governments choose to redistribute less resources per units of taxes collected.
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As Proposition 1.12 does not say anything on the magnitude of the bias, the 
latter may be as large as minus infinity. That means, the hypothesis that re­
distributive transfers are bad for growth cannot be validated by any reported 
negative coefficient on transfers in simple OLS growth regressions. Thus, for sim­
ple OLS growth regressions Proposition 1.12 renders the hypothesis generically 
untestable.
In fact, these arguments suggest the opposite hypothesis, namely that redis­
tributive transfers affect growth in a positive way. For instance, Perotti (1994) 
is surprised to find a significantly positive coefficient on redistributive transfers 
in his regressions of investment on policy variables. He quotes other studies 
that have found a positive relation between transfers and growth. (See ftn. 8 
of his paper.) Sala-i-Martin (1996) states that it is surprising that among the 
three components of public spending - public investment, public consumption 
and public transfers - the only one that seems to be positively related to growth 
is the redistributive transfer variable. For instance, social security contributions 
are often found to affect growth in a positive way.
In that sense Proposition 1.12 explains why one may get positive coefficients 
on redistributive transfer variables in simple OLS cross-country growth regres­
sions under the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for growth. On the other 
hand, the proposition is perfectly compatible with the hypothesis that redistribu­
tive transfers positively affect growth.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter a comparative dynamic analysis is conducted to investigate the 
link between (re-)distributive policies and growth. Within a common theoretical
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framework it is shown that optimizing governments take account of fundamental 
economic variables when making their decisions so that public policy is eco­
nomically endogenous. In the model the optimal policies of growth maximizing, 
’right-wing’, non-redistributing and redistributing ’left-wing’ and ’income egali­
tarian’ governments are analyzed. I show that changes of fundamental economic 
variables have interesting effects on optimal steady state policies and through the 
latter on growth and the post-tax factor income distribution. Two findings of the 
chapter are noteworthy.
First, under certain conditions the policies optimal for the accumulated factor 
of production (growth maximization) may also be pursued if a government has 
other welfare objectives. An increase in technological efficiency generally raises 
optimal taxes and growth under the policies considered. That result suggests 
that the estimated coefficients on tax variables are generically biased in simple 
cross-country OLS growth regressions. The direction of the biases are deduced 
from the theoretical model, providing some explanations for certain, sometimes 
puzzling point estimates found in the empirical literature.
Second, in many models redistribution towards the non-accumulated factor of 
production slows down growth. In this paper redistribution is only optimal under 
quite restrictive conditions. In the optima considered an increase in technological 
efficiency reduces the incentive to redistribute so that a testable implication of the 
model is whether a more advanced country relies more or less on wealth transfers 
as a means to pursue some welfare objective.
Under the assumption that policy is economically endogenous, I show for 
simple cross-country OLS growth regressions that the point estimates of the effect 
of redistributive transfer variables on growth are generally biased downwards. 
That suggests, the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for growth may not be
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testable by simple cross-country OLS growth regressions. The downward bias 
is, however, perfectly consistent with empirical findings in the literature which 
find a positive association between redistributive transfers and growth. It may 
also represent corroboration of the hypothesis that redistribution is not bad for 
growth.
Several caveats apply. I have only considered wealth taxes as a tax base. 
Other tax bases may entail different optimal policies. It is an interesting question 
whether the results carry over to other forms of taxation. Also, in reality workers 
own capital and capital owners supply labour so that it would be desirable to use 
a less aggregated set-up for the investigation of the trade-off between economic 
growth and personal income inequality. These questions leave room for further 
research on the topic.
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Chapter 2
Economic Growth, Distributive 
Policies, and an Income cum 
Investment Subsidy Tax Scheme
2.1 Introduction
In the theoretical literature models are often presented in which increasing taxes 
for redistributive purposes slows down growth. For instance, Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), or Bertola (1993) argue that a government that redistributes resources 
towards the non-accumulated factor of production levies higher taxes and induces 
lower steady state growth. Their results crucially depend on the tax arrangement. 
As has been pointed out by Bertola, any policy that subsidizes investment is good 
for growth. (Alesina and Rodrik make a similar point in their paper.) That raises 
the question how investment subsidies are financed and what their distributional 
consequences are. Bertola (1993), p. 1192, rules out capital income taxation as a 
means of subsidy financing as it would defeat the purpose of enhancing growth.
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However, he analyzes the effect of consumption taxes on growth enhancement 
and their distributional consequences.
In this chapter I investigate whether capital income taxation really does de­
feat the purpose of enhancing growth. In particular, I provide a comparison of 
a particular capital income tax with a wealth tax scheme. As in Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) the wealth tax scheme is supposed to represent a broad class of 
tax arrangements that distort the investors’ incentive to accumulate capital. For 
simplicity and in line with the models mentioned above I assume that the non- 
accumulated factor of production is labour and the accumulated factor is capital. 
The workers never save and consume their entire income. The capital owners do 
not work and accumulate capital.1
In the chapter the tax scheme is designed as a capital income cum invest­
ment subsidy tax. The tax rate on capital income and for investment subsidies 
is assumed to be equal, and therefore tantamount to a tax on the capital owners’ 
consumption.* 2 But notice that in terms of implementability there are important 
differences. As a consumption tax scheme the government would effectively tax 
the capital owners’ consumption so that a government representing their inter­
ests may not want to use it. On the other hand a pro-labour government may 
wish to use it. For both governments it would be difficult to determine whether 
a homogeneous consumption good was bought by a capital owner or a worker. 
Thus, viewing the tax arrangement as a consumption tax raises various difficul­
ties. But as an income cum investment subsidy scheme these difficulties do not 
arise. Suppose the government provides public inputs to production as in Barro
(1990) and uses its tax revenues to finance them. Raising an income tax may then
^ h u s, the model is Kaldorian in spirit. For a justification why the workers may choose not 
to invest in an optimizing framework see Bertola (1993).
2 For simplicity and in order to elucidate the effect of that tax on growth I abstract from 
wage taxes throughout.
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be good in terms of the pre-tax return on capital if the public inputs positively 
affect production and it may be bad in terms of the post-tax return to capital. 
However, coupled with an investment subsidy, a ’right-wing’ (capital owners’) 
government may want to use the tax scheme. Analogous reasoning holds for a 
’left-wing’ (workers’) government.
Setting the tax rate equal seems a very special arrangement at first sight, but 
it may be justified by the following observation. A right-wing government acts 
in the interests of capital owners, consequently it would wish to set the income 
tax rate equal to zero. As the presence of a Barro-type production function is 
assumed where public services feed back into production, it would like to subsidize 
investment as much as possible. Hence, setting the tax rate on income and 
investment equal seems to be a reasonable choice.
Similar reasoning applies for a ’left-wing’ government. It would wish to set 
a very high tax rate on capital income for redistributive reasons. But that hin­
ders investment, when one recalls that in a simple endogenous growth model 
a la Barro (1990) or Romer (1986) workers enjoy ever increasing wages along 
a balanced growth path. Thus, a left-wing government would have to strike a 
balance between financing investment and redistribution. Hence, setting the tax 
rate equal again appears to be a reasonable choice.
With these justifications the uniform tax rate on capital income and for invest­
ment subsidies is simply assumed. As in the model of chapter 1 the governments 
may want to expropriate the capital stock and run the economy more efficiently 
themselves. As that is rather unrealistic, I assume that each government respects 
the right of private property.
Given these assumptions I show that the economy’s steady state growth rate 
depends only on the pre-tax return to capital and the time preference rate. That
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is interesting for the following reason. The capital owners pay income taxes and 
receive an investment subsidy. The tax arrangement is such that for optimizing 
capital owners the distorting effect of income taxes is removed by the investment 
subsidy and the positive effect of public inputs to production. The income tax 
only has a negative effect on the capital owners’ instantaneous consumption level.
The relationship between growth and taxes in the model is neither inverted 
U-shaped as in Barro (1990) or Alesina and Rodrik (1994) nor U-shaped as in 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), but strictly positive. Thus, in the model it is 
growth maximizing, if the capitalists are taxed maximally. Thus, capital income 
taxes raise the growth rate in the model, but reduce the capitalists’ consumption 
level. It is shown that the capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme 
allows higher growth than a wealth tax scheme if a government targets the same 
ratio of public inputs in production to the capital stock under either tax scheme. 
Furthermore, if the capital owners are sufficiently impatient setting the wealth 
and the income tax rate equal reveals that the income cum investment tax scheme 
allows for higher growth. Consequently, the model’s tax scheme is conducive to 
high growth.
In contrast to most optimal growth models such as, for instance, Cass (1965) 
or Koopmans (1965) impatience is not necessarily bad for growth in the model. 
It is shown that there exists a concave relationship between growth and the time 
preference rate and there exists a time preference rate which maximizes growth 
for given taxes. The reason for that lies in the removal of the distorting effect 
of income taxation by the investment subsidy, which is taken into account by 
optimizing agents. As the tax scheme operates like a consumption tax, more 
impatience raises the capital owners’ instantaneous level of consumption and 
with it the tax revenues the government channels into production. That raises
the return on capital and so the steady state growth rate. Furthermore, I show 
that an inverse relationship holds for maintaining a given growth rate, that is, 
the more impatient the capital owners are, the lower the income tax rate has to 
be for a given growth rate.
Next, the chapter provides a public policy analysis and asks what tax rates a 
government that represents a mixture of the workers’ or capital owners’ welfare 
would choose. I show that a ’right-wing’ government never redistributes resources 
towards the workers and that its optimal tax rate is less than the growth maximiz­
ing one. That is hardly surprising since the ’right-wing’ government represents 
the interests of the capital owners only. As capital income taxes reduce the in- 
vestprs’ instantaneous consumption level, the ’right-wing’ government chooses a 
tax rate that represents the optimal trade-off between generating high income 
through raising enough tax revenues in order to raise the return on capital and 
reducing consumption.
It is then an interesting question whether the capital owners are better off 
under the model’s income tax scheme or a wealth tax scheme. I show that the 
capital owners prefer a wealth tax scheme when the wealth taxes are chosen so 
that their welfare is maximized. As growth may be higher under this model’s 
tax scheme, the preferred choice of the capital owners implies that they value the 
direct tax effect on their consumption level higher than the intertemporal effect 
of having higher income and consumption in the future. I identify conditions 
under which the capitalists’ preferred tax policy generates higher growth under 
the chapter’s scheme than under the wealth tax scheme. From that I conclude 
that the accumulated factor of production does not always choose the growth 
maximizing tax base. Furthermore, it does not necessarily act growth maximiz­
ing, that is, it chooses higher growth under the model’s tax scheme than under a
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tax scheme where it actually maximizes growth.
Next, I show that if the social planner uses an income cum investment sub­
sidy tax arrangement, placing more weight on the welfare of the non-accumulated 
factor of production (workers) raises the optimal tax rate on the income of the ac­
cumulated factor of production (capital) and through that the growth rate. Hence, 
under the tax arrangement it is not optimal for growth maximization to shift po­
litical power to the accumulated factor of production. The result is in direct 
contrast to what is shown in Alesina and Rodrik (1994). A result similar to the 
chapter’s is obtained in Bertola (1993), but notice that in comparison to a wealth 
tax scheme, taxation of capital income does not defeat the purpose of enhancing 
growth in this model.
The ’right-wing’ government acts like a growth maximizer under the wealth 
tax scheme. With the chapter’s tax scheme a ’left-wing’ government that does not 
redistribute towards labour acts like a growth maximizer. Thus, a switch from a 
wealth to an income cum investment subsidy tax scheme induces an important 
switch in optimal policies. I show that a ’left-wing’ government only redistributes 
if the economy is sufficiently inefficient or the workers as a group are rather 
impatient. I conclude that one may observe an economy with a government 
that represents only the interests of the non-accumulated factor of production 
(labour) to have redistribution and higher growth than an economy represented 
by a government solely concerned about the accumulated factor of production 
(capital).
Next, I analyze the distributional consequences of the two tax schemes. I 
restrict the analysis to a comparison of growth maximizing policies for simplicity 
and in order to eliminate politically given distributional preferences. I focus on 
the distribution of total factor income of the capital owners and the workers.
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The procedure is motivated by the observation that income shares of factors of 
production are still of considerable relevance for the study of income distribu­
tion and that usually property income is of great importance at the top of the 
income scale in personal income distribution analyses. (See, for instance, Atkin­
son (1983), chpt. 9.) I show that the pre-tax total factor income distribution is 
equal under either tax scheme for given growth maximizing policies. The pre-tax 
and post-tax income distributions depend on the. share of capital. If the share of 
capital is very low and equals the minimum tax rate of the income tax scheme, 
the post-tax factor income distributions coincide. That is a special, but inter­
esting case, as it shows that two economies might have the same factor income 
distributions, but exhibit different growth performances.
Furthermore, it is shown that the chapter’s post-tax factor income distribution 
is in general more favourable to labour for growth maximizing policies and may 
generate higher growth than under a wealth tax scheme.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the model set-up, 
introduces the capital income tax cum investment subsidy tax scheme and the 
government’s behaviour, and derives the market equilibrium. Section 2.4 pro­
vides a public policy analysis and compares the optimal tax choices of different 
governments with those obtained under a wealth tax scheme. The distributional 
consequences for growth maximizing policies are analyzed. In propositions I state 
the main results of the chapter. Section 2.6 draws some conclusions.
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2.2 The M odel
The model set-up is very similar to the one in chapter l.3 I assume that the 
economy is populated by two types of many identical individuals who all have 
the same rate of time preference p. The capitalists (k) own capital equally and no 
labour and the the workers (W ) own labour equally, but no capital. Both groups 
derive logarithmic utility from the consumption of a homogeneous, malleable 
good.
There are many firms in the economy. Those who own capital, own shares of 
the firms. Aggregate output is produced according to a Barro (1990) technology
yt = A k f  g\~Q L\~a , 0 < a < l  (2.1)
where yt is total output, kt is the economy-wide real capital stock, gt are total 
public inputs to production and A  is an efficiency index, which depends on cul­
tural, institutional and technological development. I ignore all exogenous factors 
that play a role in the growth process by assuming that A is constant over time.
Furthermore, I set Lt =  1 so that at each point in time (raw) labour is 
inelastically supplied and the total labour endowment is equal to unity. For 
simplicity, I assume that the technology uses raw labour and capital. I abstract 
from problems arising from the introduction of human capital. Alternatively, one 
may assume that kt is broad capital and that human and physical capital are 
strict complements. For a justification of the latter approach see, for instance, 
Mankiw et al. (1992), p. 416.4 Throughout the chapter I abstract from problems
3Some of the assumptions have already been explained and justified in chapter 1. For the 
sake of brevity I will not repeat them here.
4 Both assumptions would allow me to concentrate on the distributional conflict between the 
accumulated and the non-accumulated factor of production.
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arising from the depreciation of the capital stock.
2.2.1 The Public Sector
The government taxes the capital income of and grants an investment tax subsidy 
to the capital owning households. Let 9 be the tax rate on real capital income 
which is held by the investors. Thus, the constant tax rate 9 is levied on rtkt. 
The government also grants an investment subsidy of 9kt, i.e. it subsidizes the 
individuals’ total investment at the rate 9. So I consider the special case where 
the tax rates on capital income and the investment subsidy are equal. The tax 
arrangement amounts to a tax on the capitalists’ consumption, but in terms of 
implementability I refer to it as an income cum investment subsidy tax.5 The 
government respects the right of private property and it is impossible to tax all 
income. For simplicity let 9 € [0,1 — e] where e is small.6 Then total tax revenues 
(net of investment subsidies) at date t are given by
9 t =  9[rtkt -  kt] . (2.2)
5In fact, I contemplate a Ramsey Tax Problem. See, for instance, Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971) or Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), chpt. 12. In order to see the equivalence let q =  1 + tc 
where q is the price consumption goods command in terms of producer prices normalized to 
be one and fixed. The government taxes consumption at rate t c. Let Y k denote the capital 
owners’ pre-tax income minus pre-tax investment. Then a consumption tax is equivalent to an 
income cum investment tax if the capital owners’ budget constraints satisfy
(1 + t c)Ck = Y k ^  C * = ( 1 - 0 ) T 4,
which is true if t c ~  .
6 A small e captures that the upper bound on tax rates consistent with no expropriation 
may still be large, that is, it may be close to, but it is less than one. For ease of calculations 
it is often assumed that e -¥ 0 when the effects of maximal taxation are analyzed. Then the 
reader should bear in mind that maximal taxation in this market economy model with private 
property is not meant to be the same as outright expropriation.
The government faces the following budget constraint, which is assumed to be 
balanced at each point in time,
0£ =  9t +
The LHS depicts the total tax revenues and the RHS total public expenditure 
at time f. The workers receive the fraction A0( of tax revenues as transfers 
and gt is spent on public inputs to production. The parameter A measures the 
degree of redistribution in the economy and is constant over time. Rearranging I 
consequently contemplate the budget constraint,
By assumption the government sets gt/k t constant for all t, which might appear 
to be in conflict with a balanced budget, because (2.2) and (2.3) imply
capital stock. I show below that the assumption of a constant ratio of public 
inputs to production to the capital stock leads to rt ~  i t  in equilibrium.7
2.2.2 The Private Sector
The firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment, maximize profits, and 
take gt as given. They are owned by the capital owners who rent capital to
Alternatively, I may impose the steady state condition when deriving the equilibrium later 
on, which would also call for constant g t /k t .
gt = { 1 “  A)©i. (2.3)
(2.4)
which is only satisfied if f t =  j t where 71 denotes the growth rate of the aggregate
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and demand shares of the firms. The capitalists’ assets are their shares of the 
firms. The shares are collateralized one-to-one by capital. The markets for assets, 
capital and labour clear at each point in time and a representative firm faces a 
path of a uniform, market clearing rental rate, {rt}, of the capital stock, kt and 
wage rate, {wt}, for labour.
The firms rent capital and hire labour in spot markets in each period. I 
set the price of yt equal to 1 at each t, which implies that the price of kt in 
terms of overall consumption stays at unity. (For a justification see, for instance, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chpt. 2.2) Given constant returns to capital and 
labour, factor payments exhaust output. Profit maximization entails that firms 
pay each factor of production its marginal product
Notice that (2.5) implies constancy of the marginal product of capital over time. 
That follows from the assumption that the government sets g t/k t constant over 
time. Hence, rt = r. The wages vary over time and the ratio of public inputs 
to production to the capital stock (gt/k t) has a positive bearing on the marginal 
product of capital and the wage rate.
The capital owners form a homogeneous group. As a class they choose how 
much income to consume or invest, and they take the paths of (r, 0, A) as given. 
Their intertemporal problem is given by
max f  In C* e~ptdt (2.6a)
ctfc Jo
s . t  Cî = ( \ - e ) [ r k t -k t]  (2.6b)
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i.
k( 0) =  k0, ¿(00) =  free. (2.6c)
Equation (2.6b) is the capital owners’ dynamic budget constraint. We see that 
higher income raises consumption and more investment lowers it. For given in­
come and investment higher taxes have a negative effect on consumption. For 
finding the solution to this problem I construct the Langrangean
kt) =  In C‘ e~pt + w *  [(1 -  6)[rkt -  kt] -  C*]
where //* is a co-state variable associated with the budget constraint (2.6b) and 
represents the current-value marginal utility of wealth.8 Note that the objective 
function H(') has two state variables, (Cf,fce), as its arguments and that the 
corresponding Euler-Lagrange Equations are given by
Euler-Lagrange Equations: Hx -  -¿Hi, % =  C*, kt .at
i * * i
Then the FOC involves the static optimality conditions for C*
e"'" ~  ^ e ~ pt =  0
so that in the optimum the capital owners equate the marginal utility of con­
sumption to the marginal utility of wealth. The dynamic condition for kt is given
by
¡ite~pt(\ — 9)r +  — 6) — p/rfe“pi( 1 — 9} =  0.
8For a similar procedure see Turnovsky (1995), chpt. 9. For the solution of variational 
problems see, for instance, Chiang (1992).
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By cancellation in and rearrangement of this equation one obtains
Mt =  IkP -  
lim ktpte~pt =  0,
where the last equation ensures that the present value of the capital stock ap­
proaches zero asymptotically. The static optimality condition yields M^ '■'t
and so consumption grows at
which is constant for all t. Thus, if gt/kt is constant, then 7 =  f  =  0, as asserted 
above. The growth rate depends on the pre-tax return on capital, because the 
capital owners have perfect foresight and know that they receive an investment 
subsidy. In the optimum the distorting effect of capital income taxation is exactly 
offset by the accumulation inducing effect of the investment subsidy which is, of 
course,'due to the assumption of a uniform tax rate.
Equations (2.6b), (2.7) and the transversality condition imply that in the 
optimum the capitalists1 instantaneous consumption is given by9
instantaneous level of consumption. Furthermore, it follows that the capitalists’ 
wealth and consumption optimally grow at the same rate, that is, 7 =  7*. Thus, 
the model’s tax scheme is highly growth promoting.
9 For a derivation see Appendix A.l.
(2.7)
Ctk =  (1 -  9)pkt. (2 .8)
Hence, the distorting effect of income taxes is present in the capital owners’
94
The workers derive a utility stream from consuming their entire income. They 
do not invest and they are not taxed by assumption. Their intertemporal utility
is given by
f°°  ln C f ' t~ptdt where C f  = Wt + TRt .
Jo
where Wu T R t denote the workers’ total wage income, resp. transfers received. 
Thus, as in chapter 1.2.4 I assume the classical savings rule for the workers and 
the capital owners.
2.3 M arket Equilibrium
The overall resource constraint in the economy is
I t = kt =  rkt + Wt + TR t -  Orkt + 9kt -  C* -  C™. (2.9)
As the workers’ consumption is C™ = Wt -h T R t with TRt =  A9(rkt — kt), this 
constraint is binding, simplifying (2.9) to
which corresponds to the capital owners’ budget constraint which holds as an 
equality given the optimal behaviour of the capital owners, that is, 7 = 7* and 
Ci — (1 — B)pkt. Note that more impatience causes the capital owners to value 
current consumption more than future consumption. That makes them consume 
more per units of capital at each t. Furthermore, an increase in the tax rate 9 
reduces instantaneous consumption of the capital owners per units of capital.
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Next consider production as given in (2.1). As is constant, 7y =  7S =  7** 
As 7 =  7* one gets r t — 7t =  p in (2.4) so that
|  =  a  -  m
in steady state equilibrium. Substituting this into (2.5) one obtains
r  =  aA [(l -  A)0p]1-a (2.10)
wt = rj(0, X)kt =  (1 -  o)A[(l -  \)9p)l- aku ¿ t =  l,Vi, (2.11)
which looks a bit surprising because the marginal products depend on preference 
parameters. It is, of course, due to the fact that in a model with productive 
government inputs a financing tax scheme that operates like a consumption tax 
should depend on preference parameters. It is also noteworthy that the return on 
capital is higher the more impatient the investors are. The reason is that higher p 
makes the capital owners consume more per units of capital at each date, which 
increases the tax revenues that are channelled into production by the government 
to raise the return on capital and the growth rate.10
From equation (2.3) instantaneous consumption of the workers is given by
Ctw = 7)(6,\)kt + \9pkt. (2.12)
10In appendix A.5 1 show that for the more general case of iso-elastic utility with preference for 
consumption smoothing the return on capital is also increasing in p, that is, if the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of consumption between different dates varies between zero and one, 
more impatience raises the steady state rate of return on capital. Interestingly, the comparative 
dynamic effect of consumption smoothing on the rate of return in steady state is shown to 
be ambiguous. The effects of less patience and more consumption smoothing on steady state 
consumption of the capital owners per units of capital is positive. The model is thus compatible 
with the finding that in endogenous growth models more consumption smoothing and more 
impatience imply a lesser willingness to save. See, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995), p. 144.
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so that 7cw =  7. Hence, the steady state market equilibrium is characterized by 
balanced growth with 7  ^=  7* =  7 =  7qw.
2.3.1 Properties of the Market Equilibrium
The steady state growth rate depends positively on the return on capital. As 
public inputs to production affect the return on capital, the following derivatives 
are useful. Let £  =  (1 — a)A ((l — \)0p)~a. Then
so that an increase in the tax rate raises wages (given kt) and the return on 
capital, and redistribution lowers them. Recall that the growth rate is given by
From this arid the expressions above one readily verifies
Lem m a 2.1 The economy’s growth maximizing tax rate, 9, is 1 — 6. <
The result establishes what a growth maximizing government would choose. It is 
clear that a growth maximizing policy is bad for the capital owners as it implies 
a very low level of their instantaneous consumption. The surprising implication 
is that the income cum investment subsidy tax scheme calls for maximal taxation 
of the reproducible factor of production, if the objective is to maximize growth.
tq =  aE( 1 -  X)p , rx = -aEOp,
r]e = (1 -  a)E (l -  \)p  , r)K = - ( l - a ) E 9 p
(2.13)
7 = r -  p = aA[(\ — A)6p]1 “ — p. (2.14)
2,3.2 Comparison to a Wealth Tax Market Equilibrium
Following Alesina and Rodrik I have presented a model in chapter 1 that is almost 
identical to then one developed so far. Assume that technology, preferences 
etc. are as in this chapter and that the only difference is that the government 
taxes the capital owners’ wealth. The government runs a balanced budget and 
uses its tax revenues to finance public inputs to production. The capitalists’ 
dynamic budget constraint is then given by Ck =  (r — r)k t — kt where r  is the tax 
rate, levied on the capital owners’ wealth. Solving a problem analogous to the 
one presented above shows that the economy wide growth rate (cf. also chapter 
1.3) is given by 7(r) =  r(r) -  r  — p, where r(r) is given as in (2.5), that is, 
r =  aA  J and gt =  (1 — A)rht. I will now compare the two tax schemes 
and their implications for growth. To this end denote 7 (9) (7(7-)) as the capital 
income cum investment subsidy tax (wealth tax) induced growth rate.
F irst, suppose the two governments maintain the same ratio of gt to kt, that 
is, they  set gt(9)/kt =  gt(r)/kt > 0 for all i, then r(9) =  r(r)  from (2.5) and so 
7(0) > 7 (r). Thus,
P ro p o sitio n  2.1 I f  = Si^ -  > 0 for all t , then 7(9) > 7 (r).
Thus, if a government sets a particular target ratio of productive government 
expenditure to the capital stock, it may fare better in terms of growth with this 
model’s income cum investment subsidy tax scheme.
But notice that the return on capital depends on the rate of time preference 
in this model (Ramsey result) and so one needs to know exactly under what 
conditions the ratio result holds. For this I will investigate under what conditions 
7(0) > 7(r) with 6 = r  and A = 0. From (2.10) and r(r)  =  aA  ((1 — A)r)1-a I
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check whether 7 (0) > 7 (r), that is, whether
otA (Op)1 a — p > ocA (r)1' “ — t  — p 
a A (6pŸ~a > a A (T Ÿ ~ Q- T .
With 0 =  t  and A =  0 the inequality is equivalent to
,1-a
> 1 ----- 7aA
p > i1 - ^
l—o
The growth maximizing wealth tax rate is given by f  = [a(l -  a)j4] « . (Cf. Lemma 
1.1 of chapter 1.3.1.) Suppose 6 — f , then the condition amounts to p > q »^ .
Proposition  2.2 If p > A =  0, and 0 = f  where f  maximizes 7(7*), then 
7(0 )s= r >  7 ( r ) r= f .
Figure 2.1 below visualizes the result when the proposition holds and e -> 0.
Figure 2.1: 7 as a function of 9 or r
7
:A '•<> 
5 \  ■' ■ - ' •
• v->
°>> 0>
Given sufficient impatience the income cum investment subsidy tax scheme
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generates higher growth than a wealth tax scheme. Notice that the tax scheme 
neither generates an inverted U-shaped (Barro (1990) or Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994)) nor a U-shaped relationship (Persson and Tabellini (1994)) between 
growth and taxes. Instead, a strictly positive relation between growth and taxes 
holds under the model’s tax arrangement. The reason is that in terms of growth 
the positive effect of granting investment subsidies outweighs the negative effect 
of levying income taxes on capital. Another noteworthy implication of the model 
is that in contrast to most optimal growth models such as Cass (1965) or Koop- 
mans (1965) impatience (higher p) is in general not bad for growth.11 In order to 
see that let A =  0 in (2.14) and calculate
=  a ( l  -  a )A [6 p ]~ Q -  1
to establish that 7 is a concave function of the rate of time preference p and that 
7  ^ ^ 0 for given taxes. The time preference rate that maximizes the growth rate 
for given taxes is given by
[a (l — a)A ]“ =  9p <=> p — f /6
so that there exists an interesting relationship between the growth maximizing 
wealth tax rate f  and the growth maximizing time preference rate p under the 
model’s tax scheme. The lower the ratio of the growth maximizing wealth tax 
rate to the income tax rate under this model’s scheme, the more patient the 
capital owners are required to be for growth maximization. That comparative 
dynamic result is stated as *
“ Notice that from Lemma 1,2 in chapter 1.5 it follows that the lower p  is, the higher the 
growth rate under a wealth tax scheme will be.
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Lem m a 2.2 Under a wealth tax scheme growth is maximized if p is very small 
Under an income cum investment subsidy tax scheme 7(0) is a concave function 
of p and maximized if p ~  f/9 .
The reason for the different implications of the tax schemes for growth is that 
the tax arrangement is equivalent to a tax on consumption. The capital owners’ 
instantaneous consumption depends positively on their time preference rate. If 
the capital owners are more impatient, they will choose higher consumption (per 
units of capital) and that will raise the tax revenues available to the government. 
The revenues may in turn be used to provide productive services, thereby raising 
the return on capital and so the growth rate.
Next I ask which 9 yields 7 (0) =  7(f) given A =  0. For this note that
7(f) = a
1 — a
t — p where f  =  [a(l — o)j4]° .
Solving 7(0) =  7(f) for 6 involves 1
aA [Bp]1—a _ a  fL — a
B = f
1—>
 1
1
P
Thus, a lower p calls for higher B if 7(0) is to be set equal to 7(7*).
P roposition  2.3 I f  B =  1-Q  ^ and A = 0, then j(B) =  7(f),
Thus, there is an interesting trade-off between tax rates and the time preference 
rate for given growth. The more impatient the capital owners are, the lower the 
taxes have to be for maintaining a given growth rate. Again that is due to the 
fact that more impatient capital owners consume more, but also generate higher
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tax revenues for the government, which may be used for productive services.
2.4 A Public Policy Analysis
Consider a government that cares about the workers and the capital owners. 
Respecting the right of private property, it chooses 6 and A in order to maximize
w(e,\,p) = (i-p) vr + pvl
where Vr , V 1 are the intertemporal utility indices of the capitalists, resp. workers. 
These are derived in appendix A.2 and are given by u
V* = r  X  e-*dt =  M i !  +  1  (2.15)
JO P  ( T
V1 =  [°° In CiM' e~<*dt = + + JL, (2.16)Jo 1 P  p2 v
As in chapter 1 the parameter p € [0,1] represents the welfare weight attached 
to the two groups in the economy. If p  =  1, (0), the government cares about the 
workers (capitalists) only. I refer to the government’s choice of p  as being a
P =  1, (0) - left-wing (right-wing) government.
The constancy of p  is justified by interpreting p  as reflecting the socio-economic 
institutions in an economy. Then the fact that governments alternate in office 
becomes less of an issue since institutional features are usually constant for long 
periods of time.
Before proceeding the following result for a wealth tax scheme is useful. Let 
technology, preferences, welfare function etc. be as in this paper with the notable 
exception that the government raises wealth taxes. Denote 7(r) as the growth
102
rate generated by the optimal policy under a wealth tax scheme. Then this 
chapter’s model reduces to the one analyzed in chapter 1. Proposition 1.1 of 
chapter 1 states that the growth rate under a wealth tax scheme is inversely 
related to the social weight /? attached to the welfare of the non-accumulated 
factor of production. For the purpose of this chapter I restate the proposition
Proposition  1.1 (A lesina and Rodrik) The growth rate 7 (r) is inversely re­
lated to ¡3, the social weight attached to the welfare of the non-accumulated 
factor of production.
Thus, under a wealth tax scheme a government placing more weight on the welfare 
of the non-accumulated factor of production chooses a higher than the growth 
maximizing (’right-wing’) tax rate. Below I will compare their result with this 
paper’s tax scheme.
From (2.15) and (2.16) the welfare function of the government is given by
W(O, X, P)  =  ( l - 0 ) ln[(l -  0)pko] | ln[(r; +  \6p)k0] + 1.
P2
(2.17)
The government maximizes this function under the constraint A > 0 which re­
stricts the governments in that even a right-wing government does not tax work­
ers. Let v ^ i  — 0, A denote the partial derivatives of W(-) with respect to 0,A. 
Then maximization involves the following expressions of marginal welfare
- / ?  Pjye + Xp) le , ^  Pim + Bp) 7a
(1 - 6 ) p  (r} + \dp)p p2 (i) + \9p)p (?' (2.18)
I am interested in the conditions under which one obtains an interior solution such 
that A > 0. I will show that these conditions are restrictive and qualitatively 
similar to the ones presented in Alesina and Rodrik (1991). For an interior
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solution the government solves
vq =  0 and A (i?*) = 0
where the \{v \)  expression enters because of complementary slackness for the 
constraint A > 0. First rearrange the condition vq =  0 using (2.18) to obtain
PiVe + Ap) _  1 - 0  _  7£
{n +  A 0p)p (1 -  9)p p2
0  _  1 ~  0___________le
(r} + \Qp) "  (1 -9){r}o +  Ap) p(t)q +  Ap) (2.19)
Similarly, for an interior solution rearrange the condition v \ = 0 to get
0{r}\ + 9p) _  __7a 
(t) + A 6p)p p2
0 _  ~7a
(r? + A6»p) p(i?A+0p)
Setting these equations equal yields
(2.20)
1 - 0 7«
(1 -  0){t}q + Ap) p(7)e + \p) 
1 - 0
( l - 0 ) ( r f e  +  Ap)
P(1 "  g)
(1 -  0)(t?* +  Ap) 
p ( l -ff)(7 k  +  flp) 
(1 -0 )
- 7 a
p(t?a + 0p)
le __________ 7a
p{ve +  Ap) P f a  A +  0p)
7g(??A + Ap) -  7Afa +  Ap)
(ifo + Ap)(??A + 6p)
le(nx +  Op) -  i x(ri8 +  Ap). (2.21)
Thus, for an interior solution equation (2.21) has to be satisfied. In appendix A.6 
I show that the following relationship between 9 and A must then hold
\ i . n (1 — 0)a(l — a)A  t .2 i /riA =  1 -  —  where B  =  ^ + (1 -  a)2A. (2.22)Op 1 -  p
Whenever the optimal (0,A) combination is such that B i  > Op there is no re­
distribution. Clearly, the optimal combination is such that 9, A are functions of 
a , A, /?,/?. Suppose the optimal 9 were increasing in A. Then a very high A 
would lead to a high 9. The maximum value for 9 is 1 — e. If A  is such that 
((1 -  a )2A)“ > /?, then A =  0. Thus, a high A rules out A > 0. If 9 were 
decreasing in A, the argument would even be simpler. An analogous argument 
holds for a low p. Hence, for very efficient economies or very patient agents there 
is no interior solution with A > 0 and so redistribution does take place under 
those conditions. Thus, this chapter’s model reaches the same qualitative con­
clusions as Alesina and Rodrik, namely that redistribution is bad for growth and 
only optimal if the agents are sufficiently impatient or the economy is not very 
efficient.
It is not difficult to see that a right-wing (/3 — 0) government does not redis­
tribute, since if 0  =  0 in (2.18) one is left with ^  which is negative and so v \ < 0 
implies that there is no redistribution under a right-wing government.
Next, suppose 0  € [0,1) and A = 0. The government wants to find 6 that 
solves vq — 0. The optimal 9 is denoted by 9. Setting equal to zero with A =  0 
implies
L z É - Ê m  + J i
1 — 9 7] p
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where I have already multiplied through by p. Let E  s  (1 — a)A  ((1 — X)8p)~a. 
From (2.10), (2.11) and (2.13) one obtains ^  and 7* =  aE p  so
that
1 - 0
1 - 6
( 8 - 0 )  + a0( 1 - 0 )  
6 (1 -6 )
0(1 -  a) 
6 +  a E
a ( l - a ) A  [6pYa (2.23)
which must be solved by 6 and is only implicitly defined and such that 6 = 
f (a ,  A tp, 0). The optimal tax rate 9 is unique. To show that I calculate v$$ 
which is given by12
vee 1 - 0  P(i -  ey
(i -  a)/?
p62
+ i ££<0 , v 0 e [o, i]
r
(2.24)
as ^8$ < 0. Thus, v$ is strictly decreasing in 6 so that the optimal 8 must be 
unique.
The tax rate chosen by a right-wing 0  =  0 government satisfies
A -  f  a-fl)°
p
where f  = [o(l — ct)yl]° which is the growth maximizing tax rate under a wealth 
tax scheme. Let 8T denote the solution to the equation above. It is obvious that 
8 — 1 (e —v 0) does not solve the equation and that 8T is decreasing in the time 
preference rate. I summarize for a right-wing government, in
P roposition  2.4 A right-wing (0 — 0) government does not redistribute, A =  0,
- T (1 — 0*r) aand its optimal tax rate is determined by 8r = ----------- — < 1.
P
12 Note vg — ~ 1 - 0  
(1 - 0 ) p
+ I tp2 if A =  0.
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The intuition for 0r < 1 is not difficult to understand. On the one hand the right- 
wing government wants to set a high tax rate, since that is good for the capital 
owners’ income and the growth rate, which positively affects the capitalists’ util­
ity. On the other hand higher taxes reduce consumption, which negatively affects 
their utility. 0r represents the optimal trade-off for this problem.
It is an interesting question whether the capital owners are better off under 
the income tax scheme or under a wealth tax scheme. The capital owners’ welfare 
under the wealth tax scheme (see appendix A.2) is given by
l n W + 2 (r)
p r
It is now shown that the capital owners prefer the wealth tax scheme to this 
model’s capital income tax scheme. Under the income cum subsidy scheme the 
highest welfare to be obtained by the capital owners is given by V T(6r) and under 
the wealth tax scheme it is Vr(f). Clearly, Vr (r) < Vr(f) for any r  /  f. Without 
loss of generality assume that r  =  Op so that V r(r = Op) < V r(r), I will show 
that for positive taxes V r(9) — V r(r =  Op) < 0. The difference is given by
ln[(l ~  0)pko] 7(0) ln[/jfc0] 7 =  Op)
P P2 P P2
=  M 1 - ^ )  7(0) -  =  flp)
P P*
_  ln(l — 6) otA(0pY~a — p — aA{Qp)l~a + 0p + p
-  +  jP
The term ln(l — 6) is negative, but 6 is positive. By the mean value theorem one 
gets J that is, ln(l -  B) — ==& where pG ( 1 - 0 ,1 )  so that
ln ( l - e )  + 0 = —  + O = tP— —^  (2.26)
P P
which is negative since p € (1 — 0,1). Thus, V r(B) < V t(t = Bp) implying that 
V T(BT) < V T(r = BT p) < V r(f). Hence, the capital owners’ optimal policies 
are such that they perfer a wealth tax to this model’s income cum subsidy tax 
scheme. ,
P ro p o sitio n  2.5 V r(Br) < Vt(t =  Brp) <  V ^ f) so that the capital owners’ op­
timal policies under either tax scheme imply that they prefer a wealth tax scheme 
to a capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme.
The result may not look very surprising because the capital income tax cum sub­
sidy arrangement works like a tax on the capital owners’ consumption, reducing 
their utility. However, the growth rate may be higher under the model’s income 
tax scheme. Thus, the result establishes that the capital owners value the direct 
effect on their consumption level higher than the intertemporal effect of having 
higher income and so higher consumption in the future.
The right-wing government represents the accumulated factor of production 
and acts growth maximizing under a wealth tax scheme, but does not do so 
under the capital income cum subsidy scheme. I will show that for a wide range 
of parameter values the optimal policy for the capital owners under this model’s 
tax scheme generates higher growth. Thus, even though the optimal right-wing 
policy is not growth maximizing under the capital income cum subsidy scheme, 
it may generate higher growth than the optimal right-wing policy under a wealth 
tax scheme. From Proposition 2.3 it follows that j(B) > 7(f) is equivalent to
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The optimal right-wing policy is 0r
p . Substituting
in 7 (8) > 7(f  ) yields
P
( l - 0 r)“ 
(1 -  f )
>
>
>
f
(1 -  a)A
1
P
7“l—o 1
(1 -  a) A
a
a l~a.
i1—a
Whether this inequality holds is not easily analyzed analytically, but the following 
table presents a numercial simulation showing that there exist parameter values 
for which 7(f) < 7(^r)-13
Numerical Simulation for A =  1
P a f 6r 7(f) A
1. 0.01 0.25 0.001 0.086 -0.010 -0.009 +
2. 0.01 0.50 0.063 0.672 0.053 0.032 -
3. 0.01 0.75 0.107 0.851 0.312 0.218 -
4. 0.05 0.25 0.001 0.023 -0.050 -0.049 +
5. 0.05 0.50 0.063 0.420 0.013 0.023 +
6. 0.05 0.75 0.107 0.611 0.272 0.263 -
7. 0.10 0.25 0.001 0.012 -0.100 -0.099 +
8. 0.10 0.50 0.063 0.303 -0.038 - 0.013 +
9. 0.10 0.75 0.107 0.466 0.222 0.248 +
where A =  sgn (7(0r) — 7(f)). From the table it follows that for given a  an 
increase in p causes the optimal right-wing policy to generate higher growth
13 How the simulation was carried out is explained in Appendix A.8.
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under the income cum subsidy than under the wealth tax scheme. A similar 
conclusion can be reached for given p and increases in a. That establishes
P ro p o sitio n  2.6 3 a , A and p such that 7(f) <  7(0r), that is, for a wide range 
of parameter values the preferred policy of the accumulated factor of production 
generates higher growth under the capital income cum subsidy tax than under the 
wealth tax scheme.
The proposition is interesting for the following reason: The right-wing govern­
ment represents the owners of the accumulated factor of production and acts 
growth maximizing under a wealth tax scheme. Therefore, the proposition casts 
doubt on models such as Alesina and Rodrik’s that identify growth maximizing 
and optimal policies of the owners of the accumulated factor of production. In 
this model the owners of the accumulated factor of production prefer a wealth 
tax scheme (Proposition 2.5) and a government representing their interests acts 
growth maximizing given that scheme. But that choice is not growth maximiz­
ing in comparison to a tax scheme that the owners of the accumulated factor of 
production w’ould not choose and under which their optimal policy is not growth 
maximizing, but may still generate higher growth than under the accumulated 
factor owners’ preferred (wealth) tax scheme (Proposition 2.6). Hence, the model 
provides an example that the owners of the accumulated factor of production do 
not always choose a growth maximizing tax base.
Next, I show that an increase in ¡3, that is, an increase in the weight attached 
to the welfare of the non-accumulated factor of production (workers) increases 
the optimal 9 for all non-redistributing governments (A =  0). If /? > 0 then 9
n o
solves (2.23) so that
v(e(P),P)e = 0
must hold in the optimum. One may view this as an implicit function and totally 
differentiate with respect to /? to obtain14
d§
vee Qp +  v$0 -  0.
Equation (2.24) implies v$$ < 0, and notice that from (2.18)
1 1 — a   ^ - i
v$l3 =  + ~ W  > 0 ’ v 0 6 [ (U l
which entails that
de _  v(o),ß
dß v(9)gg
(2.27)
so that any optimal 0 is increasing in ß. But then an increase in ß  also raises the 
growth rate since > 0. Thus,
P roposition  2.7 I f  there is no redistribution (A =  0), placing more social weight 
on the welfare of the non-accumulated factor of production (higher ¡3) raises the 
optimal tax rate (0) and growth (higher ^(9)).
This is one of the major results of the paper and in direct contrast to Proposition 
1.1. It shows that if the social planner uses an income cum investment subsidy 
tax arrangement, and shifts political power to the non-accumulated factor of 
production (workers), the optimal tax rate on the income of the accumulated
14 For a similar proof in a different context see Mirrlees (1986).
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factor of production (capital) is raised, implying higher growth. Hence, under the 
tax arrangement it is not optimal for high growth to shift all political power to 
the accumulated factor of production. A similar result is obtained in Bertola 
(1993), but notice that taxation of capital income does not defeat the purpose of 
enhancing growth in this model.
Consider now a left-wing (/? = 1) government. From (2.18) one readily verifies 
that vq(P =  1) > 0 so that a left-wing government would choose the maximum 
tax rate 6l =  1 -  t. I will ask under what conditions a left-wing government 
would want to redistribute.15 As 9l =  1 — e I assume that e is so small that 9 «  1. 
That facilitates the analysis without altering the qualitative results. A left-wing 
government wants to redistribute if Va)a=o >  0» that is, if redistribution increases 
the workers’ welfare. So from (2.18) with 9 zz 1 and A =  0 one has to check under 
what conditions
A^|A=0
V\ + P 
VP
- f ^ > 0
P2
where 7a =  t"a. Recall E  =  (1 — a)A  ((1 — A)9p)~a and that
r \  = - aE9p , rj =  E( 1 -  A)0p, t?a =  -(1  -  oi)E9p.
Making the appropriate substitutions for 9, A I get that
A^(A=0
l  — a  1
p +  (1 -  a)Ap'~a
a ( l  — a)A
pi+a > 0 (2.28)
15In appendix A.7 I show that the optimal A > 0 depends in a complicated, non-linear way 
on the parameters of the model. The exact solution is not of interest in this paper.
must hold if the government wishes to redistribute.16 The condition does not 
hold if p —> 0 or A is very large. Thus, a left-wing government does not want to 
redistribute if the economy is very efficient or the agents are very patient.
P roposition  2.8 A left-wing government always sets the growth maximizing tax 
rate, 9l — 1 — e. I f  A  is large or p is low, a left-wing government does not 
redistribute, A =  0.
Under a wealth tax scheme a right-wing government acts like a growth maximizer 
in the optimum. In contrast, this paper’s tax arrangement establishes that a left- 
wing government that does not redistribute acts like a growth maximizer. Thus, a 
switch from a wealth to an income cum investment subsidy tax scheme induces an 
important switch in optimal policies. In particular, it makes a right and left-wing 
government switch roles in terms of who maximizes growth.
2.5 Distributional Implications
The distributional consequences of the optimal policies considered in the pre­
vious section are ambiguous if one wishes to compare different policies of the 
various governments and the two tax schemes. For simplicity, I concentrate on 
the policies chosen by growth maximizing governments employing the wealth tax 
or this model’s income tax scheme. As an indicator of the income distribution 
I use the ratio of the total factor income of the capital owners to that of the 
workers. That is obviously only a crude measure, but as has been pointed out 
by, for instance, Atkinson (1983), the relationship between the income shares of 
factors of production and the distribution of income among persons is compli­
16\Vith X = 0 and i  k  1 one gets E  =  (1 — a )A p ~ a and so r \  = — a ( l  — a)>lp1-a, T) = 
(1 — a )A p l ~a and t)x = —(1 — a)2/ip1-Q. Simplifying yields the expression above.
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cated, but factor shares remain of considerable relevance. Also, as regards the 
personal distribution of income it is still broadly true that income from prop­
erty is of greater importance at the top of the income scale. Let F9 denote the 
pre-tax factor income ratio of the workers’ and capitalists’ factor incomes if the 
government pursues a growth maximizing (A = 0) policy, then
Fjr _  r (g)fct _  r (T)fc» _  °
n(6)k, i?( r ) k t 1 -  a
which follows from (2.10) and (2.11) and the corresponding expressions under 
a wealth tax scheme. So the pre-tax factor income distribution is equal under 
growth maximizing policies and independent of the capital stock.17 Depending 
on the share of capital a , pre-tax factor income inequality F 9 is greater or less 
than one. Turning to post-tax factor income inequality I obtain these ratios
F(t ) = r(f) — fT)(r)
and F(9) = (1 -  9) r(0) 
V(9)
which reduce to
and F(<?) = i f  = 9 =  1 -  e. (2.29)1 — a 7] 1 — a
under growth maximizing policies. From that I immediately get
P ro p o s itio n  2.9 I f  e =  a, then F(t ) = F(6). I f e < a ,  then F (t ) > F(9).
17 A word of caution is in order here. F 9 should not be viewed as the pre-tax factor income 
ratio. In reality the ratio of total capital income to total wage income is less than one. For 
instance, in most OECD countries the factor share of physical capital is about 40 percent. 
Recall, however, that a  is the share of broad capital, including human capital, in the model. 
Therefore, one may view F 9 and F  as inequality measures of the stylized economy under study. 
Rescaling the measures would not affect the qualitative results in any significant way.
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Throughout it has been assumed that e is small. If the share of capital is very 
low and equals the minimum tax rate e, the post-tax factor income distributions 
under either tax scheme with a growth maximizing policy coincide. That is a 
special, but interesting case, since I have already shown that under the model’s 
income tax scheme growth is in general higher. Thus, one may observe two 
economies with the same post-tax factor income distribution, but very different 
growth performances. In the more general case, e < a, and the post-tax factor 
income distribution is more favourable to labour under the capital income cum 
investment subsidy tax scheme.
Hence, the only thing that one may conclude from this section’s factor in­
come distribution analysis is that the pre-tax factor income distribution is the 
same under both tax schemes with growth maximizing governments. The growth
9
maximizing policy under this paper’s income tax scheme is in general biased to­
wards the post-tax income of the non-accumulated factor of production and may 
generate higher growth than the growth maximizing policy under the wealth tax 
scheme.
2.6 Conclusion
In many theoretical models high taxation of the accumulated factor of produc­
tion (capital) for (re-)distributive purposes is unfavourable for high growth. The 
rationale for these results is not difficult to convey. If the government uses taxes 
that distort the private investors’ incentive to accumulate capital, then any tax 
rate that is higher than the one that maximizes growth and that is good for the 
non-accumulated factor of production must slow down growth. Any policy that 
subsidizes investment is clearly good for growth. But that raises the question
115
how the subsidies are financed.
The chapter addresses two points that have been made in this context. The 
first point is that increasing taxes for redistributive purposes slows down growth 
and the second is that capital income taxation defeats the purpose of enhancing 
growth when used as a means to finance investment subsidies. i
A capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme is analyzed. The tax 
rate on capital income and for investment subsidies is uniform. The tax scheme 
is tantamount to a tax on the capital owners’ consumption. I justify the imple- 
mentability of the income tax scheme and the uniformity of the tax rate for a 
right-wing and a left-wing government. One reason why even a right-wing govern­
ment may implement the tax scheme is that the government uses tax revenues to 
provide public inputs in production, which raise the return on capital. However, 
in the model the capital owners prefer another, namely a wealth tax scheme.
For the capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme I show that in­
vestment subsidies remove the distorting effect of capital income taxation for 
optimizing agents. In equilibrium growth depends strictly positively on the pre­
tax return to capital, the income tax rate and the time preference rate. There 
exists a growth maximizing time preference rate and it is growth maximizing 
to tax capital income maximally. The reason for these results is that the tax 
scheme operates like a consumption tax scheme. More impatience causes the 
capital owners to consume more, raising the government’s tax revenues that are 
channelled into production as public inputs, thereby raising the return to capital 
and growth.
The chapter then provides a public policy analysis and compares optimal 
policies with those generated under a wealth tax scheme. It is shown that a right- 
wing government never redistributes and does not choose the growth maximizing
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tax rate. Notice in Alesina/Rodrik a wealth tax scheme causes the right-wing 
government to act like a growth maximizer. Interestingly, I find that the capital 
owners’ preferred policy is not growth maximizing under the capital income cum 
investment subsidy tax scheme. But their preferred policy under that tax scheme 
may still generate higher growth than their optimal, growth maximizing policy 
under the wealth tax scheme. Thus, the preferred policy of the accumulated 
factor of production is not always good for growth.
It is shown that placing more weight on the welfare of the non-accumulated 
factor of production (workers) leads the social planner to raise the optimal tax rate 
on the income of the accumulated factor of production (capital) and through that 
the growth rate. Hence, under the chapter’s tax arrangement it is not optimal 
for growth maximization to shift political power to the accumulated factor of 
production. The result is in direct contrast to what is shown in Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994). A similar result is obtained by Bertola (1993), but notice that 
in comparison to a wealth tax scheme taxation of capital income does not defeat 
the purpose of enhancing growth in this model.
With the model’s tax scheme a ’left-wing’ government that does not redis­
tribute towards labour acts like a growth maximizer. Thus, a switch from a 
wealth to an income cum investment subsidy tax scheme induces an important 
switch in optimal policies. In the model a ’left-wing’ government only redis­
tributes if the economy is sufficiently inefficient or the workers as a group are 
rather impatient. Thus, one may observe an economy with a government that 
represents only the interests of the non-accumulated factor of production (labour) 
to have redistribution and higher growth than an economy represented by a gov­
ernment solely concerned about the accumulated factor of production (capital).
Finally, I analyze the total factor income distribution consequences under
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growth maximizing policies and the two different tax arrangements. I find that 
the chapters’s tax scheme is in general biased towards generating relatively more 
post-tax factor income for the non-accumulated factor of production, while often 
inducing higher growth than under the wealth tax scheme.
However, one should be cautious about the results derived in the chapter. 
The set-up of the model is highly aggregated. In reality workers own capital 
and capital owners supply labour. It would be desirable to know more about 
how exactly the government achieves targeting personal investment. The model 
has worked with the distribution of total factor income, which is only a crude 
measure of the distribution of personal incomes that is usually considered to be of 
interest and more importance. Even though these problems provide ample room 
for further research, do I believe that the model captures some important aspects 
of taxation, economic growth and factor income distribution.
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Appendix A
A .l Proof th a t 7  = 7 k
Let the capital owners’ problem be
max [  lnC( eptdt (A.1.1)
Ct J o
s.t. k = R k t - C t  (A.1.2)
fe(0) =  given, k(oo) =  free. (A.1.3)
where R  denotes a constant after-tax return.18 Setting up the present value 
Hamiltonian for this problem yields
H — \nCt -\- iit{R kt -  Ct)
where jit is the current value shadow price of one more unit of investment at 
date t . The necessary FOC for the maximization of H(-) are given by equations 
(A. 1.2), (A. 1.3) and the equations
1  (A.1.4)
18 The arguments below would not change if R  followed a time path that the private sector 
agents had to take as given. See, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chpts. 2.1.2 
and 4.1.4.
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fit = ptp ~  R  Pt 
lim ktp téwpt =  0
(A.1.5)
(A.L6)
where the last equation is a transversality condition which ensures that the 
present value of the capital stock approaches zero asymptotically. The shadow
where the initial level of consumption, Co, remains to be determined. Substituting 
for Ct in (A.1.2) implies
kt = R k t - C 0
which is a first order, linear differential equation in kt. It is solved as follows
h - R k t  =  —Cq eyt
price evolves according to pt =  Po ^ p R^ where po is a positive constant which 
equals ^r. Consequently the transversality condition boils down to
po lim kt e~Rt =  0.
Equations (A.1.4) and (A.1.5) imply that in the optimum consumption grows at 
the constant rate
(A.1.7)
Thus, consumption at any date is described by
Ct =  Co e '* -* *
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e~m ( 4  -  R k,)
f  e ' “  (k t - R k t )  dt
- e - m C0 e1'
-  ƒ  C0 e-^dt.
The last equation is an exact differential equation with integrating factor e~Rt. 
The LHS is solved by kt e~Ri +  60 and the RHS is solved by ^  e_p* 4- 6j, where 
b0tbi are arbitrary constants. Thus,
kt= zC* +  b e«
P
(A.1.8)
where b = b \— b0. Substituting this into the transversality condition implies 
i - l i m  ( — + b e“ )  e~Rt =  lim ( -  e~>* + - ^  =  0
C0 *“► °° \  p )  t-*00 Q ))
which holds if the arbitrary constant b is set equal to zero. Then equation (A.1.8)
becomes
kt =  ~  e7i => 7fc =  7 - R -  P
P
so that consumption and wealth grow at the same constant rate in the optimum. 
Furthermore, the optimal level of consumption at each date is given by Ct =  pkt.
Relation to different chapters
• Chapter 1: R =  (r — r) and C% — C f and so C? =  pkt in the optimum.
• Chapter 2: R — r and Ct = ^  so that C\ =  (1 -  9)pkt in the optimum.
• Chapter 3: In the optimum u>t =  Thus, R =  (r — r)ujt +  (r* -  T*)0(u>t) 
is constant. Hence, Cf = pkt in the optimum.
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A . 2  Derivation of the  welfare m easures
It is convenient to recall the integration by parts formula
rb . rb
/  v2dvi -  [t>iV2]a -  / vidv2. Ja Ja
The capitalists’ and workers’ intertemporal welfare is equivalent to
Vr = / ‘lnCf e-pt and V1 = J ‘ In C f  e- "
when letting t oo. For the integration by parts define v2 =  lnC?, dvi =  e~ptdt
where j  =  fc, W. In chapters 1 and 2 the optimal choices of the private sector
agents imply that dv2 =  ^  = 7 and constant. Then v\ — — - e~pt so thatc t p
fOO I f ’ 1 OO 1 fQO
Jo \aC{ e~pl dt = -  [ -  InC? + - ^  7 e~<* dt
= _  1  L  e-p < r
p p2 I-
In chapter 1 Cq =  pk0 and C ^  — (774-Xr)kt so that evaluation at the particular 
limits yields the expression for V T and V 1 as functions of r  and A in (1.14).
In chapter 2  Cq =  (1 -  9)k0 and CqV =  (77 +  X9p)k0 leading to the expressions 
of V r and V 1 as functions of 9 and A in (2.15) and (2.16).
A.3 Derivation of th e  optim al policies
Under the wealth tax scheme the government solves
max { l -  ß ) V  + ß V l s.t. \ > 0
t,A
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The first order conditions for r  and A are given by
t?T +  A ’ 7r f  +
p J ^ T p + 7 - 0 1 A |/J
^ ^ i + L _  +  ^  =  
V (t? +  At )p  fPJ
Concentrating on an interior solution for A, simplifying and rearranging yields
q ?7r+ A  7r t?> + t _  7A
P (;/ + Ar) p P (t? + Ar) p
(A.3.9)
Notice that 7,. must be negative for the first equation to hold, so in the optimum 
r  > t by Lemma 1.1. Division of these two equations by one another yields
V r  +  A _  7 r 
r]x +  T  7 a
(A.3.10)
and must hold in an optimum with A > 0. Then 7a =  r\  and 7T =  rT — 1 imply 
(t)t +  A)t*a = (t?a +  r )(rT — 1) which upon multiplying out becomes
r)Trx +  At*a = rT7]x 4- rTr  -  t?a -  r. (A.3.11)
Notice that ta7?t = rTrjx and that 77 = i— r. Then At*a =  r Tr  — 1 ^ 7 -a -  r  and so
/ .  1 — a \  / .  1 —o \  r r T rA + -------) rA =  r r T — r &  [A + ------- ) = ------------ .
\ a / \ a J rx TX
  a  
 rx
Recall ?v = aE ( 1 — A), rx = aE(~~r) where E  = (1 -  a)A[(l — A)r] Q as in (1.5). 
Thus, =  -(1  “  A). So for above
. _v 1 - a  t  r xA +  (1 — A) H---------—------— =  — t
a rx ot
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which means that E  =  1 and so
[ ( l - g ) A ] i
1 - A (A.3.12)
Notice that for this r  we have E  — 1. For the first order condition for r  we 
note that rj =  (1 — a)A[(l — A)r]l”Q = ¿£[(1 — A)r] =  [(1 — a)A ]i. Furthermore, 
r}T — (1 -  a )( l  -  A), rT =  a (l  — A). Then (A.3.12) implies A =  1 -  so
that
rj + Ar =  [(1 -  a)A ]i +  r  ~ ^  =  r -
Then the first order condition for r  becomes
p ^?T-fA 7t ^  Tjr +  A ^  7t tjt ~f~ A ____ T_
(t? +  At) p t  Pp 7r ~  /?/>'
For an interior solution r  must solve this equation, but the solution must also 
satisfy (A.3.10). Let D  =  -h and note that = —D = ancj s0 —
~ d ~ t^ +t an<^  hence = — Z? =  =  ~ d - Thus, — =  —D, D — 1 so
that the solution satisfies r  =  ftp. Thus,
r  = Pp and A =  1 -  ± ( A . 3 . 1 3 )
which is equation (1.15) when p =  1. Recall that these equations hold for A > 0, 
thus for pp > [(1 — a)A ]i.
Suppose A =  0, then the first order condition becomes
rh
n
Tr -  1 (1 ~ a)E
Pp tE
OlE  — 1
Pp
&  (1 — ot)pp — r  — a rE
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so that the solution with A = 0 is given by
(1 — a)0p =  r  |l  — o (l — a)Ar (A.3.14)
which holds only if 0p < [(1 — o)A ]i. For 0 = 1 this is equation (1.16) in the 
text.
For the right-wing government (0 = 0) the first order conditions are given by
(A.3.15)
Since = rA < 0 it follows that A =  0 and 7r =  rT — 1 =  0 implies r  — f  so that 
by Lemma 1.1 the right-wing government acts like a growth maximizer.
Lem m a 7(7*) is inversely related to 0 .
Proof: 7t < 0 for f  > f  and p > 0 as given in (1.15) and (1.16). Also
7 (r) =  aA  ((1 -  AJr)1' “ -  r  -  p.
Clearly, if A > 0, then ^  > 0 in (A.3.13), and (1 -  A)r =  [(1 — o)A]i. Thus, 
^  < 0. Suppose 0 > 0 and A =  0. Then f  is given as in (A.3.14) so that by 
the implicit function theorem ^  > 0. Thus, % — I t % < § which proves the 
lemma.
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A.4 Effects of a  on r , 7  and F  under different 
policies
A.4.1 Growth Maximizing Policies
Under a growth maximizing policy F  =  7 =  — p, and f  =  [a(l — a)A ]«.
Then ^  > 0 which is positive for all a  € (0,1). For the growth
maximizing tax rate I find
df __ [a(l — a)A]i 1 (1 — 2a)A
da a
_  f  (1 — 2a) f  In f
a 2(l — a) a
[ a ( l - a )A ]°  ln [a ( l - a )A ]  
a 2
(A.4.16)
which is not easy to evaluate. Clearly, In f  < 0 so that — —y1 > 0. But for a  > |  
the first expression is negative so that the sign of ^  seems to depend on a. The 
following plot establishes that ^  § 0 for a particular level of A.
df
Thus, there exist levels of A such that f  first increases and then decreases in 
a. That means that for two different values of the share of capital, a\ > 02 
such that f  (ai) = f  (a2), the same growth maximizing tax rate f  is induced. As 
^  ^ 0 it is not clear what sign ^  takes. For the calculation of ^  rearrange to
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get (7 +  p) = Then
ln(7 +  p) =  In a  — ln(l — a) — In f
ln(a(l -  a)A)=  ln a  -  ln(l — a) — a
- i2^ ) “+(^ ¡r)to(1 ■ +(s)ta ^
For the effect of a change in a on this expression I get
rfln(7 + p) 
da
W l - “ H
In A
1
a
-----Inf
La
As f  < 1 the expression is positive. Then dln^ +^  > 0 which implies jjj > 0. 
Thus, an increase in the share of capital raises the maximum growth rate.
A.4.2 Income Egalitarian Policies
Under the egalitarian policy ^  =  0. Rearranging I obtain
7e +  p = Te(aAT~a -  1) where re =  [A(a -  (1 -  a)F"‘]“ .
Then
^  =  - ^ r eln re +  i [ A ( a - ( l - Q ) F * ] i _1^ ( l  +  r )  > 0 , (A.4.17)
that is, ^  is positive. Substitution and simplification imply
ln(7e + p) = Inre +  ln(l -  a ) + In F* — ln(a -  (1 — a)F m)
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=  i  In A  4- * ~  ln(a — (1 -  a)F*) +  ln(l — a) +  In F*
Taking the derivative with respect to a  yields
d (  7 e  +  p )
d o t " ¿ lni4 +  - ~2 ln(® -  (1 -  <*)F')
+■
œ  
1 — a
a
œ  
1 +  F*
a  — (1 — a)F*
1
1 — a
1 i 1=  — ln re +  — ------t
a  a(X — a)
(1 — a )2(l +  F*)
a -  (1 — a)F*
— a
The expression is positive if
(1 — a)2( l .+ F*) > a 2 — a (l — ct)F*
2 a - 1F* >
1 — a
and a  < For F* < it may be negative, if a  is sufficiently large. So if 
a  < 1, then definitely ^  > 0. Thus, is positive for a  < 1 and may be
ambiguous if a >
A.4.3 Redistributing, Left-Wing Policies
A redistributing, left-wing government chooses A > 0. From equation (1.15) it 
follows that ^  = 0 since f  — p. For A — 1 — K1— let c =  (1 — a)A, then
dX
da
1
P
d  r
1-0
C o
I —O 1 .c« In c
a a 1
1 ln(l -  a) +  In A
ap L1 — a + a
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i
Suppose A  is low (e.g. A < e”T^ ) 1 then < 0. Next, suppose c «  1, then 
^  > 0. Thus, the sign of ^  is ambiguous in general and depends on A. Since
P  =  1=5 -  1 Set
dF _  1 4^(1 -  a)pa In p +  ApQ
do (1 — o)2 ¿42(1 — o)2
For A —► 0 the expression becomes negative. For p < e ~ ^  with some small, 
positive x, the expression becomes positive. Hence, the sign of is ambiguous 
and depends on A and p.
Under the A > 0 policy (see (1.15))
r =  aA[(\ — A)r]1 a =  a — [(1 — a)^4]a .
The growth rate can be rearranged as follows
1 - q 1ln(7 +  2p) = lnoH -------- ln(l -  o) +  — In A
o o
Taking the derivative yields
dln(7 +  2p) 1 1 . r„  x (1 — a)
-------------- ’ = --------Ò ln[(l -  a )A ]----- -------^O Q2 o ( l  — o)da
which is positive since (1 -  a)A  =  (1 — A)r < 1 in (1.15). Hence, under a 
redistributing policy > 0.
129
A.4.4 Non-Redistributing, Left-Wing Policies
For A =  0 equation (1.16) applies. The optimal tax rate f  solves
z = — ------a A t 1 a — p =  0
1 -  a
The partial derivatives of z are given by
zT =
T 1 - a
-  (1 — a)aA r'
which is positive for all r > f , and
zn =
° (1 ~ a )2
— At 1 q +  a A rl~Q In r
so that
dr _  _Za _  (iz^y — (1 -  ol)A t1 q +  q(1 — a)A t 1 ° In r  
da zT 1 — (1 — a )2a  A r~a
7 [~ (i_ )^ +  (1 — a)Ar~a — a (l — a)Ar~a lnr]
1 — (1 — a)2aAr~°
which is ambiguous in sign since the first term in zQ is positive, but the sum 
of the other two terms is negative. However, f  € ((a (l -  a)A)° , ((1 -  a)-A)“). 
Suppose f  —» (a(l — a)A) ° and A  =  1. Then the ~  reduces to
f  (1 — 2a) f  In f  
a 2(l — a) a
which is the same expression as that for ^  in (A.4.16). For a  — \  the expression 
is positive. For a  —t 1 a plot of the expression is similar to the one under 
a growth maximizing policy and reveals that the expression becomes negative.
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Hence, there exist A, p, a  such that “  |  0. 
The change in the growth rate is given by
“  = A t 1" “ -  y -  —  aA  It 1" “ In r j  + a ( l  — a )  A r “ Q ~  da da L J v da
— A t 1-0 -  aA  f r 1 _ a ln r ]  -  [l -  a ( l  -  a ) A r " Q]
1 J L J da
I want to show that ^  > 0 for any f  € ((a (l -  a)A)° , ((1 -  a) A)*). For that 
it suffices to show that ^  < At1"*0, since — aA  [r1-a lnr] is non-negative. For 
the rest of the proof it is convenient to represent the solution space f  in the form
f  =  x  ((1 -  a)A)° where x € (a®, l) <$=> f  € ((a(l -  a)A )“ , ((1 -  a)A )») .
A higher x means that the optimal f  is higher. I want to show that < A t 1 “, 
that is,
-  (1 — a)A rl a +  q(1 — a)A t 1 “ In t
1 — (1 -  a)2aAr~° < A t
1—a
A{ 1 -  a)2 — 1 -f a  In r  < 1 - a — a (l  — a)A r Q.
Substituting f  for r  yields
----------1 +  a  Inf <1 — a
a
------1 - f a  In f <3:°
1 a
1 — a  x a 
1 — x a
1 — a
and holds since a  In f is unambiguously negative, ~  < 1 and x Q > 1 for all 
x  € ( a « ,l )  . Hence, > 0.
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For F  with A — 0 I obtain
dF  _  1 r Q r a ln r  +  a r a~1^
da (1 -  a )2 (1 — a )2 A  (1 -  a)A
A — ra — (1 — a ) r Q [inr + a r~ l
(1 -  a )2A '
I want to show that this expression is positive. Its denominator is positive. 
Thus, for checking the sign of ^  it suffices to check the sign of the numerator. 
For simplicity
dr __ 
da
H  =
t H
1 — a (l — a )2A r~ a 
1
where
( l - o )
+  (1 -  a) A t  a — a (l — a )A t  Qlnr
Then the numerator becomes
A ~ T° ~ —  ^ (1 - a f A r - o  [{1 "  a(1 ~ q^ At “ ) ln T + aH\ (A-418)
The expression in the square brackets is given by
(1 — a(l — a )2A t  q) lnr + a
( l - o )
+  (1 — a ) A t  q -  a (l — a ) A t  Q lnr
and simplifies to
(1 -  a ( l  — a)Ar “) ln r  -  — ^ —- + a ( l  — a)A t a
(1 -  a)
which upon substituting back into (A.4.18) and simplification yields
. _  Q _  [(1 — q )t q -  q (1 -  a)2A] l n r  -  q r a  +  q (1 — a)2A
1 — a ( l  — a )2i4r-Q
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Expressing this as a fraction of (1 -  a ( l  — a)2Ar~Q) amounts to
(1 — a ( l  — a)2Ar~a){A — r a) -  [(1 -  a )r°  -  a ( l  -  a )2a] In r
+  a rQ -  a ( l  -  a)2A  (A.4.19)
as the corresponding numerator. Now evaluate at f  and use f  =  x((l — a )A )i. 
Clearly, 1 > a ( l —a)2A f~ a =  a ( l —ot)x~a since the lowest value x could assume is 
a®. Thus, the denominator of the fraction is positive. Turning to the numerator 
in (A.4.19) I find
(1 -  a ( l  -  a)x“°)A(l -  (1 -  a)xa) — [(1 -  a )2(xa — a)] A  In f
+  a (l  -  a)A (xa -  (1 -  a))
The term -  [(1 -  a)2(xa — a)] A In f  is non-negative since x a > a. I wish to show 
that the sum of the other two terms is positive. Multiplying out and collecting 
terms I get
A — a( 1 -  a)x~a — (1 — a)Axa -I- a (l — a )2A +  a (l — a)A xa — a ( l  -  a)M ,
A (1 — a (l -  a )x “° -  (1 — a )2xQ) =  M(x).
It is not difficult to verify that if x —► a i , then M  Aot( 1 -  (1 — a )2) > 0 and 
if x —> 1, then M —I a A > 0. Thus, at the boundaries of x the numerator is 
positive. For showing that it is positive for all values in x, I look for extrema of 
M (x). The function M  is differentiable in x and so continuous. I look for either 
maxima or minima of M. If one finds a unique x in (a% 1) that maximizes M, 
then by the sign found for the endpoints in that interval, it follows that M  is 
positive. I will now show that all extrema in the relevant range maximize M  so
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that it cannot be negative. Taking the derivative yields
dM
— =  A (a2(l — a)x Q 1 — a ( l  — a ^ x “*1)
and setting it equal to zero establishes
as the value of x that yields a unique extremum of M  for given a. Suppose 
the extremum were a minimum and a  > Then x* > 1 and by the boundary 
argument M  would be positive. Thus, I concentrate on a < \  for which it is 
possible that a« < x* < 1. For showing that x* maximizes M  I calculate
<PM
dx2 A ( - a 2(l -  or)(l +  a)x a~2 +  a ( l  -  a )2xa"2) 
Ax~2 (a ( l — a )3xa — a 2(l +  a )( l  -  a)x~a) .
Substituting in x* one obtains
d?M
dx2 A x '2 ( a ( l  -  a )3 ( ^ - )  * -  a 2(l +  a )( l  -  a ) ( 1 ^ )  §
Ax~2a 2 (1 -  a )2 ((1 -  a) -  (1 +  a)) < 0.
Hence, x* € maximizes M. Thus, the infimum of M  is at which
establishes that M  is positive. As all other terms of are positive it follows
that > 0.
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A. 5 Iso-elastic utility functions and compara­
tive dynamics
Suppose the capital owners have the instantaneous utility function
u (Cf) = f i’ 1 , „ > 1  (A.5.20)
where the constant a =  £ represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
If v —\ 1, U(-) reduces to logarithmic utility. A high v implies a low elasticity 
intertemporal substitution, low a. This means that the capital owners like to 
smooth consumption. In contrast, a high elasticity of substitution implies that 
the investors are indifferent to the timing of consumption. In that case the agents 
may defer consumption for a long time while investing in order to consume a large 
amount at a future date. By restricting v > 1 1 rule out such behaviour implying 
er € (0, l) .19 Notice that a high time preference rate p implies that the investors 
value future consumption less than current consumption.
The capital owners solve a problem similar to (2.6a) under the dynamic budget 
constraint
c?  =  (1 — 6) [rkt -  kt].
Proceeding as in section 2.2.2 it is not difficult to verify (see also e.g. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995), chpt. 2.1.2) that the steady state, balanced growth rate in
19 Notice that in principle one could have assumed 0 < v < 1 as well which may, however, 
cause problems below. For the argument I wish to make it may suffice to show that the model 
generalizes to all functions where v > 1.
135
a market equilibrium with arbitrary taxes is given by
7  =  - — -  =  a(r — p). (A .5 .2 1 )
Then the optimal level of consumption is determined by
C.tk =  (1 -  0)[r -  j]kt =  (1 - 8) [(1 -  a)r +  ap] kt
where kt = k^e11. Thus, a and p have an effect on both the level and growth 
of the capital owners1 consumption. For given 9 and r an increase in p (more 
impatience) or a decrease in a (more consumption smoothing) lower the growth
—-JL
rate and raise the constant fraction that is, the capital owners’ steady state 
consumption per units of capital. Thus, more impatience or more consumption 
smoothing make the capitalists less willing to save for given tax rates and given 
g- and r.
By assumption the government sets & = constant. For convenience assume 
A = 0. Then with the balanced budget condition (2.4) one gets
b s jr  =  O ( r - j )  = 0 ( r - a ( r - p ) ) .
In equilibrium the marginal product equals the return on capital, that is, r  =  
qA (6)1_q. Then b is implicitly defined as
b = 9 [(1 — o)ocA (b)l~a +  ap]
6° = 8 |(1 — a)aA  +  op6a_1] .
136
It is constant by the following argument. Define
x ~  ba — 9 [(1 — <?)aA + crpba~l]
then Xb =  aba~l — 9ap{a — 1 )ba~2 > 0 for all b 6 (0,1). Then the solution to 
x — 0 must be independent of time since x = 0. Thus, & =  b =  0 by the implicit 
function theorem so that
9t = c{0, a, p)kt <=> r = f (9,a , p) (A.5.22)
which follows from (2.5). With x& > 0 one verifies that xp < 0 so that ^  > 0 
and hence ~  > 0. Also, xa = 9 (aA -  pbQ~l) |  0 depending on p, a and A for 
given 9. Hence, the effect of an increase in a on b and r is ambiguous.
A. 6  Conditions for an interior solution
From (2.21) we must have that
(i _7g)+ ~  = Mv\ + Sp)-y\(n« + V)-
Recall that
r = a A (( l -  X)9p)l~ct , 77 =  (1 -  a)A  ((1 -  A)0p)1_o 
Let E  = (1 — a )A ((1 — X)9p)~Q. The partial derivatives of r, 77 are given by 
r9 =  aE( 1 -  A)p, r\  =  - aEOp, 77* = (1 -  a)E(\  -  A)p, t?a — -(1  -  a)E0p
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Multiplying out the LHS of (2.21) noting that 7, =  r„ i = 0, A one gets
r& rjx +  re 9p -  rx rjg -  rx A p
The derivatives imply that r# tjx  — t X tj$ — 0. So the LHS reduces to
r$ 9p - r x \ p  =  aE (  1 -  A)9p2 4 * aE9Xp2 
=  aE[p29 -  A9p2 +  AQp2)
= otEp29
Then equation (2.21) is really given by
p(l -  i3)(r)X + 9p)
( 1 - 9 )
p ( l - p ) ( 9 p - ( l - a ) E 9 p )
( 1 - 9 )
- a ) E )
( 1 - 9 )
((1 -  A)8p)a -  (1 -  a)2A
((i -  W pT
aEp28
aEp29
aE
(1 — 0)a(l — ot)A 
B
where B =  ^ +  (1 -  a)2A  and B  is increasing in A  and /? for given 9.
From this one verifies that the optimal relationship between 9 and A must satisfy
which is equation (2.22) in the text.
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A.7 The optimal A for a left-wing government
The left-wing government solves v \ =  0 if A > 0 in the optimum. From (2.18) 
this entails
(*7a +  Op)p = - 7 a (rj + A Op)
As 9l =  1 — e, substitute for 9 above and let 9 «  1. Recall 7* =  ta, then
(ì?a + p ) p = - r \  (*7 + Ap).
Since E  =  (1 — a)A  ((1 — A)9p)~a so that
Ta = —aE9pi =  E (l -  A)0p, r]x — -(1  -  a)E9p
Making the appropriate substitutions with 9 & I I  get
( p - ( l - a ) £ p )  =  (1 -  a)Ep(E(l  -  A)p +  Ap)
1 — (1 — a)E  =  (1 — ot)E(E(l — A) +  A).
Thus, A depends in a complicated and non-linear way on the parameters of the 
model.
A.8 Numerical Simulation Procedure
I have defined the following variables in Mathematica
t := (a*(l - a)*A)‘a~(-l) 
gt := -rho - t + a*A*t~(l - a)
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gth := -rho + a*A*(rho*th) *(1 -  a)
c := FindRoot[ths*rho -  t* ( l  -  th s )~ ( l/a )  == 0, { th s , 0>] 
t s t  :=(1 -  th ) -  a " (a /( l  -  a))
where th — 0, t =  f , gt =  7 (f) and gth  =  7(0). Setting 4^ — 1 and for given 
values of a  and p I have calculated ths =  0r, set ths — th  and calculated gt 
and gth, recording the values in the table. I have checked, but not recorded, the 
results with calculating tst.
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Part II
Economic Growth and 
Distributive Policies in Open
Economies
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Chapter 3
Economic Growth, 
Redistribution, Capital Mobility 
and Tax Competition in Open 
Economies
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I investigate the effects of redistributive taxation on economic 
growth in economies linked by factor mobility. In many policy discussions that 
address the issue of growth vs. redistribution, setting higher taxes for redistribu­
tive purposes is deemed to slow growth. Yet most developed and some developing 
countries redistribute a significant share of their GDP. Does that always lead to 
lower GDP growth? In the chapter’s model the experience of higher or lower 
GDP growth, when governments opt for redistribution, depends on who their 
opponents are when setting taxes in a non-cooperative environment. Further­
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more, it is shown that the growth/redistribution trade-off crucially hinges on 
technological efficiency.
As in the previous chapters I assume that the government provides public 
services that feed back into production. The model follows Alesina and Rodrik
(1991), (1994) in that a government tha t cares about the non-accumulated fac­
tor of production in a closed economy chooses lower growth if it redistributes
resources to that factor.
The present chapter extends the growth redistribution trade-off problem to a 
two-country world.1 I identify the accumulated factor of production with capital 
and the non-accumulated factor of production with labour. The workers never 
save, and supply labour inelastically.* 2 The capital owners do not work, accumu­
late capital and decide where to install their capital. That model specification 
allows one to concentrate on the problem of growth and distributive taxation.
Capital is internationally mobile in the chapter, and capital mobility has a 
direct bearing on the productivity of capital employed in production. The under­
lying forces governing the varying degrees of capital mobility are left unmodelled.
As Alesina and Rodrik I assume that the governments tax the capital owners’ 
wealth, but not the non-accumulated factor of production. The wealth tax scheme 
is meant to represent a broad class of tax arrangements and captures problems 
associated with taxation of the accumulated factor of production in the growth 
process.3 As in the previous chapters expropriation of capital is ruled out for the
JThe chapter is a revised version of ’Economic Growth, (Re-)Distributive Policies, Capital 
Mobility and Tax Competition in Open Economies’, EUI Working Paper, ECO 97/24, 1997.
2Bertola (1993) derives this behaviour for utility maximizing agents.
3In light of chapter 2 the choice of tax base is not at all innocuous. For instance, Bertola 
(1993) or Alesina and Rodrik (1994) point out that indirect taxation may lead to different 
results as regards the growth redistribution trade-off. In the previous chapter it has been 
shown that a capital income taxation cum investment subsidy tax scheme designed to equal a 
tax on consumption of the accumulated factor of production may guarantee higher growth in 
a closed economy for left-wing governments than right-wing ones. An extension of this closed
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governments by assumption. Two principles for capital income taxation in open 
economies are common.* 4
Under the *residence principle’ residents are taxed uniformly on their world­
wide income regardless of the source of income (domestic or foreign), while non­
residents are not taxed on income originating in a country.
Under the ’source principle’ all types of income originating in a country are 
taxed uniformly, regardless of the place of residence of the income recipients.
In the chapter it is simply assumed that the source principle for wealth tax­
ation is adopted as a tax rule. If a country loses capital, it suffers in terms of 
welfare of the capital owners or the workers. Given the danger of losing capi­
tal and absent any problems arising from transfer pricing, the source principle 
appears more suited as a tax principle, because in a non-cooperative environ­
ment governments cannot perfectly monitor their residents’ income or wealth. 
Another, empirical justification for the assumption is that capital income paid 
by subsidiaries at home to the center of multinational enterprises abroad (where 
it is often tax exempt) is typically taxed at source and at the same rate as the 
domestic firms’ capital income.
In the optimum the capital owners allocate their capital depending on the
economy result to open economies has been done in ’Redistribution, Income cum Investment 
Subsidy Tax Competition and Capital Flight in Growing Economies’, EUI Working Paper, ECO 
95/16, 1995. The results there suggest that any policy that guarantees high after-tax returns 
may maximize growth and attract capital. Even though right-wing and left-wing governments 
may switch roles in who guarantees high after-tax returns, the basic return-growth relationship 
for attraction of capital exists in this chapter and the open economy version of chapter 2. I 
have chosen the wealth tax base to relate to the literature that treats optimal policies of the 
accumulated factor of production as similar to growth maximizing policies.
4Razin and Yuen (1992) use an endogenous growth set-up to show that the residence prin­
ciple is Ramsey efficient. Their result seems to suffer from a time inconsistency problem since 
distortionary capital or wage taxation may produce time inconsistent solutions. [Cf. Fischer 
(1980), Chamley (1985).] Capital taxation in economies with high capital mobility has re­
ceived quite some attention recently in e.g. Chamley (1992), Canzonieri (1989), Roubini and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992), Gosh (1991) and Devereux and Shi (1991).
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after-tax returns on capital in the economies.5 For given public policies in the 
two economies, I show that in the market equilibrium domestic GDP growth 
depends crucially on the capital allocation decision of the investors.
For the public policy analysis I assume that the governments in each country 
are either ’right-wing’ and only care about the capital owners, or they are ’left- 
wing’ caring about the workers only. The governments’ objectives are such that 
a right-wing government wants to maximize the national investors’ worldwide 
income, whereas a left-wing government is concerned about redistribution, GDP 
and GDP growth. In a closed economy the right-wing government acts growth 
maximizing.
The governments of open economies are taken to engage in tax competition.6 
The objectives imply that the welfare maximizing governments implicitly compete 
for capital.7 The governments (left-wing or right-wing) in each country (domestic 
and foreign) move simultaneously, but before the private sector.8
For technologically similar economies it is shown that in the Nash Equilibria 
there is no room for redistribution for two left-wing governments. The result holds 
for sufficiently high capital mobility. For very low capital mobility the govern­
ments redistribute, but less than in a closed economy. The intuition for the result 
is the following: The left-wing governments face the trade-off between growth and 
redistribution. For the latter they need capital which is internationally mobile.
5 For two-sector growth models with shifting of resources for investment see, for instance, 
Inada (1963), Rahman (1963), Intriligator (1964), Ryder (1969), Hamada (1969), Pitchford 
(1977) or Bagchi, Olsder and Strijbos (1981).
6Tax competition between fiscal authorities has been studied in numerous papers such as, 
for instance, Gordon (1983), Zodrow and Mieszokowski (1986), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1988), 
Wildasin (1989), Gordon (1992), Bond and Samuelson (1989), Coates (1993), Kanbur and Keen 
(1993), or Lockwood (1993).
Competition for capital has, for example, been analyzed in Sinn (1993).
8 For a model that studies the related problem of solving the trade-off between the provi­
sion of government consumption goods and growth in a Barro (1990) world see Devereux and 
Mansoorian (1992).
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They can only get more capital if they set a tax rate that approaches the one 
guaranteeing the maximum after-tax return. For redistribution they want to set 
higher taxes. Since it is capital that is redistributed, tax competition causes a 
left-wing government to concentrate on securing high enough wages. By that the 
effects of the concern for wealth inequality are reduced. The result is driven by 
capital mobility and strategic interaction between two governments which have 
the same preferences.
If a left-wing and a right-wing government compete in taxes, the strategic 
interaction is shown to be less. The reason is that the right-wing government is 
not concerned about redistribution. It just wishes to maximize the capital owners’ 
utility by securing them a maximum after-tax return on capital. As the after­
tax return on capital determines growth, it maximizes growth and by that it also 
attracts foreign capital. The lack of redistributive concern results in an extremely 
simple reaction function which the right-wing government possesses regardless of 
who its opponent is. Given the fixed right-wing reaction function, the left-wing 
government knows it cannot attract foreign capital. As a consequence it chooses 
to redistribute, albeit less than in the closed economy, and experience relatively 
low' GDP growth.
As capital mobility increases, the left-wing governments are shown to be­
gin mimicking right-wing policies. For high capital mobility it follows that two 
competing left-wing governments optimally set tax rates closer to the growth 
maximizing one than under left-right competition.
Next, the chapter analyzes the effect of technological efficiency differences. I 
show that as long as an efficiency gap can be maintained the efficient economy’s 
government gets more capital. That is especially true for a left-wing government 
with an efficient economy. If the gap is large enough, it may redistribute and have
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higher GDP growth than a right-wing opponent. Thus, the growth redistribution 
trade-off may not be a question of being right-wing or left-wing (preferences), but 
rather a problem of being efficient or not (technology). Interestingly and contrary 
to some policy debates, very high factor mobility (’globalization’) may not con­
strain a nationally preferred redistribution policy, if the economy is sufficiently 
efficient.
Finally, for some degrees of capital mobility the model has the surprising 
implication that a left-wing government may be better off in terms of GDP growth 
if it faces competition from another left-wing government. That goes with the cost 
of a reduction in or no redistribution. Competing against a right-wing government 
in turn allows for some redistribution in the optimum, at the cost of reduced GDP 
growth.
Thus, one may conclude that high GDP growth and redistribution are possible 
if the economy is sufficiently efficient. Government preferences alone may not ad­
equately explain the pattern of growth and redistribution in open economies with 
wealth tax competition, differences in strategic behaviour and varying degrees of 
factor mobility.
At the end of the chapter I discuss some empirical implications of the model 
and compare them to the results of chapter 1.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the model set-up, 
derives the dynamic market equilibrium and discusses the optimal policies in a 
closed economy. Section 3.6 analyzes tax competition among governments with 
different objectives. The main results of the chapter are stated in propositions. 
Section 3.7 discusses some empirical implications and section 3.8 concludes.
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3 .2  The Model
Consider a two-country world with a ’’domestic” and a ’’foreign” country. Denote 
variables in the foreign country by a (*). There are many identical individuals 
in each country, who all have the same rate of time preference p. The capitalists 
(k) own capital and no labour and the workers (W), own labour, but no capital. 
All agents derive logarithmic utility from the consumption of a homogeneous, 
malleable good that is produced in the two countries, and the domestic consumers 
prefer to consume the domestic good. By assumption all goods as well as the 
capital stocks can be transferred costlessly between the economies. Following 
Barro (1990) aggregate domestic production takes place according to
Yt = A K ? G lt - a L1t-« i where 0 < a < l  (3.1)
where Yt is output produced in the home country, Gt are public inputs to produc­
tion and A is an efficiency index. The foreign country has the same technology 
and technological differences between the countries are due to differences in effi­
ciency. The economies are called similar if A = A* because the countries may well 
be different in terms of institutional or cultural development. I call economies 
different if A ^ A*, which may capture the situation when one compares a devel­
oped Northern with a less-developed Southern economy. I abstract from problems 
arising from depreciation of the capital stock. Furthermore, L\ — Lt = 1 so that 
the labour endowment is inelastic and equal in both economies. K t is an index 
of the domestically productive capital stock in the home economy. It takes the 
form
K t =  f{ u thu (1 -  u*t )k*t ) = u t kt + <j>\ k\ (3.2)
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where kt (A:J) is the real capital stock owned by domestic (foreign) capitalists. 
The variable wt € [0,1] denotes the fraction of real capital at date t  owned 
by domestic capitalists that is retained at home for domestic production. The 
foreign owned capital stock k[ that becomes domestically productive depends on 
which satisfies
o < <PM;z) < 1 -  u i  , < 0
I assume symmetry for both economies so that and <j>t are symmetric func­
tions. The parameter z measures capital mobility imperfection in the sense to be 
explained below. The function 4>t captures the following: The amount of domes­
tically owned capital, u tku that enters domestic production is fully productive 
at home. In contrast, the domestic capital owners may send (1 — abroad, 
but their capital stock is not as productive abroad as at home. In the model it is 
generally less productive abroad and enters foreign production via, that is, 
through 4>tkt which is less than or equal to (1 —u t)kt. Analogous reasoning holds 
for domestic production Yt and foreign owned capital in (3.1).
Thus, domestically and foreign owned capital stocks are imperfect substitutes 
in production. The degree of substitutability is due to productivity differences. 
The assumption that <f>J is a function of means that the productivity of foreign 
capital depends on how much the foreign capital owners have sent to the domes­
tic economy. If more foreign capital (lower a;**) enters the domestic economy’s 
production, foreign capital becomes more productive (higher <j>l) in the domestic 
economy. One may think of foreign capital as a basket of foreign owned capital 
goods.9 As more of these goods enter domestic production, the possibility of
9The following is worth noting: I have assumed imperfect capital mobility of the same good.
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finding ways to use these goods in a way that produces as efficiently as domestic 
capital goods increases. That justifies - < 0, since a reduction in increases 
<fi*. The parameter z  measures the ease with which that is possible. A higher z 
means that it is easier to find ways so that foreign owned capital is as productive 
as domestically owned capital. The ease of achieving domestic capital productiv­
ity (increasing capital substitutability) is supposed to reflect the degree of capital 
mobility imperfection between the economies. I motivate that as follows:
1. From the trade literature it is well known that highly integrated economies 
like France and Germany or the states within the U.S. have very large 
intra-industrial trade, including trade in capital goods. This suggests that 
a machine produced in Germany (capital good) is as productive in France as 
in Germany when used as a production input and vice versa. In this model 
I extend that by assuming that a machine (stock) owned by a German is 
as productive in French as in German production.
2. Institutions play a powerful role in restricting the usefulness of foreign (real) 
capital at home. For example, if a firm in the U.S. would buy a car manu­
factured in Europe according to European safety standards, the U.S. firm 
would not be able to use that car on U.S. roads, because European cars are 
not required to have blinkers on the car’s sides and have different bumpers. 
Another example is provided by domestically imposing certain norms and 
laws that may make foreign capital domestically unproductive.
For these reasons I call z  a measure of capital mobility. If z  —► oo capital
Call it ectoplasm, cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Ectoplasm and its fruits are assumed 
to be edible (consumption good), the fruits can also be used as investment for growing more 
ectoplasm. I assume that capital is in general less productive abroad and that shipping is 
costless. Then domestic capital will be sent abroad if the return is higher there. Wherever 
the owner’s ectoplasm trees are located, investment in new ectoplasm trees in the particular 
country is assumed to be costless.
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mobility becomes perfect, the different capital stocks become perfect substitutes 
in production and become equally productive. If z -*■ 0, the economies become 
autarkic, the capital stocks become unsubstitutable and foreign capital is get­
ting completely unproductive in the domestic economy’s production. The exact 
influence of the (institutional or technological) factors determining z are left un­
modelled.
The firms in each country operate in a perfectly competitive environment, 
act as profit maximizers and cannot influence the public inputs to production. 
The firms are generally owned by domestic and foreign capital owners who rent 
capital to and demand shares of the domestic firms. The same holds for the 
foreign firms. The domestic capitalists’ assets are their shares of the firms. The 
shares of the domestic and foreign firms are collateralized one-to-one by capital. 
The markets for assets and capital clear at each point in time.10
If the domestic capitalists send their capital abroad, they incur a loss (¡>t < 
1 —u t per unit of domestic capital, as domestically owned capital is less productive 
abroad. However, domestically owned capital may be used for the production of 
foreign type or domestic type good in the foreign economy. If the domestic 
capitalists send their capital abroad in order to produce there, they choose to 
pay the foreign workers (and the government) in foreign type good, and they 
choose to pay themselves in domestic type good. That is so, because all domestic 
agents prefer to consume domestic goods. I assume that the foreign (domestic) 
firms using domestically (foreign) owned capital can produce both types of good 
and that once the capitalists have chosen which type of good is to be produced, 
one cannot change a domestic type good into a foreign type good. Thus, if
10The assumptions that assets are collateralized one-to-one and the rental rate of domestic 
and foreign capital is - later on - constant can easily be relaxed without altering the results. 
For a justification of these assumptions cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Chpt. 2.
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there is any domestically owned capital abroad (or any foreign owned capital in 
the domestic economy), the prices of the two types of goods must be the same, 
because, otherwise, a profit maximizing firm would produce only that type of 
good which commands the higher price. Hence, a firm that uses foreign owned 
capital in domestic production will produce both types of goods only if the prices 
of the goods are equal. That price serves as numéraire and is set equal to 1.
Given perfect competition the firms in the domestic economy generally rent 
foreign and domestic capital and hire labour in spot markets in each period 
in their country. For constant returns to capital and labour, factor payments 
exhaust output. Profit maximization for given entails that firms pay each 
factor of production its marginal product
d¥t = a A $  = rtd(utkt)
Q Y
^  = (1 -  a)A  5 K t = wt
dYt r
d((l -of)*,*) \ l - u >;) ‘
( G \  1~Q
— j
(3.4)
Due to the productivity differences the marginal product of foreign owned capital 
(1 — wl)kl in domestic production is lower than that of domestic capital u tkt.u 
It is clear that the marginal products depend on government policy through the 
amount of public services supplied.
3.2.1 The Public Sector
The governments in both countries redistribute and tax the market value of cap­
ital at constant rates at each point in time. Let r  be the tax rate on the market 
value of capital (wealth) which is held domestically by domestic investors. Thus, 1
11 If foreign owned capital is domestically productive, then K t  =  u t k t  +  ( ~ - b ~) (1 ~ UJt )  K  so 
that a marginal increase of foreign owned capital (more (1 — wf) fc‘) in the domestic economy 
raises K t by ( r ^ ) -
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ft is levied on u tk f  The government also taxes the market value of real for­
eign capital located in the home country, that is, the government demands 
T<j)\k*t of the domestic type good owned by the foreign capitalists or, equivalently, 
it takes the fraction r  of foreign owned, foreign type good which is less productive 
in producing domestic public services Gt. The reason that the government taxes 
less than (1 — uj^kf lies in the fact that if the government raised r( 1 — 
in order to buy capital goods in the domestic market to provide them as pub­
lic inputs in production, the buyers of this type of capital good would only be 
willing to pay <j>\ per unit of kj for it, since foreign capital is less productive at 
home.12 Analogous reasoning applies for the foreign government. This way of 
taxing wealth means that the countries adopt the source principle as a tax rule 
which requires that all types of wealth present in a country be taxed uniformly, 
regardless of the place of residence of the owners of wealth.
The government faces the following budget constraint, which is assumed to 
be balanced at each point in time
rK t =  Gt +  A t K %.
The LHS depicts the tax revenues and the RHS public expenditures. The workers 1
receive the fraction A of tax revenues, that is, ArK u as transfers and Gt is spent
(
on public inputs to production. The variable A represents the degree of redistri-
bution in the economy. Rearranging and taking into account that the domestic |
-----------------------------------------  . 1
12Recall that foreign capital yields income fjT*. at home. Therefore, the price per unit of r
foreign capital at home equals which is less than that of domestic capital. Then the total j
market value of foreign capital is given by <¡>1 . That way of taxing the market value of capital
is compatible with the source principle of capital income taxation. i
\
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government may have two sources of tax revenues the budget constraint satisfies
Gt = (1 -  A)rK t. (3.5)
Notice that r  is set by the government independently of other factors in the 
economy which corresponds to the uniform taxation of wealth as required by 
the strict form of the source principle. Differential taxation of foreigners and 
residents in the presence of perfect capital mobility has been investigated in a 
working paper version of the chapter.13 In contrast, in this paper the strict form 
is assumed to hold. As shown in e.g. Razin and Sadka (1994) or Bovenberg (1994) 
the source principle entails a uniform taxation of residents’ and foreigners’ capital 
income. The model can in principle allow for discriminatory taxation at the 
expense of considerable technical complications. Of course, the question whether 
tax discrimination plays a major role in the equilibria below is of interest, but 
then all the equilibria found in this paper can be interpreted as and shown to be 
results about average tax rates in a model with discriminatory taxation,
3.2.2 The Private Sector
The private sector is made up of many identical firms, workers and capital owners. 
Equation (3.4) implies that for given wt and given public policy the returns 
to domestically owned capital and labour are given by
r =  a A [(l-A )r]1-° ,, (3.6)
wt = r?(r, A)Kt = (1 -  a)A[{ 1 -  Ajr]1- “^ ,  Lt =  1, V* . (3.7)
13See ’Redistribution, Wealth Tax Competition and Capital Flight in Growing Economies’, 
EUI Working Paper ECO 95/9,1995.
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so that the return r  on domestically owned capital is constant and higher than  
the constant return on foreign owned capital. The wages are not constant, 
but grow with the index K t of domestically productive capital. It can be seen 
that taxes and redistribution have a bearing on the marginal product of capital. 
Use the definitions given in (3.5), and (3.6), assume 0 < wt < 1, 0 < ) <  1
and fixed for the home country and let E  =  (1 — a)A[(l — A)r]~a. Then
A A
TT = aE( 1 - A ) > 0  , = a E { -r )  < 0 . (3.8)
So redistribution has a negative effect on the return on capital and increases in
the tax rate raise the rate of return. For the wages, (7 I obtain
| f  =  ( l - a ) £ ( l - A ) > 0  , | [  =  (1 -  a )E (- r )  < 0. (3.9)
Thus, for given and given K t an increase in r  leads to a positive change in 
the rate of return and in wages. Redistribution lowers each of them.
The workers derive the following utility stream from consuming their entire 
wages and government transfers
ƒ °° In C'f e~’’ldt where C™ = t/(t, \ ) K t + XrKt. (3.10)
Jo
They do not invest and are not taxed by assumption.
The capitalists in each country cannot move, choose how much to consume 
or invest, and take the paths of (r,r* ,r,r* ) as given. As the capital owners have 
the opportunity to invest in either country, they determine where their capital is 
to be located, wt. They have perfect foresight and maximize their intertemporal
155
B B S
utility according to
max f  In C Ìe ptdt 
c*« Jo (3.11a)
s.t. kt = (r -  r)(jjtkt +  (r* -  T*)$(u>t)ht -  C* (3.11b)
0 < u t < 1 (3.11c)
¿(0) = ko, k( oo) = free. (3.11d)
Equation (3.11b) is the capitalists’ dynamic budget constraint and it captures 
the following: The capital owners allocate their capital stock to the home or 
foreign country depending on the return, they receive in a particular country. If 
they allocate u k t to the home country they receive the rate of return r. If they 
allocate (1 — u)k t to the foreign country, only <j>tkt will become productive and 
they will only receive the rate of return on the amount of capital that has become 
productive abroad. Thus, they receive capital income r* (1—v t)kt =  r*<f>kt
in the foreign country. By assumption consumption and investment goods as 
well as capital stocks can travel freely and re-investment of profits earned in a 
country is costless in that particular country. The worldwide investment of the 
domestic capital owners is the sum of what they invest at home, ¿J**, and of 
what they invest abroad, ¿Jr As goods and stocks can travel freely, = u tkt and 
¿21 = (1 “  wt)kt which explains the kt term on the LHS of the budget constraint.
The necessary first order conditions for the problem above are given by 
(3.11b), (3.11c), (3.11d) and
C * - *  =  ° (3.12a)
fit(r - r ) k t + -  r*)4f(u)t)kt = 0 (3.12b)
fit =  fitp -  fj,t [(r -  r)u t +  (r* -  T')<j>(u)t)] (3.12c)
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(3.12d)lim ktn te~,lt =  0.t—tOQ
where fj,t is a positive co-state variable which is interpreted as the instantaneous 
shadow price of one more unit of investment at each date. Equation (3.12a) 
equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow price of more in­
vestment, (3.12c) is the standard Euler equation which relates the costs of fore­
gone investment (LHS) to the discounted gain in marginal utility (RHS), noting 
= f t^, and (3.12d) is the transversality condition for the capital stock which 
ensures that the present value of the capital stock approaches zero asymptotically. 
Equation (3.12b) describes the investors’ capital allocation decision. It depends 
on the after-tax returns of the domestically owned capital stocks in either econ­
omy, since
-=
r — t
r* — r*
If one totally differentiates the expression one sees that the allocation decision ojt 
is increasing in the ratio of the domestic to the foreign after-tax returns,
^  ° - where ^ ' ) < o -
Thus, if the domestic after-tax return increases, the capitalists leave more capital 
at home. To fix ideas and keep matters simple consider the explicit <j> function
<Ku t ) =  —^ -r -  —JT  w‘+" ’ (313)
which obeys all the restrictions I have put on <j> earlier on.14 The parameter z
14It is immediate that 0', < 0. In order to check if <f>(u) < (1 -  u>) let d  = (1 — a;) — <p{u)-
Then = — 1 +u>* and establishes that uj = 1 minimizes d  for any z € [0, oo) so
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measures the degree of capital mobility imperfection. As required by (3.3) the 
limiting case z  —► oo (0) captures perfect capital mobility (autarky). Then the 
optimal decision rule is given by
u —  m\ (3.14)
which is increasing in the domestic after tax return for < 1 and constant 
over time. If the after-tax return ratio is larger or equal to 1, the investors leave 
their capital in their home country, u  =  1, ^(uj) =  0. If the foreign after-tax 
return goes up at 77—7 > 1, the investors may shift their capital abroad. Depend­
ing on the after-tax returns in the two countries the growth rate of consumption 
follows in a standard way from (3.12c) and (3.14):
Consumption grows at a constant rate and increases in the after-tax returns. 
Suppose the capitalists’ capital stock and their consumption grow at the same 
rate. That means that the capital stock of the capitalists grows at a rate which 
depends on the after-tax returns in the two countries. If the after-tax returns 
are such that u  =  1, all the growth of domestically owned capital takes place in 
the home country. If the foreign after-tax return is sufficiently high, it becomes 
attractive for the domestic investor to shift capital abroad. The domestically 
owned capital stock grows then at a rate that is a mixture of contributions of 
home and foreign investment.
that d > 0. Now let m = —  and note that m z = > 0. Then m  ~¥ 0 (1) as z -+ 0 {00).
Suppose w < 1. Then for z  -¥ 0 we have u 1+f - t  0 and m  -* 0 so that d —► 1 -  u  > 0. For 
2 —► 00 we have lj1+* —► a; and m —> 1 so that d —» 0. From this I conclude that (1 — u )  > 
for all z G [0,00) and u> G [0,1].
7  — =  (r  -  +  (r* -  r*)^(w ) -  p. (3.15)
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The equations (3.11b), (3.12d), (3.14) and (3.15) imply that in the optimum 
the capitalists’ consumption is given by C* =  pk%. Thus, 7 =  7* so that the 
capitalists’ consumption and wealth grow at the same rate.15
3,3 M arket Equilibrium
The constancy of r,r*  implies constancy of r,r* and and hence 7 >7*-
3.3.1 Closed Economy
For a closed economy u? = 1 and K% =  h . It is not difficult to see that the 
model reduces to the one analyzed in chapter 1. Hence, the market equilibrium 
is characterized by steady state, balanced growth with 7r  =  Ik — 7 = 7c w where 
7 = (r — r) — p and r — ari[(l — A)t]1_q. Lemma 1.1 of chapter 1 implies that 
growth is maximized by A = 0 and f  =  [a(l — a)A]« where f  solves rT =  1.
Figure 3.1: The relationship between 7 and r  in a closed economy
7
Figure 3.1 shows that growth is traded off against redistribution at a point such 
as f  with A > 0. The after-tax return is given by
r  -  t  =  aA[( 1 -  A)r]1_a -  r  =  r  (ft>l[(l -  A)r]_a -  l )  .
15For a derivation see Appendix A.l on p. 119.
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and from Lemma 1.2 of chapter 1 the maximum after-tax return is f —f  = f  ( ■
As > 0» i  = 7> (r — f ), f , an increase in efficiency raises the maximum growth 
rate, the maximum after-tax return and the growth maximizing tax rate. That 
describes the dynamic market equilibrium of the closed economy.
3.3.2 Two-Country World
In this section the dynamic market equilibrium of the domestic economy is derived 
for given, arbitrary tax rates and so for given u> and u* as the latter are functions 
of the tax rates. Define v% = ^  and v\ =  * as the shares of domestic and 
foreign capital in productive capital.
The capital owners’ optimum implies 7 =  7* where 7 is given by (3.15) and 
is constant. Hence, in an open economy equilibrium the domestic capitalists’ 
consumption grows at the same, constant rate as their wealth. The same holds 
for the foreign capitalists. The total wealth of the domestic capitalists at any 
point in time is kt and the budget constraint satisfies
kt — rukt — r u k t  + r*<f>kt — T*<f>kt — Ck
In the two-country world with given w, u* the world resource constraint is given
by
kt + k; =  rK t +  VK t +  t'K -  + r,'K[ - G t -G 't -  C? -  C f  -  C f  -  C f
where Kt = ukt + (t>"k[, K't = ui'k’t +<j>ku G, = (X - \ ) r K t and G\ =  (1 — A ‘)t‘K; 
since the governments run balanced budgets. The production functions imply 
Yt =  rK t +  wKt and Yt* =  r*Kf -{- tj* K From the private sector optimality and
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the steady state conditions the world resource constraint satisfies
7h  +  7*kt = (r -  r)K t +  (r* -  t * ) K t* -  pkt -  pk\ .
In equilibrium GDP* =  YJ so that GDP grows at the same rate as output. From 
the production function it follows that output Y% must grow at same rate as K tt 
because Gt grows at the same rate as K t. Then the evolution of the domestic 
economy is determined by the growth rate of the aggregate, domestically produc­
tive capital stock which is given by
r t Kt 7we7ifco +  7*0*elf' tfc; t * ,
Y r  u * * k o + T * -%  =  1/17+1/17
(3.16)
Notice that this growth rate is a weighted average of the growth rates of the 
domestic and the foreign capitalists’ capital (wealth) and it is in general not 
constant over time. To see that I calculate
dr, _ (V W * + 7,2<n-;eT-() Kf _ (tf,)2  ^ ^  a
dt K f -  (7 7 ) A
where A =  ukoe — . Thus, Tt is increasing over time, unless 7 = 7*. Next, I 
wish to find lim T* if 7 > 7* which is given by
lim f  ( k S i y f  
i- » 0 0  | 7 ^ 7
7u)kQ + lim 7t—»00
u kQ + lim <£*ei7’~7^ /c£
Lemma 3.1 The GDP growth rate T* is increasing over time, ^  > 0, for any 
7 ^  7*. ƒƒ 7 > 7*, then Hm r t|7>7. = 7 .
Thus, the GDP growth rate approaches the domestic, closed economy growth
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rate, if 7 > 7*.
Recall that 7 =  7^  so that there is a difference between GDP or GNP con- 
sumption growth of the capital owners. As all goods can travel costlessly I as­
sume that GDP consumption adjusts at each point in time so as to maintain 
equilibrium. Thus, the domestic economy is characterized by balanced, but not 
necessarily steady state growth.
It is clear that a/, w* play a crucial role in determining the open economy equi­
librium. But as the tax rates are given arbitrarily at this stage, one cannot say 
anything about the exact form of the equilibrium. Arbitrary levels and combina­
tions of tax rates sustain multiple dynamic market equilibria. Economically, one 
cannot say very interesting things about the economies unless more structure is 
put on the way taxes are set. That is the objective of the tax competition game 
I contemplate below.
3.4 The Government
The domestic government is assumed to maximize the welfare of its domestic 
clientele. The governments take the intertemporal utility of their clientele as their 
welfare measure. From the theory of optimal taxation it is known that a govern­
ment’s objective can be stated in terms of the indirect utility function. However, 
a government’s welfare function need not necessarily coincide with the individual 
agents’ utilities as noted in e.g. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) or Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1980), chpt. 12. The working paper version of this chapter implicitly as­
sumed that the domestic right-wing government represented the interests of the 
(domestic and foreign) capital owners as a class.16 Then a right-wing government
16See 'Redistribution, Wealth Tax Competition and Capital Flight in Growing Economies’, 
EUI Working Paper ECO 95/9, 1995.
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would be interested in GDP growth and would have an objective function very 
similar to a left-wing government’s one. Both, right-wing and left-wing govern­
ments would then compete in taxes. But as governments are voted for by their 
national constituencies, that kind of international class objective is inconsistent 
with a truly representative, national democracy. It is an interesting question, 
however, whether pro-capital governments are truly and only representing their 
national voters (capital owners) in reality. The answer to that question is out­
side the model. Instead, in the chapter I assume that the governments really do 
represent the national capital owners’ interests only.
In appendix B .l I show' that a domestic right-wing (strictly pro-capital) gov­
ernment (superscript r) has the objective function
V r = r i a C ^ d t  =  ^
J0 p r  (3.17)
where C j  =  p k Q, 7 =  (r — r ) w  -I- (r* — t *)4>( u j )  —  p .
The growth rate here is that of kt and not K t. That follows from the fact that the 
right-wing government serves domestic capitalists only and is therefore concerned 
about the capital owners’ worldwide income and not GDP.
Similarly, the welfare measure of a domestic left-wing (strictly pro-labour) 
government (superscript l) integrates to
V' =  f°°  In Clve -ptdt = +  -  f°°  T, e '^ d t
Jo P  P  Jo
where Cÿ' =  ( t) ( t , A) + Ar) K 0, Vt = + ^ 7%
Vt =  v't S  - - P — , Kt =  wJfc#e* +
(3.18)
As the wages depend on the productive capital stock, the left-wing government 
is concerned about the level and the growth rate of GDP.
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The two objective functions are increasing in (¿0, 7) and continuous in tax 
rates for given w*. Thus, given everything else getting more domestic capital 
is in the interest of right-wing and left-wing governments in the model. Further­
more, the workers’ welfare is also increasing in A;J and 7*. Thus, each govern­
ment’s objective is implicitly compatible with another objective, namely that of 
increasing the growth rate of domestically owned capital. Hence, any policy that 
generates higher domestic capitalists’ capital growth is in the interest of both 
types of government as it raises each group’s welfare.
3.5 The Government in a Closed Economy
Respecting the right of private property, a right-wing or a left-wing government 
chooses t  and A to maximize its clientele’s welfare. Exactly the same problem has 
been analyzed in chapter 1. I present the optimal policies again for convenience. 
The left-wing government chooses
If p > [(1 — a)A]° then:
T = / 7 , A = 1 —
[(1 - q)A]°
P
(3.19)
If p < [(1 — a) A]® then:
r[ l  -  a ( l  — a)Ar a] =  p{\ — a), A = 0 . (3.20)
Again, I denote the (t, A) combination that solves (3.19) or (3.20) by f  and A.
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The right-wing government chooses the the growth maximizing (r, A) combi­
nation (see Lemma 1.1 of chapter 1)
f  =  [a(l — a)A]° and A =  0. (3.21)
Thus, a redistributing, left-wing government (A > 0) trades off growth against 
redistribution with a policy f , A > 0. According to Proposition 1.3 of chapter 1 
the conditions for redistribution are restrictive. As the proposition is im portant 
in this chapter I restate it for convenience.
P roposition  1.3 For a redistributing (X > 0), left-wing government 7 > 0 only 
if a > | .  An increase in efficiency makes the left-wing government redis­
tribute less wealth given its optimal policy, that is, < 0.
Thus, an increase in efficiency causes the left-wing government of a closed econ­
omy to redistribute less wealth in the optimum. The normative and empirical 
implications of the result for a closed economy have been discussed in chapter 1.
3.6 Tax Com petition in a Two-Country 
World with C apital Mobility
What happens to the optimal, closed economy policies if governments have to 
decide in a two-country world with capital mobility and the governments can­
not coordinate their policies? That is a relevant question for countries among 
which full tax harmonization is not feasible. As a consequence governments 
may engage in tax competition. (For a similar point see, for instance, Sinn 
(1990) or Bovenberg (1994).) I model that problem as tax competition, that 
is, as a non-cooperative game between two governments. The strategies of the
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two governments are the choices of r, A and t*,A* and only pure strategies are 
considered. I assume that perfect knowledge prevails about all the parameters, 
objective functions, the strategies and the sequence of moves. Everybody acts 
non-cooperatively. The governments move simultaneously and the private sector 
agents move simultaneously. But both governments move before the private sec­
tor. At each point in time the agents are confronted with the same problem. The 
agents remember at date t only what they have done at date 0. The capitalists 
in either economy have the same initial capital stock, k0 = and the economies 
are equally efficient, A — A*, unless stated otherwise. All agents are taken to 
be equally patient across countries. If the capital owners can invest in a global 
environment, it is reasonable to assume that they have the same rate of time 
preference.
These assumptions reduce the game to a simple two-stage game.17 The gov­
ernments act as Stackelberg leaders and the private sectors act as Stackelberg 
followers. Given the optimal capital allocation decision of the capitalists (w, u;*) 
the governments decide on the tax rates and redistribution. Given the tax rates 
and A, A* the private sector decides on where to invest. Solving backwards in this 
way requires a domestic government to maximize (3.17) or (3.18) with respect to 
its instruments, taking its opponent’s choices of (r*, A*) as given. I will consider 
each possible match between a right-wing and a left-wing government under the 
assumption that the economies are similar (A =  A*) or significantly different
17In terms of dynamic games I therefore contemplate a repeated game with an open loop infor­
mation structure. I justify the information structure by the requirement that democratic gov­
ernments of either political leaning must constantly be reminded of their pre-election promises 
so that the outcome of the game in the first stage provides a benchmark for their decisions at 
time t. If the governments could remember the whole history of the game, time inconsistency 
issues might emerge. Modelling problems of time inconsistency and possibilities to cope with 
them is beyond the scope of the chapter. Thus, I assume that governments commit themselves 
to their decisions. How the commitment is enforced is outside of the model. References for 
dynamic games are e.g. Petit (1990) and Basax and Olsder (1995).
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{A > A*).18
3.6.1 The Right-wing Government’s Problem
A right-wing government does not redistribute in the model and solves
max Vr s.t. r*, A* given; A =  0.
T
I suppress the time subscript 0 in what follows. From (3.17) the FOC involves
£ p  +  7  =  0 - (3'22)
As Ck = pk, Ck =  0. For the growth rate I find
7r  =  ( r -  t ) ujt  +  (rT -  l ) a >  +  (r* -  r * ) ( f > T .
Define Si =  — ^7, Q). =  and =  rr.r_T71. so that from (3.14)
uT =  , (¡>T — —z£,\
The domestic capitalists’ FOC directly implies <j>T(r* — r*) + u ;T(r — r) =  0 and
so 7T = (rT — 1) u . Thus, equation (3.22) is solved by f  =  [a(l — a)A ]i and
is identical to the optimal right-wing policy in a closed economy. Note that the
optimal tax rate is independent of the degree of capital mobility (z ), the efficiency
in the foreign country A* and the opponent government’s tax choice.
18 To formulate the distributional conflict between capitalists and workers in a closed economy 
as a dynamic game has, for example, been done in Lancaster (1973), Pohjola (1983), Basar, 
Haurie and Ricci (1985), Mehrling (1986), Haurie and Pohjola (1987), Shimonura (1991), de 
Zeeuw (1992), or Seierstad (1993).
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Proposition  3.1 For any A, A*, z and r* a domestic right-wing government 
chooses the growth maximizing tax rate f  — [a(l — a)A ]i, irrespective of who its 
opponent is.
Hence, in any Nash Equilibrium a right-wing government pursues a policy that 
maximizes the domestic investors’ worldwide capital income. As f  is independent 
of foreign policy instruments, the right-wing government has a completely fixed 
reaction function.
3.6.2 The Left-wing Government’s Problem
Given Nash behaviour a domestic left-wing government has to take the foreign 
policy choices as given. Hence, the left-wing government’s problem is given by
max [  In C ^ e '^ d t  
r,x Jo
s.t. C}v =  (r)(r, A) +  Ar) Kt; K t = ukae* +  p k ^ e 1' 1; (3-23)
A > 0; t*, A* given.
That problem is not easily solved in general unless restrictions are put on how 
the opponent behaves or one rules out certain consumption paths. I will state 
these restrictions as I go along.
3.6.3 Left-wing vs. Right-wing
Suppose the domestic left-wing government competes in taxes with a foreign 
right-wing government, when both economies are similar. By Proposition 3.1 
the right-wing government always sets r  =  f. Under common knowledge the
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left-wing government’s problem becomes
maxV 1 s.t. r* =  f *, A >  0r,A
where V 1 is given by (3.18). As the foreign right-wing government always sets 
t* =  T*y and given A  =  A*, the domestic left-wing government cannot guarantee 
a higher after-tax return than the foreign right-wing government. But then it 
must be that 10 * — 1, <j>*(u*) =  0 and r t =  7- Thus, the GDP and GNP growth 
rate are the same for the domestic left-wing government. As a consequence it is 
not able to attract any foreign capital so that the FOC is given by19
V} = =  0, (3.24)
+  ? )
=  0. (3.25)
As in the closed economy the left-wing government wants to set r  > t for either 
maximization of wages or redistribution. But any tax rate r  > f  makes j T in 
(3.24) negative, since rT < 1 for r  > f . Recall C™ — (tj + \ t ) K o and notice that
I V =o =  7 =  (r -  t)u> +  (r* -  r*)(j>(w) -  p
since u) < 1 as r* — r* > r — r. From that I get
7t =  (rT -  l)w +  (r -  t)cjt +  (r* -  r*)<f)T. (3.26)
19The A(-) expression enters because of complementary slackness for A > 0.
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a <j>r = -zT .\U 2T, Ljx = zZzi n l  4x = - z E i n l .  (3.27)
Some algebra reveals that <f>T(r* — r*) +  (r -  r)wT = 0. Hence yT ~  (rT -1 )  u> and 
analogously 7a =  rx w. Substituting the expressions above in (3.24) and (3.25) 
yields for an interior solution
Vr + A 
77 + Ar
??A +  r
77 + Ar
+  — = rT- l (3.28)CJ P
+  — = rx----- (J. (3.29)
CJ P
Multiplying these equations by the inverses of rT — 1 and rx resp., setting the 
resulting equations equal, rearranging and noting that rTr}X =  rXTjT establishes20
[(1 — a M]°
1 — A
(3.30)
The same relation holds in the closed economy. So again t  > f . Rearrange (3.28)
to obtain
Vt +  A 
77 +  rA
z u
-------- 1—r — r p
■1-1
= -  (rT -  1). (3.31)
20 To see that this is true let a\ = and a% = Then
(3.28): -2 1 — +  ■ U r  '  =  - - urT -  1 w(rT -  1) p (3.29): — + —  =rX u  rA p
Thus, The definitions of fij., imply z^ f =r) =  ^  So one
is left with = if  - Multiplication of both sides by (q+Ar) yields (r}T+ X)r\ = (i7A~Hr)(rT — 1). 
Equations (3.8) and (3.9) imply rTrj\ =  r\T)r so that t}\ + Ar* = rrT — r  which is identical to 
equation (A.3.11) in appendix A.3. Solving yields (3.30).
Letting r  f+, rT < 1 and so the RHS is positive. Prom that one immediately 
gets that t  t  if z oo. Turning to redistribution I rearrange (3.29), use 
(3.30) and simplify in order to check whether Vjj > 0 evaluated at A =  0. The 
condition for that is21
[(1 -  a ) i4 ) 'i  >
Z  LJ
-------- 1---r  — t p (3.32)
The LHS is positive. Suppose the workers are impatient22 (p large) and z —¥ 0 
(near autarky), then it is possible that V \ >  0. However, since z e  [0, oo) there 
must be a z°} where V{ < 0. Thus, there exists a z > z° where A =  0 . Refer 
to the tax rate chosen for z E [0, z°] as r° and the one chosen for z > z° as r l . 
Recall that r t — 7 for <f>* = 0. Identify the GDP growth rate associated with r° 
as r° and the corresponding oj as w0, then it must be that T0 < TJ and u>° < 1 
with A > 0. Also, for every z > z°, call it z 1, there is an optimal tax rate r 1. Call 
r 1,^;1 the GDP growth rate and capital allocation decision for that r 1. Then 
< 1, A = 0, 7* > 7 and T1 < TJ. To see this note that for the foreign right- 
wing government TJ = 7* + so that T < TJ is equivalent to 7* > 7(1 -  v*) in 
the foreign economy. By Lemma 3.1 TJ is increasing over time and in the limit it 
is equal to 7*. But then T < TJ for r 1 and r° and all t. From the argument about 
z —► 00 it follows that t  -> f . But any optimal r is a function of z. With r  t 
as z —► 00 it may happen that in the limit w = 0 and so V1 —> — 00 which cannot 
be optimal. Thus, I conclude that if z  —► 00 a domestic left-wing government
21 Again let a2 = Using (3.27) it is true for (3.29) that a2 §  -  ( ^  +  =
“ r * ( t=7 +  ? ) '  Then ~  ~ x(n+\r) - Evaluating at A = 0 implies ^  = 2i± l. Recall
E  = (1 -  a)A[(l -  A)r]“ ° and so q = E t ^t x  = — t o lE , tjx = - r (  1 -  a )E  from (3.7), (3.8), and 
(3.9). At A = 0 this implies . Now substitute for r  from (3.30). A = 0 implies
E  — 1 and so = [(1 — a)A] ° . Thus, for VjJ > 0 equation (3.32) must hold.
22 Extreme patience p —► 0, too, causes the left-wing government to mimic a right-wing policy.
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will definitely set r  — f  in the optimum. For this case define u>2 and T2. Then 
u 2 =  1 and T2 =  T*. Consequently T0 < T1 < T2 where T2 =  T*. From these 
arguments I obtain23
Proposition  3.2 I f  a domestic, left-wing government competes in taxes with a 
foreign, right-wing government and the economies are similar, A  = A*, then
1. For low degrees of capital mobility, z € [0,2°] the left-wing government sets 
r > t and A > 0. Then oj° < 1 and T0 < FJ.
2. If z > z°, there is no redistribution, A = 0. The left-wing government just 
maximizes wages. Then u/° < a?1 < X and T1 < TJ.
5. If capital mobility is nearly perfect, z —> oo, the left-wing government begins 
to mimic the right-wing government and will choose t — t . Then u 2 = 1 
and T2 — 7 =  Tf and constant.
l r ° < r 1< r 2 where r2 = r;.
Comparing the solutions with A = 0 for the left-wing government in the closed 
economy, (3.19), and the open economy case, (3.31), I find that wages are lower 
when opening the economies up. Define fx -o)WEi as the tax rate that the left- 
wing government sets in the closed economy and ta=o,w<i as the one in the two- 
country world. Then, if z > 0, one will observe f*=o,w=i > ta=o,w<i so that wage 
maximization by a domestic left-wing government is adversely affected by a high
degree of capital mobility in the optimum.
23Notice that the proposition establishes that there is steady state growth in the domestic 
economy, which may not be the case for the foreign right-wing government’s economy. T* and so 
GDP increase over time. I interpret this as being really good for the foreign workers. However, 
the main focus of this section is on the optimal behaviour of the domestic government given 
the optimal behaviour of the foreign government.
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Corollary 3.1 For a domestic left-wing government facing a right-wing foreign 
government it follows that f\=o,w=\ > 7\=o,£j<i* Thus, wages are lower in an open 
than in a closed economy.
Two important features of Proposition 3.2 merit attention. First, left-wing gov­
ernments do not redistribute in equilibrium if capital mobility is high. The reason 
is that the effects of the concern for inequality are competed away by fear of los­
ing capital. Capital is good for redistributive reasons and for wages. Facing tax 
competition when capital mobility is high, the left-wing government is better off 
if - instead of redistribution - it puts more emphasis on securing high wages. 
With perfect capital mobility the after-tax returns are equal across countries. 
In that case capital is indifferent where to go because when both economies are 
equally efficient and perfect capital mobility prevails both governments optimally 
act as a right-wing government would by setting the tax rates that maximize the 
domestic capitalists’ worldwide income.24
Second, as the right-wing government chooses a rather inflexible tax profile, 
the left-wing government can take that into account and chooses to redistribute, 
if capital mobility is not high. That is due to a lack of strategic interaction. 
The left-wing government knows that it cannot attract foreign capital. Its best 
response is to take the optimal choice of the right-wing government as given and
then solve its tax, redistribution problem.25
24If z -¥ oo the solution to the capitalists’ problem in (3.12b) takes a ’bang-bang’ form. That 
case is analyzed in ’Redistribution, Wealth Tax Competition and Capital Flight in Growing 
Economies’, EUI Working Paper, ECO 95/9, 1995.
25Note that this is still an outcome of a game. The right-wing government uses the w reaction 
function of the second stage of the game. So even though the game collapses in the first stage 
(fixed reaction), the optimal tax choice of the right-wing government is still the result of a 
sequential (two-stage) game.
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3.6.4 Left-wing vs. Left-wing
Now the domestic left-wing government’s problem is to choose taxes when facing 
a foreign left-wing government. Again, assume A  =  A*. As capital is good for 
left-wing governments, the best the domestic left-wing government can do is to 
find optimal policies for given tax choices of its left-wing opponent. Then the 
domestic left-wing government’s problem in (3.23) is given by
maxV* s.t. r*,A* given; A > 0.
T,X
Maximization involves setting the derivatives —  and ^  equal to zero for finding 
the optimum. I restrict the analysis to steady state paths with 7 = 7*. Thus, 
r, A must solve  ^ = 0 where j  =  r, A. In appendix B.2 it is shown that
under the steady state restriction, 7 =  7*, the following FOC must be satisfied
r  : 
A: A
Vt + A u Tkp +  4>* Icq 
r) + Ar K 0 
(  T)x + T  | LJxkp A  <f>\kp 
\ 7 )  +  \ t  K o
7ti/ +  7 X  _  0
P
(3.33)
. +  +  _ 0 (3.34)
where v = 7^ , v* — and the A(*) expression enters because of complemen­
tary slackness for A > 0. The first two expressions on the LHS in (3.33) and (3.34) 
represent the effects of changes in the wage rate. The third expression shows how 
the growth rate, weighted by its contribution to the overall capital stock, reacts 
to changes in policy. The steady state assumption implies that T = 7  =  7* so 
that in an equilibrium GDP and GNP grow at the same rate.
Equation (3.27) implies j r =  (rT — l)u>. For evaluation of 7* let £1 =
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2 2 a  Cll = r^  and n i  =  Then
o»; =  - ^ n ‘, 4>r =  z S |+l o}, «  =  2e j+i e l  (3.35)
and u*(r* — r*) +  <j>*(r -  r) =  0 so that
i/7x = v (rT — 1) u  and i/*7* = i/* (rT — 1) 0*. (3.36)
Let “ 1 s  ^ . “2 =  ^ 7 >  h  s  and 62 =  — f f i V  Assume an interior
solution for A exists. From (3.33) and (3.34) it is true that
a\ +  &1 VU3 +  V* <j>* , . fl2 +  2^ VW “i" V*<i>*
t : ---------- ---------------and A : ---------- = --------------- .
rT -  1 p rx p
Setting these equations equal yields
(ai +  &i) =  (a2 +  £>2) (rT — 1).
It is not difficult, but cumbersome to verify that biT\ =  ^ ( tv — l).26 Thus, one 
is left with expressions that yield the same result as in the closed economy case,
i.e. r  — (See footnote 20.) I need the result later on and make it
Lemma 3.2 Under left-right or left-left competition, for a (rt \ )  solution with 
A > 0 the condition r  — has to be satisfied.
Given everything else, two left-wing governments would like to set t > f . But *62
26The equality may be verified using (3.27) and (3.35)
£>1 r* = l / K  ( z u f  0 ). k  +  z u *  flj £2 k * )  r x
62 (rT -  1) = l / K ( z t j U lx  k  +  z u '  Oi E2 Jfe*)(rr -1)
where o i l j  =  (rr -  l)fi\.
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higher taxes mean that bi is definitely negative since rT < 1 for r  > f. Hence, 
taxes, and so wages are smaller in the open economy than in the closed one. (Cf. 
Corollary 3.1 in the previous section.) Notice that
bi =
_  uTk0 +
K 0
\ r  — r J \ r *  — T*J Kn \ r  —r / \ r  — r  )
so that one can rearrange equation (3.33) as follows
* \ 2 + 1 JL*
« » [ *  ( t e ) '  f e  +  ( ^ f ) I+1 i t )  +
. = - ( r r - l ) .
-1
(3.37)
Let t °  solve the equation. If k o  =  A:J, the problem is completely symmetric in 
terms of strategy spaces (action sets), agents etc. As the strategies are continuous 
variables and symmetric, I contemplate a symmetric game. One can then apply 
the following theorem (see Lemma 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) or Theorem 
5.10 in Rasmusen (1989), p.127, presented here)
Theorem  1 (Sym m etric E quilibrium  Theorem ) Every symmetric game 
that has an equilibrium has a symmetric equilibrium; that is, every game in which 
players ’ actions sets are identical at each point in time has an equilibrium in which 
mixing probabilities (perhaps equal to one) are identical.
The theorem establishes that if the game has any Nash Equilibria at least one of
them must be symmetric. For what follows I only consider symmetric equilibria.
(In appendix B.3 I show that under the assumption 7 =  7* all Nash Equilibria
of the game are indeed unique and symmetric.)27 Symmetry entails r° =  t*°
27Under the assumption of 7  = 7 *, that is, balanced growth, I show that the after-tax returns 
must be equal and that this together with the FOC in (3.33) and (3.34) implies uniqueness
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with t  >  f .  Then it must be that r —  t  =  r* — t * <  r  — r  so that w =  1 ,  
<f>* =  0, (a;* =  1) and K q =  ho- That modifies &i and leaves a\ as it is. Now r°
would have to solve r; .
Vl •0 *^0r  r u=r fll +  +  C?i
T)t +  \ ( tt — 1\ f  k +  k *\
?? +  Ar 2 ( r - r / \  k )
, (r r ~ l )  
P
= 0.
Rearrange the equation to obtain
TJr  + A 2 
7? +  A T  r  —  r (3.38)
If z —► oo then r° —> f, and if z —» 0 then r° —► t , where f  is the left-wing
government’s preferred tax choice in the closed economy. The last result already 
tells one that for low enough capital mobility A > 0. Proceeding as before I 
impose symmetry on (3.34), rearrange it, use (3.30), simplify and check whether 
> 0 evaluated at A — 0. Then the condition for Vl > 0 becomes
[(1 -  a)A] « > (3.39)
The derivation is identical to the one presented in footnote 21 for the condition
A > 0 under left-right competition. It is clear that as z becomes infinite, A is
definitely set equal to zero and with z 0 one may get a positive A. Furthermore,
substituting (3.30) in (3.32) and solving for z establishes that there must be a
z > 0, call it 23, where Vl < 0 and so A = 0. Given the symmetry of the
and symmetry. An alternative procedure would have been to say at the beginning of this 
section that with ko =  fcj the game is symmetric and that I only consider symmetric equilibria. 
The justification for proceeding as above is that requiring 7  = 7 * restricts the analysis to 
balanced growth paths and requires equal after-tax returns, which does not automatically 
require symmetry or uniqueness in tax rates. So the adopted route is slightly more general.
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problem, it follows that both left-wing governments set the same tax rate so that 
uj = cj* =  1 and T = T \  Hence,
P roposition  3.3 I f  two left-wing governments compete in taxes, the economies 
are similar, A — A*, and the agents have the same initial wealth k0 = k^, then
1. For z > z3 > 0 there is no redistribution A =  A* = 0 .
2. The governments set the same tax rates so that u  =  w* and T =  T*.
3. I f  z —v oo, then r  —¥ f  and the left-wing governments act like right-wing
3.6.5 Comparison of Left-Right with Left-Left Tax Com­
petition
Consider a domestic left-wing government that faces either another foreign left- 
wing government or a foreign right-wing government. Comparing the conditions 
for redistribution, i.e. equation (3.39) of section 3.6.3 and equation (3.32) in 3.6.4, 
I find that the condition for redistribution is weaker if the domestic government 
faces a foreign right-wing government. To see this consider the RHS of (3.39) and 
the RHS of (3.32). Notice that the LHS’s of (3.39) and (3.32) are equal. Then 
for any z > 0 one obtains by comparison of the RHS’s that
Hence, the marginal utility of redistribution is reduced if a left-wing government 
competes in taxes with another left-wing government.
ones.
178
One may check that exactly the same condition applies for a comparison of 
the optimal tax choices, namely (3.31) and (3.38). I conclude that a domestic 
left-wing government sets lower taxes when competing with a foreign left-wing 
government than when confronting a right-wing government. The domestic left- 
wing government only chooses the same tax rates if z  =  0 or z —► oo. Call the 
domestic left-wing government’s tax choice r 4 when it faces a foreign right-wing 
opponent and r 5 when confronted with a foreign left-wing government. Similarly, 
define T4, T5, A4 and A5,
P roposition  3.4 I f  the economies are similar, A — A*, and the domestic left- 
wing government faces either a foreign right-wing or a foreign left-wing govern­
ment, then r 5 > r 4, A4 < A5 and T5 < T4 for any z  € [0, oo).
Thus, the proposition establishes that in two equally efficient economies a do­
mestic left-wing government competing in taxes redistributes at least as much 
when facing a right-wing as when facing a left-wing government. Also, it taxes 
wealth at least as much when facing a right-wing as when facing a left-wing gov­
ernment. Thus, for a left-wing government it matters a lot who it competes with 
in taxes. The comparison between the two possible opponents suggests that one 
may observe more GDP growth at the expense of less redistribution if the domes­
tic left-wing government faces a foreign left-wing government. Alternatively, one 
may observe more redistribution and less GDP growth if the domestic left-wing 
government competes with a foreign right-wing government.
The reason for the result lies in the fact that in the model a foreign right- 
wing government guarantees that w* =  1 so that the left-wing government has no 
chance to attract foreign capital. The strategic interaction between two left-wing 
governments is more intense because each government may get some capital off
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its left-wing opponent. That is in conflict with more redistribution (higher A), 
but may be worthwhile in terms of wages.
If z —> 0 the strategic element in finding the optimal tax rate becomes less 
important. Then it makes sense that a left-wing government sets the same taxes 
as in the closed economy. On the other hand, if capital mobility is nearly per­
fect, z oo, the left-wing government optimally mimics a right-wing, growth 
maximizing policy for fear of losing capital.
3.6,6 Different Technological Efficiency
The results so far only apply under the assumption of equal efficiency. In contrast, 
suppose now that the domestic government has a more efficient economy so that 
A > A*. Lemma 1.2 of chapter 1 implies f  > f* and f  -  f  > r* — r * if A > A*. 
From Proposition 3.1 two right-wing governments always choose policies that 
maximize their domestic capitalists’ income. Then it is clear that the right-wing 
government with a more efficient economy gets more capital and experiences 
higher GDP growth.
The other constellations of the game, i.e. left-right and left-left competition, 
are not easily analyzed. I will only make a few observations on the nature of pos­
sible equilibria in this section. Take the left-wing government. Before imposing 
symmetry I have shown in section 3.6.4 for a domestic left-wing government that 
the optimal choice of r  is obtained by solving equation (3.37), that is,
ai _ J _  (  (  r ~ T V  h .  _ i_  ( r * - T m\ x+1 k i \  r - T \ \ r * - T * J  Ko \ r - T /  K0) +
vu) 4* v*<f>* 
P
- l
=  -(»v - 1)
where ai = »j-f-Ar ' For any foreign vs. domestic after-tax return combinations and
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VA — A* =  € with e very small and z —> oo one gets r  —► f  and A =  0. Hence, for 
slight efficiency differences and very high degrees of capital mobility, the domestic, 
more efficient economy with a left-wing government has higher GDP growth than 
the foreign economy with a right-wing government.
P roposition  3.5 I f  capital mobility is very high, z —> oo, and there are small 
efficiency differences between the economies, i.e. A  — =  c, e > 0 and small,
a domestic left-wing government will have higher GDP growth than a foreign 
right-wing government, T > T* =  0.
It is interesting to note that A > A* and z oo is really bad for the workers 
in the inefficient, foreign country, because as z —> oo one gets u* =  0,u> =  1 
and (rj* +  \*t*)K* = 0 and so V 1* —> —oo. Thus, it is crucial for the workers 
under a left-wing government to have an efficient economy if capital mobility 
is very high. As the left-wing government only represents domestic workers in 
this model (a form of left-wing nationalism), the policy of a domestic left-wing 
government with an efficient economy may cause the foreign workers to ’starve’ 
in the inefficient economy. Interestingly, the proposition also captures the more 
general point that a national redistribution policy may not be constrained by 
very high capital mobility (’globalization’).
Next, for sufficiently large differences in (A, A*) it may well be possible that 
a domestic left-wing government redistributes, grows more than and gets at least 
as much capital as its right-wing counterpart, even if capital mobility is very low. 
Suppose z  «  0, then one gets approximately the same solution as for the closed 
economy case. From Lemma 3.2 the solution satisfies r  =  KIzsM i. Proposition
1.3 tells us that for positive growth and wealth redistribution capital must be 
more important in production than public inputs, that is, a  > which I assume
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to hold now. I wish to check whether it is possible for a domestic left-wing 
government to have 7 > 7* with A > 0, if the foreign government is right-wing 
and has an inefficient economy. Now 7 > 7* and A > A* involves
A  a  Qf A
r - r  — p > r * ~ T *  — p <=> r — t  > ---------r*
1 -  a (see Lemma 1.2).
Lemma 3.2 implies r  =  ^ [ ( 1  “  so that 7 > 7* requires
([(! -  «Ml* -  [<*(1 -  > T.
For redistribution (A > 0 ,r  =  p) one needs r  > [(1 -  a).4]°. Now if P  > x  and
x > Q then Px > Qx so that •
i f s  (K 1 “  “  M 1 ~  r  >  t  [(1 -  a ) A } «
Assume Proposition 1.3 holds and a > | ,  then the LHS is smaller than 0.946. 
Letting A =  xA *, x  > 1, the inequality holds if x > 1.056. Thus, in the model 
an efficiency advantage of, say, 6 percent in a world of very low capital mobility 
(z ^  0) is enough for a left-wing government to be able to redistribute and grow 
at least at the same rate as its right-wing opponent’s economy.
P roposition  3.6 I f  capital mobility is very low, z zs 0, and the share of capital 
sufficiently high, a  > then for some efficiency differences, A > A*, a domestic 
left-wing government may redistribute and grow at least at the same rate as its 
right-wing opponent’s economy, that is, 7 > 7* and A > 0 and T > T*.
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For all other degrees of capital mobility exact solutions are difficult to obtain. One 
may conjecture that there should always be (z,A) combinations that guarantee 
that a domestic government redistributes wealth and has higher GDP growth so 
that the solutions should be somewhere between those found in Propositions 3.5 
and 3.6. Hence, it is important for the workers, as well as the capital owners, to 
live in an efficient economy, because that is good in terms of welfare and GDP 
growth and may mitigate negative effects of tax competition in a non-cooperative 
environment.
3.7 Some Implications for Empirical Research
The chapter’s model extends some of the results of chapter 1 to open economies. 
There I have discussed the signs of possible biases for coefficients measuring the 
effect on growth of policy variables that are frequently used in ’simple cross­
country OLS regressions’, a procedure that has been defined in chapter X. (See 
ftn. 3 on p. 22.) As this chapter’s optimal policies are highly non-linear, I will 
not investigate the signs of possible biases rigorously. Instead, I will outline pos­
sible implications of the model for simple cross-country OLS growth regressions. 
In order to focus on distributional conflicts I assume that the samples contain 
countries in which left-wing and right-wing policies are pursued. Furthermore, 
I restrict the discussion to two variables that are often used in the literature, 
namely the ratio of tax revenues to GDP (av2 of section 1.6) and redistributive 
transfers.
One important assumption made in chapter 1 has been that economic policy 
is endogenous. That was meant to capture the fact that optimizing governments 
take fundamental economic variables into account when making decisions. With
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tax competition and ignoring the rate of time preference, the fundamental eco­
nomic variables that could in principle determine a country i’s growth in a large 
cross-section sample are such that
7i =  ƒ 0*1! ^-*1 Zil Z~i)
where the subscript —i indexes all the countries other than country L In principle, 
public policy of country i might depend on fundamental economic variables of 
each other country. For instance, one could assume that a country competes in 
taxes pairwise and perhaps alternatingly with each other country in the sample. 
That would raise tremendous problems in determining the exact optimal, public 
policies. Theoretically one cannot rule out that each country competes in taxes 
with all other countries, but it seems quite unrealistic. For that reason I rule out 
such a possibility.
An alternative that is more in line with the model is to assume that the 
countries of a sample can be (statistically) clustered into two groups of countries. 
One is taken to be governed by right-wing policies and the other one is led by left- 
wing policies. I assume that the clustering preserves all the behavioural patterns 
of the two policies. That allows one to concentrate on all cases of left-wing, right- 
wing competition. By running simple cross-country OLS growth regressions for 
each group separately one would find the behaviour of a typical member in that 
group. For the whole sample growth in a typical country would depend on
7 =  /(a,a* ,A ,A *,z)
where all arguments of ƒ (■) represent averages of each group’s fundamental eco­
nomic variables. (The V  indexes the other group.) It is important to realize that
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2 is taken to be independent of which country is being considered. It reflects the 
symmetry assumption of the model and may be justified when one only considers 
typical countries.
Suppose one assumes that policy is exogenous when in fact it is endogenous 
and uses the whole sample to run a simple cross-country OLS regression of the 
growth rate on a policy variable. The resulting point estimate for the effect of the 
policy variable on growth is generally biased as has been shown in chapter 1, sec­
tion 1.6. There the bias is due to country-specific effects, fundamental economic 
variables have on policy variables. For instance, if the efficiency index is difficult 
to observe and, therefore, not included in the regression, it will affect the point 
estimate through the non-random component of a country-specific error term. 
When the economies are linked by factor mobility or trade, the assumption of 
country-specific error terms may be justified, if one attributes greater weight to 
these factors in determining unobservable, random components. The assump­
tion appears plausible and convenient in many situations and it is used by most 
authors in the literature.
The correlation of error terms across countries affects the sign of a bias. As 
a consequence it may lead to qualifications of some results of chapter 1. For 
country-specific error terms Proposition 1.10 has established that the point esti­
mate of the effect of the ratio of tax revenues to GDP (av2) on growth is biased 
downwards, unless all governments pursue right-wing or income egalitarian poli­
cies. For open economies and correlated error terms Proposition 3.2 has shown 
that for samples with technologically similar countries, linked by very high capi­
tal mobility, left-wing governments mimic right-wing policies. That suggests, the 
estimated coefficient on av2 may be unbiased in such a case. However, it seems 
unlikely that nearly perfect capital mobility prevails between countries in a large
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sample. Also, if the economies are different, Proposition 3.5 tells one that due to 
efficiency differences left-wing policies may lead to relatively high GDP growth, 
in which case it is almost certain that the point estimates for the effect of a r2 on 
growth are biased.
In section 1.6.3 I have shown that under the assumption of country-specific 
error terms the estimated coefficients on the ratio of transfers to taxes collected 
(A) or of transfers to GDP ( ^ )  are generally biased downwards in simple cross­
country OLS growth regressions. (See Proposition 1.12.) In this chapter Propo­
sitions 3.2, 3.5 and 3.6 state that redistribution takes place if capital mobility is 
low and the economies are similar, or the economies are technologically different. 
For instance, suppose the conditions for Proposition 3.6 hold. In that case the 
typical economy under a left-wing policy has higher GDP growth with redistri­
bution than the typical economy with a right-wing government. The result is 
due to sufficiently high efficiency differences. That suggests that in some cases a 
positive A may be empirically correlated with a relatively high growth rate, that 
is, with a higher growth rate than for a right-wing government. That is so even 
though a higher A causes lower growth in the theoretical model. Depending on 
efficiency differentials it is then possible that the point estimate for the effect of 
A on 7 may be biased upwards, which is the opposite direction of that derived for 
the closed economy. The upward bias would depend on what value z assumes. 
Thus, the possibility of an upward bias in the estimated coefficient on the effect 
of redistributive transfers on growth is conditional on particular realizations of 
the degree of capital mobility. An upward bias would support the hypothesis 
that redistribution is bad for growth. It is worth stressing, however, that the 
upward bias result holds for specific values of z only. As has been pointed out in 
chapter 1, most authors find significantly positive point estimates for the effect
186
of redistributive transfer variables on economic growth in simple cross-country 
OLS regressions. (See, for instance, Perotti (1994) or Sala-i-Martin (1996).) Fur­
thermore, if the conditions for Proposition 3.2 are satisfied, a downward bias in 
the coefficients would follow.
Summarizing, I conclude that it matters for empirical analyses of the effect 
of public policy on economic growth what one assumes about the links that exist 
between countries (country-specific vs. cross-country linked error terms or the 
degree of capital mobility), whether policy is exogenous or endogenous and how 
governments interact with each other internationally.
3.8 Conclusion
Employing the framework of a simple growth model with distributional conflicts 
seems to imply that if one taxes wealth, the growth rate is reduced by redis­
tribution. (See chapter 1.) That is the argument presented, for example, in 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Bertola (1993) and others, and it would suggest that 
redistribution always implies lower growth.
In this chapter I have extended the growth redistribution trade-off problem to 
a two-country world with varying degrees of capital mobility. Introducing non- 
cooperative behaviour (tax competition between governments) it is shown that 
the possibility of losing capital features saliently in the optimal decisions of a 
government that wishes to redistribute.
I show that when the opponent’s economy is equally efficient and capital 
mobility is sufficiently high, no redistribution takes plat  ^ in the optimum if two 
left-wing governments compete in taxes. That holds even though both care about 
redistribution. The intuitive reason for it is that capital is good for left-wing
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governments. Losing capital reduces wages and the utility loss of a government 
incurred by a drop in wages outweighs the utility gain derived from redistribution. 
However, the workers are compensated for this by higher wages.
If a right-wing and a left-wing government compete in taxes, the right-wing 
government optimally pursues its domestically preferred policy and is not influ­
enced by its opponent’s tax choice. The right-wing government’s reaction to any 
opponent’s tax choice is very unresponsive in the model. As the right-wing gov­
ernment guarantees the maximum after-tax return for its capital owners when 
both economies are equally efficient, a competing left-wing government is un­
able to attract foreign capital. It is then optimal for the left-wing government 
to redistribute at least as much as it would when competing with another left- 
wing government. It is shown that as capital mobility increases, tax competition 
intensifies and the left-wing governments begin to mimic right-wing, growth max­
imizing policies.
If the economies are technologically different, i.e. one economy is more efficient 
than another one, then more capital will locate in the efficient economy. If the 
efficient economy wishes to redistribute, it can afford to do so at the expense of 
losing some capital. Hence, the amount of redistribution depends on who the 
opponent is and on the efficiency gap that distinguishes it from its opponents. 
Hence, policies that are geared to make an economy more efficient are in the 
interest of both workers and capital owners. That holds especially true for workers 
with a left-wing government.
Finally, in the model one would observe left-wing governments to behave 
differently in the optimum when facing different opponents. If the opponent is 
left-wing (same preferences) it will choose higher GDP growth and higher wages 
at the cost of reduced redistribution. If it confronts a right-wing government it
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redistributes at least as much at the expense of lower GDP growth. The result 
again hinges on the intensity of strategic interaction and the degree of capital 
mobility.
In this paper it is argued that high GDP growth and redistribution may 
be possible with a large enough efficiency gap or low enough capital mobility. 
For instance, very high capital mobility (’globalization’) may not constrain a 
national redistribution policy, if an economy is efficient. Government preferences 
alone may not adequately explain the pattern of redistribution and GDP growth 
in open economies with tax competition, differences in strategic behaviour and 
varying degrees of factor mobility.
Several caveats apply. I have abstracted from questions of time inconsistency. 
If governments could condition on the whole history of a more complicated dy­
namic game the outcome might well be different. I have not analyzed the effects 
of tariffs on capital flows. It is quite likely that a government whose economy 
experiences capital outflows will set up tariffs. It would also be desirable to use a 
less aggregated set-up when investigating the trade-off problem. In reality work­
ers own capital and some of the well capital endowed work. These and other 
problems provide room for more research on the trade-off between growth and 
redistribution in a non-cooperative environment.
Appendix B
B .l The governments’ welfare measures
B y assum ption r , r* and so u),u* and 7 ,7 *  are constant. For the right-wing 
governm ent the welfare integral is given by V r =  J jf ln C f e~pt. Let t —t 00 and 
use integration b y  parts. For this define V2 =  In C * , and dv\ — e~pidt. Recall 
th a t C * =  pkt. T h en  dv2 =  C k/ C k — 7  =  constant, and 17 =  — -  e~pt. Then
where Co — pko. E valuation at the particular lim its yields the expression o f V r 
in (3 .17).
T h e  left-wing governm ent’s welfare integral is given by V 1 =  Jjj In C}v e~pt. Now 
let t  -» 00 and define u2 =  In and dvx =  e~ptd t. R ecall C tvv =  (g +  A r)/^ . 
T hen  dU2 =  d y / C y  =  r () and i>i =  -  J c “ * .  Thus,
T ln C r  e"* dt = - 1  finer ^ 1 “  + -  T t , e '“1 dt (B.1.2)
Jo p  L J° P Jo
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which is equivalent to the expression for V1 in (3.18). From (3.16)
7 uje^kp +  7*<ft*er f fcg 
ue^ko  +  0*e7**fc5
which depends on time so that one would have to evaluate J£° r ( e~pt dt if one 
wanted to find a definite solution.
Next turn to the properties of V 1 and V r with respect to kt ik^. First note 
that > 0, for i =  W, k , j  =  kt, k\ and Vt. For two paths ku > k2t for all 
£, one has ln(7|t > \nC2i for i — W ,k. But then welfare must also be higher,
roo roo
that is, ƒ In C\te~ptdt > /  In C2te~ptdt. Similarly, for k \t > kXt one obtains 
Jo Jof  oo roo roo roo
/  In C u e '^ d t  > I \nC ^e~p‘dt and /  lnC,f1e“'’,di =  /  In C ie '^ d t  since 
dl^ t = 0. So increases in k t  raise the welfare of capitalists and workers and 
increases in kJ raise the workers’ welfare only. Since k t  =  A:0e7i and k f =  fcje7** 
increases in fco, and in 7 , 7 * increase k u k*t and hence the workers’ welfare. 
Furthermore, increases in k $ ,  7  increase the capital owners’ welfare.
B.2 The left-wing governm ent’s problem
Recall the left-wing government’s problem in (3.23), that is,
roo
max /  In C ^ e ^ d t  r,A Jo 1
s.t. C ?  =  (t?(t, A) +  Ar) K u K t — u)k0e yt +  ^ ¿¿ e 7**, A > 0 .
I look for constant policies in the optimum. To this end employ the Leibniz Rule 
and differentiate through the integral
, r f d c y  1 
Jo V dT C tW e~pidt =  0 , (B.2.3)
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where the expression for A enters because of complementary slackness. The 
derivatives in the brackets are given by
dC Y  1 _  f a  +  A ^  + fo +  A r ) ^  7?r + A dKt 1
dr C'j? (?? +  Ar)Kt 77 +  Ar "** dr K t
dC Y  1 _ (7?A +  r ) / r f +  (7? +  A r ) ^  t?a + t 1
^  (?; +  Ar)A'i 77 +  Ar"*" dA K t
Now let Ai = and 0 i =  and notice that A i,0 i are constant. For the 
change in K t I obtain
dK t/dr = A +  A ,  (0Jr + 7rujt)e^k0 (0; + 7;< ^)e7’fA:;
dK t/d A _  Q + 0  __ (^a + 7A^)e7tfc0 (0a +  7A<ft**)e7‘ffco
Kt 2 3  a; 0^g7i _j_ Ltikoe11 +
where I have defined A2 =  and A3, 02» ©3 analogously. Notice that
these expressions are not constant, but depend on time in a complex way. With 
the definitions I reformulate the optimality conditions in (B.2.3) as
t : f  (Ai + A2 ■+■ A3) e ptdt =  0 (B.2.4)
J 0
A : A ( jf°° (©, +  0 j  +  ©3) e-r'dt) =  0. (B.2.5)
By Lemma 3,1 Tt is increasing over time and approaches roax(7,7*). In what 
is to follow I will concentrate on steady state paths. For steady state growth
7 = 7*. Let us focus on the optimality condition for r . Imposing 7 =  7*
* , ,  M , a (o;T +  7ru;£)e7ifco (wr +  7^ 0*0entails Kt =  o;fcoe7t +  <j> fcje7* and so A2 =   ------- ——--------  =  ------- —--------
Kt K  0
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and A3 = t o + w w ' kK t
t o  +  7;»•«)*;
K 0 Then (B.2.4) becomes
(t^r +  JrUt)k0\
Ko )  
Ko
e ptdi
I e -^d i =  0.
For the evaluation of each integral notice that
rOO
Jo ptdt =
1 °° 1 roo
1 te~ptdt = 1 tpept 0 P Jo fPept pept
Then it is not difficult to verify that
■ roo
/  Aie~p‘dtJo
e - p l d t
r ( t e  
r  ( * * * & * * )  * * *
At
P
v Tko
pKo +  p2*T0 
0*^0 , I r ^ k Q 
ptfo p2^  *
From (B.2.3) and (B.2.4) I may now express the FOC for t  under the steady state 
condition 7 = 7* as
foo fdC tW 1 
Jo \  dr Ctw e pidt
|7= 7*
Ai wrkQ + 4>*kZ yru)kQ+ '£<!>* k$
p pK0 +  ?K p
=  0 
= 0
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which is equivalent to the expression in (3.33). Analogous reasoning establishes 
that for an interior solution for A
(d C ?  1 \
Jo [ax  c r ) h=r e ptdt
Qi +  4>\kÔ 7 a ^ o +  7 a ^* ^ q
P pK0 p*K0
=  0 o  
=  0
which corresponds to equation (3.34) in the text.
B . 3 Symmetry and Uniqueness of Nash Equilib­
ria in the Left-Left Tax Com petition Game 
when 7 = 7*
If 7 = 7% then (r -  r) u  +  (r* — r*) <j>(uji) — p = (r* — r*)cj* +  (r — r) <(>*(u)*) — p 
must hold. Rearranging and cancelling p implies
[w -  <t>'\ (B.3.6)
Now let Ei =  ( —— — ) and recall 
\r* —
w = s '  ’ * =  7 T T  "  s r ‘) 1 
=  ( i  -  s r “ ) •
Any Nash Equilibrium in (r, A, r*, A*) must be such that either Ei < 1 or Ei > 1 
or Ei = 1. Suppose Ei < 1. Then u* — 1 by the optimal behaviour of the capital
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owners, equation (3.14), and so <£* =  0. Then (B.3.6) reduces to
Ei U)
EJ+1 
(z +  l)S f+l 
Ef+1
1 - 0
1 — ------  •+* ----
z + 1 z +
(z + 1) — z + zE{+1 
1
T= r l
which can only be satisfied if S i = 1, hence, contradicting our assumption that 
Ei < 1. Next, suppose Ei > 1. Then w =  1 and <j> =  0 by equation (3.14). From 
(B.3.6) this implies that
Efl
( z + i)s r*
which again can only be satisfied if Ei =  1, contradicting the assumption that 
Ex > 1. Therefore, Ei =  1 in equilibrium with 7 =  7*, that is, the after-tax 
returns must be equal. It is not difficult to see that Ei =  1 indeed satisfies the 
condition 7 =  7*. So I conclude that any Nash Equilibrium in (r, A, r*, A*) that 
satisfies 7 =  7* must satisfy r  —  t  =  r *  —  t * .
Given symmetry with respect to technology, preferences, action sets etc. the 
after-tax functions (r -  r, r* — r*) are symmetric. Given that r — r  first (strictly) 
increases and then (strictly) decreases in r , two tax rates r  sustain the same 
after-tax return as can be seen from Figure 3.1 on page 159. Thus, in order 
to get uniqueness I must check whether only one of the tax rates is chosen in
Si (1 -0 * )  =
_ ^1 z  + _  
Z + l  2 + 1  1 “
(z 4- l)E i — E12 +  zEj"z = 
Ef+1 =  1
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equilibrium. To this end I distinguish two cases.
First, suppose an interior solution with A > 0, A* > 0 would be Nash Equilib­
rium. Then the FOC in (3.33), (3.34) and Lemma 3.2 tell us that
[(1 -  o)A ]t
1 — A and r*
[{ l -a)A]o  
1 -  A*
must hold in any possible Nash Equilibrium with A > 0, A" > 0 .  Since r = 
c*j4[(1 -  A)r]1_a and r ( l  -  A) =  [(1 — a).4]i it is not difficult to see that
r = Q [(1 -  a)4]a -  r*.
So Lemma 3.2 implies r = r* and under the condition 7 =  7*, that is, Ei = 
1, this implies that r  =  r* and so A =  A*. From that I conclude that any 
Nash Equilibrium with A > 0, A* > 0 satisfying 7 =  7* must be symmetric. 
Furthermore, from the optimality condition of Lemma 3.2 and for A > 0,
0 < A =  1 — — — a)AL  r  > [(1 -  a)/l]« > [q(1 — a)^l]“ = f
T
so that r  > f  and so by symmetry t* > f. But since then either after-tax return 
function is (strictly) decreasing in r  or r* the tax rates chosen in equilibrium 
would have to be unique. Hence, in any Nash Equilibrium with (A, A* > 0) and 
7 =  7*, the equilibrium must be symmetric and unique.
Next, I have to check whether any equilibrium with A =  0,A* = 0 will be 
symmetric and unique under the assumption 7 = 7*. In this case equation (3.33) 
with A = A* = 0 must be analyzed. Nowr 7 = 7* requires
r — t = r — r
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which allows for two symmetric and two asymmetric equilibria. (See Figure 3.1.) 
I will now show that the condition of equal after-tax returns allows for a unique 
equilibrium only. In equilibrium the FOC in (3.33) must be satisfied for an 
interior solution in r. Under the condition 7 =  7* and so equal after-tax returns
VT(A = A* = 0) = -  + z (7 f? )  (h T")
, f r v - i )
p
=  0
where ^  > 0 for all r  G [0,1]. Suppose r  < t would hold in equilibrium. Since 
rT — 1 > 0 for r  < f , marginal utility VT would be positive which cannot be 
the case in equilibrium. Thus, any equilibrium combination (t, t*) must be such 
that t, t* > f. But if 7 =  7* in equilibrium, the equilibrium (r,r*) combination 
must be unique and symmetric. That follows since the after-tax functions are 
symmetric and so only r  = r* satisfies r — t  = r* — t * .  Also, for r  = t * > t the 
after-tax functions are (strictly) decreasing so that any equilibrium combination 
must be unique.
Hence, any Nash Equilibrium in (r, A, r*,A*) that satisfies 7 =  7" must be 
unique and symmetric.
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Part III
Human Capital and Economic
Growth
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Chapter 4
Public Policies and Education, 
Economic Growth and Income 
Distribution
4.1 Introduction
As markets become more integrated (’globalization’), human capital assumes a 
pivotal role in policy debates (especially in OECD countries) on the maintenance 
of international competitiveness. The experience of some East Asian, high growth 
countries suggests that empirically there is a positive link from the provision of 
education to income equality and growth. (See, for instance, Bertola (1997), 
Fig. 6.) In this chapter I present a model that offers an explanation of the 
stylized fact and contributes to the policy debates, by recourse to three issues 
that have been put on the agenda by growth theorists.
One of the issues is that human capital formation may explain long term 
patterns of economic growth very well. (See, for instance, Lucas (1988), Tamura
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(1991), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) or Caballé and Santos (1993).)
A second issue concerns population. For instance, Kremer (1993), Deardorff 
(1994) or Romer (1996), chpt. 3.7, show that the size of the population and its 
growth may explain patterns of economic growth, if one looks at very long time 
horizons (Kremer’s is more than one million years!). In those models the larger 
the population, the more likely technological progress and so higher growth is. 
Furthermore, Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) or Rosenzweig (1990) show 
that economically driven fertility choices and human capital investments may 
lead to growth.
Thirdly, the chapter considers the theory of distribution and growth, which 
has been analyzed in a vast number of contributions. Just to name a recent 
few suffice it to mention Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) or Garcia- 
Penalosa (1995b) who derive interesting conclusions on the relationship between 
(re-)distribution and growth, mainly showing that the relationship is negative if 
too many resources are (re-)distributed to the non-accumulated factor of produc­
tion.
The chapter takes as its starting point the stylized fact that high growth 
economies have large or efficient public education systems and show low degrees 
of income inequality. In defence of considering public education one should bear 
in mind that even in countries such as the US a very large fraction of education 
is carried out publicly. Furthermore, governments have fiscal and institutional 
instruments other than direct provision of education at their disposal that have 
a significant bearing on the working of any private education systems.1
The population in the model presented below is made up of two types of 
agents. They are either high skilled or low skilled. So I argue that the composition
l Toi a discussion of public vs. private education see Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
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of the population matters in the growth process. I assume that human capital 
can be identified with ’degrees’. Thus, I take education to be 'lumpy' in the sense 
that high skilled people are hired in the labour market only if they have obtained 
a degree.
In the model the agents own the initial capital stock equally. The assumption 
is motivated by the literature on human capital investment. There it is usually 
shown that given some distribution of innate abilities and costly education, op­
timizing agents sort themselves into high and low skilled workers depending on 
the path of the wages and the distribution of wealth. (See, for instance, Min­
cer (1958) or Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983).) If markets work perfectly, the 
sorting will see to it that the lifetime utility of a high skilled and a low skilled 
worker is equalized, and that there is no inequality in the present value of lifetime 
earnings. However, should the capital market not function perfectly so that, for 
example, agents wishing to fund education cannot borrow against future earn­
ings, the sorting will be distorted and one would observe inequality in the present 
value of lifetime earnings. The assumption of equal capital ownership eliminates 
that effect on the people’s choice of education.
Instead, the source of income inequality is taken to lie in the production 
process itself. In the model high skilled people carry human capital in the form 
of degrees that enable them to perform all the tasks a low skilled person can do 
and more. In particular, I assume effective labour in production to depend on basic 
skills and high skills and that basic skills and high skills are imperfect substitutes 
in production, but that low and high skilled people are perfect substitutes in basic 
skills. Thus, high skilled people may always perform the tasks of low skilled 
people, but low skilled people can never execute tasks that require a degree.2 In
2 For instance, Lindbeck and Snower (1996) show that firms may organize production so
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a perfectly competitive labour market this entails that the high skilled workers 
get a wage premium over and above what their low skilled colleagues receive. 
Thus, ex ante every agent would like to and may get a degree which means that 
innate ability differences are not important in the set-up.* 3 I thus assume that 
all people have the same innate ability. Even if people have the same innate 
abilities and have the same initial endowments and although the capital market 
functions perfectly, there will in general be inequality in the present value of 
lifetime earnings in the model.4 That is so, because I assume that education is 
provided as a public good.
Throughout the paper income inequality refers to inequality in the present 
value of lifetime wage earnings, and I abstract from problems arising from the 
time spent receiving education. Of course, students forgo wage earnings for some 
time and do so with the expectation that they are compensated by higher wages 
in the future. But if one follows the traditional approach in the human capital 
literature (see e.g. Mincer (1958)) and views education as an effort demanding 
process, causing students to experience disutility while learning, the model may 
easily account for that by endowing the low skilled by some fixed positive and
that people perform one particular task (Tayloristic organization) or various tasks (holistic 
organization). In this model I argue that only high skilled people are capable of performing 
several tasks and that firms use a mixture of Tayloristic and holistic organization.
31 only contemplate agents that are endowed by some basic ability, which may be low, and 
that receive basic education, which can be provided and produced costlessly. In the paper 
education is always meant to be higher education. One may argue that ex ante everybody 
having a basic ability level is a candidate for receiving (higher) education and once chosen to 
be in the education process will complete the degree. So the education process is taken to be 
sufficiently productive in converting no (low) skills into high skills using the basic ability of 
agents.
4 Recently, Chiu (1998) has presented a model that studies the positive (and causal) link 
from income equality to human capital accumulation and high growth. He attributes the 
source of inequality to innate ability differences and liquidity constraints. This paper provides 
a different, technology based explanation with a positive (causal) link from human capital to 
income equality and high growth for given policy. Notice also that in the previous chapters the 
source of factor income inequality was due to an unequal wealth distribution. In that sense this 
chapter complements the previous results.
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endowing the high skilled by some fixed negative amount of ’happiness’, without 
altering the qualitative results of the chapter. Along these lines I consider only 
adults who are at least as old as the ones with a degree. Then the low skilled 
adults joining the labour pool as adults can be taken to have received utility by 
being idle during adolescence. In contrast, the high skilled would have studied 
and suffered disutility up to adulthood.5
For a given capital stock the wage premium for high skilled labour is shown to 
depend negatively on the percentage of high skilled people in the total population. 
Thus, if the percentage of high skilled people in population increases, the wage 
premium falls. That captures an important and realistic aspect in the explanation 
of wage inequality. (For empirical studies on this issue see, for instance, Freeman 
(1977), Katz and Revenga (1989), Bound and Johnson (1989), Tilak (1989) or 
Londono (1990).)
The government’s task is to provide and finance education as a public good.6 
Respecting the right of private property, the government finances education by 
raising a tax on the wealth of all individuals.7 Thus, even those who have not 
received (higher) education contribute to financing it. That is realistic in most 
public education systems and - as shown below - is in the low skilled people’s 
interest. The model allows for other forms of taxation, but it is realistic to say 
that the government takes real resources (capital) from the private sector and 
uses them to finance education.
The model postulates a simple relationship between government revenue and
5 Alternatively, one may simply assume that all people spent the same time in school, but 
attend different courses leading to different degrees.
6 In the model the government implicitly chooses the percentage of high skilled people in the 
population and provides the education resources freely. Thus, education as a public good is 
excludable, non-rival and optional in the model.
7 The command optimum would involve expropriation of the capital stock. As that is not 
common in the real world, I rule it out. For a similar justification cf. Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
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education output, that is, high skilled people. In particular, I assume that the 
percentage of high skilled in population is directly related to the tax rate chosen 
by the government. An example is provided to demonstrate that the relationship 
is compatible with more general set-ups.
The agents solve a simple investment decision problem and in the market 
equilibrium, characterized by steady statef balanced growth, the growth rate is 
positively related to the percentage of high skilled people in population up to 
a certain point. The reason is that the government takes resources away from 
the private sector in order to finance education, which reduces growth. On the 
other hand, it generates more high skilled people which exert a positive effect 
on production, growth and equality in the present value of lifetime wage income. 
The model allows for the possibility that no high skilled labour is present in 
the economy and that there is a particular number of high skilled agents that 
generates the same rate of growth as that when there are no high skills. For 
maximum growth, taxes and so the number of high skilled people must not be 
too high. Furthermore, growth and income equality depend positively on the 
productivity of the education sector.
Next, I conduct a public policy analysis. If the government’s welfare function 
attaches fixed weights to the representative high or low skilled individual’s utility, 
a government that only represents the low skilled worker acts like a Rawlsian 
government. Both choose the growth maximizing number of high skilled people 
in the model. The intuition for this is that in the model the low skilled worker’s 
wage does not depend on x, the percentage of high skilled people in population. 
But their capital income does depend on x, which explains why the low skilled 
worker chooses the growth maximizing x and the highest after-tax return on 
capital. A striking implication of the model is that growth maximization and
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Rawlsian preferences yield identical policies.
The opposite holds for a government that only represents the average high 
skilled worker. It acts like an Anti-Rawlsian government. Both choose x  lower 
than the growth maximizing one, because the wage premium depends negatively 
on x. Although a higher x  raises their capital income, high skilled workers do 
not like too many of their own kind, because it reduces their wage premium. In 
the optimum they choose a x  lower than the growth maximizing one.
A strictly egalitarian government that is rigidly committed to guaranteeing 
»
the same utility level for the average low and high skilled worker chooses either 
only high skilled or only low skilled people. A comparison of the agents’ utility 
reveals that they may be better off if the government does not produce education. 
But a priori the strictly egalitarian objective does not preclude either possibility. 
The results are theoretically interesting, but in the rest of the paper and to add 
realism I concentrate on cases where there is heterogeneity in skills.
A strictly utilitarian government faces a non~trivial problem in the model. It 
maximizes the individual utility indices and the weight, it attaches to them. It is 
shown that it optimally sets a x  higher than the growth maximizing one, implying 
that it attaches more weight to having high skilled people in the economy than 
making the average high or low skilled individual ’happy’.
A comparison of the different policies indicates the following pattern for 
growth and inequality in the present value of lifetime wages. Strict egalitarianism 
is generally bad for growth in this chapter. A government serving the average 
low skilled worker pursues a growth maximizing policy and grants the highest 
after-tax return on capital. It is ambiguous whether in comparison to each other 
the strictly utilitarian or the average high skilled labour serving government has 
higher growth, but both choose less than maximal growth.
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For the distribution of the present value of lifetime wage income the model 
shows this pattern: The strictly egalitarian policy generates zero inequality, at 
the expense of relatively low growth. The preferred low skilled worker’s policy 
implies a more equitable income distribution than the high skilled workers’ one. 
The strictly utilitarian government chooses a more equal wage rate ratio than the 
low skilled workers’ government. Interestingly, the optimal, strictly utilitarian 
policy is more egalitarian in the model than the optimal, Rawlsian policy.
High and low skilled people form the clientele of representative governments. 
The public policy analysis suggests that the recent high growth, relatively low 
income inequality experience of some, highly competitive countries is due to a 
combination of public education policies and improvements in the productivity 
of the education sector which is difficult to measure. If the productivity is equal 
across some countries, a policy favouring low skilled labour maximizes growth, 
may attract capital by granting high after-tax returns and reduces inequality 
compared to the optimal policy of high skilled labour.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the economy. Sec­
tion 4.2.1 derives the optimal behaviour of the private sector and the market 
equilibrium. Section 4.3 investigates optimal policies for governments with dif­
ferent welfare functions. Section 4.4 compares the optimal polices and section 4.5 
provides some concluding remarks.
4.2 The Model
Consider an economy that is populated by N  (large) members of two represen­
tative dynasties of infinitely lived individuals. The two dynasties are high skilled 
workers, Li, and low skilled workers, L0i where Li, Lq denote the total numbers of
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the respective agents in each dynasty. I assume that the difference between high 
and low skilled labour takes on a ’’lumpy” character, that is, either an individual 
has received education in the form of a degree and is then considered high skilled 
or it has no degree and remains in the low skilled labour pool. Thus, even if an 
agent has received some education, but has not obtained a degree, she or he will 
not be hired as a high skilled worker. By assumption the population is stationary 
so that the number of high and low skilled workers is given by
L\ =  xN  and L0 =  (1 — x)N  (4.1)
where x  denotes the percentage of high skilled people in the population. The 
members of the dynasties supply one unit of either high or low skilled labour 
inelastically over time. So the total high and low skilled labour supplied equals 
L\ and L0, respectively. Each high or low skilled worker initially owns an equal 
share of the total capital stock in the economy, which is held in the form of shares 
of many identical firms operating in a world of perfect competition. Thus, all 
agents receive wage and capital income and make investment decisions.
I assume that aggregate production is given by
Yt =  At K]~a Ha, H Q = [(Li +  L0)a + I f ) , 0 < a  < 1, (4.2)
where Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock including disembodied technological 
knowledge8, H measures effective labour in production, and At is a productivity 
index at time t. The production function is a reduced form of the following 
relationship between high and low skilled labour: I assume that effective labour
8Thus, technological knowledge is taken to be a sort of capital good which is used to produce 
final output in combination with other factors of production. For an up-to-date discussion of 
these kinds of endogenous growth models see, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (1998), chpt. 1 .
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depends on basic skills and high skills and that basic skills and high skills are  
imperfect substitutes in production. On the other hand it is assumed tha t low  
and high skilled people are perfect substitutes in basic skills. This argues th a t  
high skilled people may always perform the tasks of low skilled people, but th a t  
low skilled people can never execute tasks that require a degree.9 Notice th a t  
even if either no high skilled or no low skilled labour is present in the economy, 
production will take place. Thus, each type of labour alone is not an essential 
input in production.
I will analyze the effects of different public policies on economic growth and 
the income distribution. Postulating an equal initial wealth (capital) distribution 
is clearly a simplifying assumption, but it serves to focus on the effects of different 
policies on the income distribution. An alternative set-up may be that there is 
another type of agent in the economy that owns all the initial capital stock. Then 
the reader may verify that at least all the results for governments representing 
high or low skilled workers hold. Also, it is shown below that the workers’ utility 
depends on the balanced growth rate so that analyzing high and low skilled 
workers embodies the problem, a capital owning class would have.
The government runs a balanced budget at each point in time, uses its tax
9To see this more clearly I assume Vi =  A (H ^ K j~ Q, where the index of effective labour 
H  depends on labour requiring basic skills (B) and labour requiring high skills (5). Labour 
requiring basic skills is performed by high and low skilled persons, B  = B{Lo, L \), whereas 
high skilled labour is only performed by high skilled persons, 5  =  S(Li). High and low 
skilled people are perfect substitutes to each other when performing basic skill (routine) tasks, 
i.e. B (L q,L i ) =  L q + L i. Thus, high skilled people also perform those routine tasks a low 
skilled person may do. On the other hand, only high skilled people can perform high skilled 
tasks (labour) and for simplicity I let S (L \)  = L \. To capture the relationship between labour 
inputs I assume
H  =  [ B f  +  S ']*  =  [(£i + L o f  +  I f] ' .
For p  < 1 labour requiring basic skills (£ ) and labour requiring high skills (5) are imperfect 
(less than perfect) substitutes. For ease of calculations let p = a  < 1 which yields equation 
(4.2). For a similar set-up in a different context see Garcia-Penalosa (1995a).
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revenues to finance public education, and chooses its expenditure Gt so as to 
maintain a constant ratio of Gt to its tax base over time. With those assump­
tions the economic effects of various tax bases such as wage or capital income 
taxes would be possible to investigate in the model. However, in order to sim­
plify let the government raise a tax on the wealth holdings of the agents. The 
government taxes the agents’ wealth holdings at a constant rate r  on the capital 
stock of the representative agent kt =  So Gt = rktN  = rK t and ^  =  r  for 
all t. Thus, real resources are taken away from the private sector and used to 
finance public education, which generates high skilled workers. In general, public 
education is ’produced’ using government resources and other factors such as, 
for instance, high skilled labour itself. That is captured by the following reduced 
form representation of the education technology sector
x — t( where 0 < e < 1 , (4.3)
x T = erc_1 > 0 and x TT = e ( e - l ) r ‘-2 < 0. Thus, if the government channels more 
resources into the education process, it will generate more high skilled people, 
xT > 0. However, doing this generally becomes more difficult on the margin 
(xTT < 0). This is supposed to reflect that, if x TT < 0, more public resources 
provided to the education sector lead to a decreasing marginal product of those 
resources due to e.g. congestion or other effects. The parameter e measures 
the productivity of the education sector.10 If t <  1, the education sector is
10 The reduced form education technology directly relates the percentage of high skilled people 
(x) to the percentage of resources (wealth) going into the education sector (r). Then e may 
be viewed as the elasticity of education output to education financing (input) and may be 
interpreted as a productivity measure. As x( =  r* ln(r) < 0 because r  < 1 , a higher e reduces 
output for given r. Thus, for given policy a decrease in e reflects a more productive education 
technology. Also and more conventionally, let pr = j  denote productivity. Then pr = r <_1, 
which is decreasing in c as well. Hence, for given policy productivity would be decreasing in e 
according to both productivity concepts.
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productive and a marginal increase in the wealth tax rate increases education 
output substantially. Underlying that is the description of an education sector 
with spillovers from, for instance, high skilled to new high skilled people or where 
the capital equipment such as computers makes the education technology very 
productive. The case e =  1 looks as though the education technology were quite 
productive as well, since then the number of high skilled people rises one-to-one 
with an increase in the tax rate. However, x t < 0 for given policy so that a 
higher e leads to less high skilled people (education output). Combining this 
property with the assumption of a non-increasing marginal product (xTT < 0) 
due to e.g. educational congestion effects may justify calling c =  l a  relatively 
unproductive education technology.11
Equation (4.3) is compatible with many models that also use high skilled 
labour as an input generating education. The following argument justifies the 
use of the set-up. Let ht denote the total stock of human capital in the economy 
in a discrete time model. Following, for instance, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) 
assume that human capital evolves according to
ht+i — ƒ (Gt, Ku ht) ht
where new human capital ht+i is produced by non-increasing returns. Here hu­
man capital formation would depend on the level of the stock of knowledge hu 
government resources provided for education Gt and the tax base K t. The func­
tion ƒ(•) governs the evolution of human capital. Assume that it is separable in
11 In an earlier version the model was extended to cases where c > 1  at the expense of adding 
more constants and functional forms without adding any significant qualitative insight.
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j.
ht+i =  c(r) hf, where c > 0, d  > 0, c" < 0, 0 < /? < 1.
where /? measures the productivity of the education sector and c(r) captures the 
efficiency or quality of education, depending on the government resources chan­
neled into education. (For a similar expression in an optimizing agent framework, 
see Nerlove, Razin, Sadka and von Weizsacker (1993) eqn. (7).) That is a widely 
used specification. See, for example, eqns. (1), (2) in Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992), eqn. (1) in Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), or eqn. (2) in Razin and Yuen 
(1996). What distinguishes this model from those contributions is that in this 
paper human capital is carried discretely by the agents and so ht = x tN. Now 
normalize population, that is, set N  = l. Then total human capital at date t is 
given by x t. In a steady state x  = x t =  £*+1 and so
the form f(g(Gti Kt)}ht). Let g = c = c(r) and for simplicity
x = c ir )1-^.
Next suppose that the efficiency of the education sector is described by c(r) =  r * 
where 0 < ¡i < 0. For non-increasing returns to scale it is necessary that p+ 0  < 1. 
Let =  e then the more explicit set-up would be equivalent to (4.3) in steady 
state. As x t < 0, any increase e would mean that less human capital is generated 
in steady state. From the assumption of non-increasing returns to scale it follows 
that fi < 1 — 0  so that e < 1. Hence, e = 1 would represent a relatively 
unproductive human capital formation process.
Finally, notice that from equation (4.3) choosing r  is equivalent to choosing x. 
For the rest of the chapter it is convenient to use the inverse relationship r  = x i  
whenever the government chooses taxes.
211
4.2.1 The Private Sector
There are as many identical firms as individuals and the firms face perfect 
competition. I assume that there is a capital spillover, which takes the form 
At =  ^  where 7} > a , so that the average capital stock is the source
of a positive externality.12 In order to simplify I set rj =  a  which allows me to 
concentrate on steady state behaviour. For a justification see Romer (1986). As 
the firms cannot influence the externality, it does not enter their decision directly 
so that the marginal products are given by
r = (1 - a ) k ? K r H a,
ti>i =  a k f K ^ l i h  +  L o ^  + L r 1},  M )
w 0 =  a k ? K } ~ °  {L t +  L 0) ° - ' .
The workers own all the assets which are collateralized one-to-one by capital. 
A representative worker takes the paths of r,w ^ wq, t as given. Assuming the 
workers have logarithmic utility, the representative worker solves the problem
roo
max / Inc* e~pi dt e* Jo (4-5)
s.t. k = +  (r — r)k  — Ci i = 0,1 (4.6)
kQ =  constant, = free.
Equation (4.6) is the worker’s dynamic budget constraint. The problem is a 
standard one (see, e.g Chiang (1992), chpt. 9.) and its solution involves the 
following growth rate of the average high or low skilled worker’s consumption
7 =  7co “  7ci =  (r -  r) — p. (4.7)
12The model also works if the externality depends on the entire capital stock instead.
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Thus, consumption of all workers grows at the same rate in the optimum and 
depends on the after-tax return on capital. As the workers own the initial capital 
stock equally and have identical utility functions, their investment decisions are 
the same. Thus, the wealth distribution does not change over time and all agents 
continue to own equal shares of the total capital stock over time. The only differ­
ence in utility stems from different wage incomes which affect the instantaneous 
levels of steady state consumption.
4.2.2 Market Equilibrium
For the rest of the paper normalize by setting N  =  1 so that the factor rewards 
in (4.4) are given by
r = (1 — a)(l + xQ), (4.8)
wi = akt{l +  xQ-1), (4.9)
Wq — ak t. (4.10)
The return on capital is constant over time and the wages grow with capital. As 
wi = wq (1 -f x0“ 1), high skilled labour receives a premium over what their low 
skilled counterpart gets. That reflects the fact that the high skilled may always 
perfectly substitute for low skilled labour so that both types of labour receive 
the same wage wq for routine tasks and that performing high skilled tasks is 
remunerated by the additional amount The premium depends on the
percentage of high skilled labour in the population, grows over time at the rate 
7 and is decreasing in x for a given capital stock.
From the production function one immediately gets 7y =  7* so that per capita 
output and the capital-labour ratio grow at the same rate. Since N  does not grow,
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7 y  =  7k s0 that total output grows a t the same rate as the aggregate capital 
stock. From (4.7) the consumption of the representative worker grows at 7. Each 
worker owns ko = units of the initial capital stock. Equation (4.6) implies 
k =  +  (r — r)k  — Cj so that
7k =  Wl k~  “  (r -  r) for i =  0,1.
where (r — r)  is constant. In steady state, 7* is constant by definition. But ^  is 
constant as well, because from (4.9) and (4.10)
kt
afct(l +X“- 1)
kt
Wq
= a ( l  +  xa_1) and . —  =  a,
kt
which implies 7* =  7. Thus, the economy is characterized by balanced growth in 
steady state with 7y =  7 k  =  7 y =  7* =  7a =  7c0*
The levels of instantaneous consumption in steady state are determined as 
follows: From (4.6) and using 7 =  k and 7* =  7CI =  7C0 in steady state one 
obtains (r — r  — p)kt — Wi 4- (r — r)kt — c*. Thus,
Ci =  wi +  pA:* and Co = w0 +  pkt (4.11)
are the instantaneous consumption levels of a representative high or low skilled 
worker in steady state.
From (4.8) and r  =  x* one obtains 7 =  (1 — a) (1 -f xa) -  x i  — p so that 
for given r  an increase in x raises growth. The necessary first order condition 
for growth maximization involves a (l — a)xa-1 =  which upon solving for x
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establishes that
x =  [ea(l — a)] l-«° (4.12)
is the growth maximizing percentage of high skilled workers in the population 
and f  =  [ea(l — a)] l~ta is the growth maximizing tax rate.
Proposition 4 .1  A growth maximizing government chooses x =  [£a(l — a)]7^  
and f  = [ea(l — a)] *-««.
Growth is a concave function of x since for e < 1 and any x
d27
(dx)2
=  —o (l — a)2xa 2 1—3« -x * < 0
and the marginal growth rate for x —> 0 is infinity,
lim
x —^0
¿7
dx = x°‘ 1
q(1 — a) -  —  
6
=  +00
since j > 1 by assumption. By the concavity of 7 and given the above properties 
there is a 7(2;), generating the same growth as 7(0). In that case the government 
chooses a rather high tax rate, implying a high x. Thus, in the model it is possible 
that an economy has high skilled workers, but does not do better than another 
economy with no high skilled people. That x is given by
7(0) -  7(x) =  (1 — a) -  p — (1 -  û) [1 +  xQ] +  x< + p =  0
=  (1 — a)»-« (4.13)
and clearly x > x. The effect of a change in the productivity of the education
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sector for a given x G (0,1) is given by
¿7 ln(x) x*
x  =  - H —  < °*at t2
An increase in e makes the production of education more difficult. So a reduction 
in e, that is, making the education technology more productive, raises the growth 
rate. Hence, the growth maximizing x must also be higher.
Lemma 4 .1  The growth rate 7 has the following properties:
1. 7 is concave in x.
2. lim =  +00.
x->0
3. £ < 0  for x €  (0,1).
4- If x — (1 -  then 7(0) =  7(x).
The properties can be read off from Figure 4 .1. It can be seen that the growth 
Figure 4.1: 7 as a function of x for different t
7
Parameter values: a  =  p  =  0.01, €\ — 1, £2 =  0.6.
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maximizing x increases with an increase in the productivity (lower e) of the 
education technology and that there exists a x where 7(0) =  7(1).
4.2.3 Income Inequality
In the model all income differences between individuals are due to differences in 
wage income. Therefore, I will concentrate on the wage income distribution in 
this section. If one wants to relate growth to income inequality it makes sense 
to look at an average of personal wage incomes over time. If the agents can sell 
their income stream in a perfect capital market, they will discount their stream 
of wages by the market rate of return on assets, r — r. Consequently, the present 
value of their lifetime sum of discounted wages is
r 00 ft
/  wit e~^ r~T)tdt =
Jo Jo
wm e7t e = —  =  tof where i = 0,1.
Thus, the variable wf denotes the sum of an individual’s wage income discounted 
by the market rate of return on assets. That is the income concept used when 
analyzing the wage income distribution in this section.13 Notice
wd0
wo
P
o*o
P
and wf
u>i
P
Q*q(1 + X Q X) 
P
(4.14)
and that the mean of the discounted sum of wage incomes is
t±d — (l — x)wq + xwf = (1 +  rrQ)a*o 
P
(4.15)
130 ther income variables one may want to use are current wage income wu% detrended initial 
wages WiOi or capital adjusted wages All of these concepts suffer from the problem that 
do not fully reflect the path the wages follow.
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implying ^  =  0» ^  < 0 and ^  >  0, that is, the mean of the PV of life­
time wage income is increasing in x, In order to compare any two cumulative 
distribution functions of discounted lifetime wage income assume Xi > x. Then 
the different values of x  will give rise to two cumulative distribution functions, 
F(wf(x i)) and C?(u>f(x)), which have unequal means.
If F  dominates G in the sense of Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SOSD), 
then F  will be preferred to G by any increasing, concave social welfare function 
according to Atkinson (1970). Geometrically, a distribution F(w) dominates 
another distribution G(w) in the sense of SOSD if over every interval [0,c], the 
area under F(u;} is never greater (and sometimes smaller) than the corresponding 
area under G(u>).14
Second Order Stochastic Dominance is equivalent to Generalized Lorenz Curve 
(GLC) dominance. (For a proof see, for example, Lambert (1993), pp. 62-66.) 
Generalized Lorenz Curves are frequently employed for the comparison of income 
distributions with unequal means. A GLC is obtained by multiplying the values of 
the y-axis of an ordinary Lorenz Curve, which relates the share of the population 
(x-axis) to the share in total income (y-axis) that that population share receives, 
by mean income, i.e. (share of total income) x (mean income). The GLC for the 
distribution of the PV of lifetime wages is presented below.
A GLC dominates another one if the two curves do not cross and one is 
completely above the other one. In the figure the income distribution associated
with Xi > x GLC-dominates the income distribution for x. The reason is that
14 The concept derives from evaluating risky returns under conditions of uncertainty. Formally 
and for non-negative incomes, Second Order Stochastic Dominance requires
f  F{w)dw < f  G{w)dw.
Jo Jo
The introduction of the concept here follows Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), chpt. 3.4.
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Figure 4.2: Generalized Lorenz Curve
share in population
an increase in x  raises fid and shifts the kink at B  to a point B ' which is to the 
left and on the old GLC(x).
One can then invoke the theorem by Shorrocks (1983) according to which 
GLC dominance carries with it welfare approval according to every increasing, 
strictly concave utility-of-income function. Put another way: Every individual­
istic additively separable symmetric and inequality-averse social welfare function 
would prefer the GLC dominating income distribution. That means that accord­
ing to the GLC dominance criterion there exists a unanimous preference for the 
(PV of lifetime wage) income distribution with the higher GLC. Thus, all people 
with an increasing, concave social welfare function (SWF) would agree to prefer 
the GLC dominating income distribution. Even the high skilled would prefer the 
distribution with a higher x  under e.g. a veil of ignorance. In that sense the 
model’s society as a whole would prefer the distribution of the PV of lifetime
wage income generated by the higher percentage of high skilled people.15
15It is straightforward to see that exactly the same holds for the distribution of detrended 
(initial) wage incomes and capital adjusted wages It also holds if one works with 
current wage rates wn and x  < x. In that case an increase in x  causes the new GLC to be 
everywhere above the old GLC for t > 0, because the capital stock would be higher at each
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Let I ( x )  be any inequality measure reflecting that a higher x leads to a GLC 
dominating distribution.16 Then 1(0) =  1(1) — 0 <  I (x )  and ^  < 0 for x  € 
(0,1). Thus, according to /(x) and for the PV of lifetime wage incomes there is 
no measured inequality if all agents get the same wage and they are all either 
equally high or low skilled. If there is any skill heterogeneity, producing more 
skills reduces inequality in the PV of lifetime wage incomes if measured by I(x).  
Furthermore, as x =  r € and so 7(r), a decrease in c for a given policy r, would 
lower I (x) .
P roposition  4.2 I f  there is heterogeneity in skills, x  € (0,1), an increase in the 
percentage of high skilled people or an increase in the productivity of the education 
technology (lower e) for given policy reduce inequality in the present value of 
lifetime wage incomes in the sense of Generalized Lorenz Curve Dominance.
Thus, according to the proposition and in terms of the PV of lifetime wage 
income an increase in the number of high skilled people represents an equalizing 
income transfer from a rich, high skilled person to a relatively poor, low skilled 
person.
4.3 The Government
The government takes the optimal decision of the workers as given and chooses
taxes to generate education output. That is equivalent to choosing x  in the
date and mean income would rise. However, if x  > x  it does not necessarily hold.
16A simple measure satisfying the properties of 7(i) is I  = ^  - 1  which Fields (1987), axiom_ wo
A5, calls relative gap inequality, denned in terms of mean wage incomes of the two groups. 
Notice that the measure as such does not take explicit account of the population composition. 
However, in the model it implicitly does, because the wage rates depend on the relative number 
of high skilled people. In appendix C.l I check the properties of I{x) against those of some 
other commonly used inequality measures. It is shown that, for instance, the variance and the 
coefficient of variation have the properties of J(x) if a  <
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model. I assume that the government has different objectives. For instance, it 
may represent only high skilled workers, only low skilled workers or a mixture of 
the two. Integrating the utility of the representative low and high skilled worker 
as given by (4.5) one obtains
V* =  ln ( (a ( l+ * - » )  +  p)fc,)+ 7 ^
p p2 p p2
v ‘ -  7  _  In ((a + p )k 0) | 7  (4.17)
P P2 P P2
These expressions are derived in appendix C.2. Superscript h (1) stands for high 
(low) skilled.
4.3.1 A Strictly Egalitarian Government
A strictly (utility) egalitarian government wants to make all agents equally well 
off. Committed to perfect equality it sets V h =  V1 which amounts to
In ci 
P
+ 2 . _  incp 7
<=> Cl =  Co-
But ci = c0 is not possible unless either x  =  1 and all individuals have high skills 
or x — 0 and all agents are low skilled. That is what the strictly egalitarian 
government chooses and it makes intuitive sense for such a government in the 
economy under consideration. In the model strict total utility egalitarianism is 
equivalent to strict income egalitarianism since ci = Co requires w\ =  wo with the 
agents having equal capital income by assumption.17 It is important to realize 
that a Rawlsian, who maximizes the utility of the least well-off, may also choose 
such a policy in x G [0,1]. The strictly egalitarian policy implies I  =  0, that is,
17For a discussion of egalitarian objectives see Sen (1982) or Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), 
chpt. 1 1  and the discussion in section 1.5.1 of chapter 1 .
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no inequality in the PV of lifetime wages, but the growth rates and consumption 
levels are different. A comparison of possible policies reveals that
v { x  =  i )  § y(x = o)
In ((2a +  p)k0) 7(1) > ln ((a  +  p)fc0) 7 (0)
P P2 < P P2 '
As 7 (0 )-7 (1 ) =  (1 — a ) - p - 2 ( l  — a) +  l + p  =  a, growth is higher if the strictly 
egalitarian government chooses x  =  0. But the utility difference depends on
[(2a + p) -  (a +  p)\ ko |  e?
so that the agents under such a government would be better off with x = 0 if they 
are very patient (low p) and may want x  =  1 if they are sufficiently impatient 
and their initial capital stock is large enough. Notice, however, that for x  = 1 
and positive growth, p must not be too large so that x  ~  1 may only be better, 
if the initial capital stock is very large. Thus, a clear welfare ranking is not 
possible, but it seems more likely that the agents would have higher utility with 
a i  = 0 policy that generates higher growth. However, a priori one cannot rule 
out either policy, as the strictly egalitarian government is not concerned about 
welfare levels.
P roposition  4.3 A strictly egalitarian government chooses either x  = 0 orx  — 
1 implying 7(0) > 7(1) and I  =  0. I f  the agents are very patient, they will prefer 
x  =  0.
The proposition is theoretically interesting and points out an important inde­
terminacy in egalitarian policies. However, one rarely observes people having the 
same skills or all having the same degree. For the sake of realism I assume for the
222
rest of the paper that x  € (0,1). That rules out the class of strictly egalitarian 
policies above. Notice it also rules out the Rawlsian policies x  =  0 or x  =  1 
which belong to this class. The restriction implies that an increase in x  decreases 
inequality in the PV of lifetime wages and is equalizing individual utilities. I use 
the concept of equalizing utilities as the egalitarian principle. Thus, a policy that 
grants higher x  will be called more egalitarian. For a similar point see Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1980), chpt. 11.
4.3.2 A Class of Governments
Suppose the government has the social welfare function
W h(V h, V 1) =  C V k +  (1 -  C) C € [0,1] (4.18)
where V h, V 1 are given by (4.16) and (4.17). The welfare function attaches fixed 
weights on the individual high and low skilled agent’s utility. If £ = 1 the 
government is only concerned about the welfare of the representative high skilled 
worker, and if f  =  0 it cares about the average low skilled worker only. For all 
other values of £ it represents a mixture of the representative agents’ utility. The 
government chooses x  in order to maximize W b. The FOC is given by
X t +„ _ 0^ . £ + pi) + ( p i + p i
OX OX p \  OX Cl OX P J P \ OX Co o x  p — 0.
Notice that ^  = 0 because low skilled labour’s wages and consumption do not 
depend on x. Simplification yields
(C \ (  <*(1 ~ Q)fe0j a 2 N 7r _  Q 
\ p )  \afc0(l +  a:®*1) + pko) p2
(4.19)
223
where 7* =  From that one immediately obtains an important result. As 
the first expression on the LHS is negative for C > 0, it follows that j x must be 
positive. Given the concavity of 7 the government chooses x so that x < x. Thus, 
if the government attaches positive weight to a representative high skilled worker, 
it does not choose the growth maximizing x, but rather a smaller percentage of 
people with high skills.
The case £ =  0 is of special interest because it is equivalent to the choice of 
a Rawlsian government. A Rawlsian government has a welfare function W  =  
m in(Vh, V 1). As the wages of the high skilled are always higher than those of 
the low skilled, ci > Co and so V h > V 1 for all x e  (0,1). But then C =  0 
captures the preferences of a Rawlsian government with leximin preferences over 
the individuals’ utilities.18 Thus, a Rawlsian government, maximizing the utility 
of the least well-off, and a government representing the average low skilled worker, 
set the growth maximizing tax rate (x* =  x) and grant the maximum after-tax 
return on capital.
If C = 1, the government acts in the interest of the average high skilled worker. 
That government’s choice is equivalent to an Anti-Rawlsian government with 
leximaxpreferences such that W  =  m ax(V hy V1). Recall 7X =  a ( l —a)x°-1 — 
and use (4.19) to get the FOC for C = 1
epa( 1 — a)koxQ~2 
akQ(l + x Q_1) +  pk0 
epa( 1 -  a) 
a ( l  + x ° “1) +  p 
(ea(l -  a) -  x i~a) (a (x +  xa) +  px)
ea(l — o)xa~l — X«“1
ea(l — a)x — x«“ 1+2_Q 
pea( 1 — a).
18 Notice that the Rawlsian objective is also satisfied if V h — V*, which is an objective that 
has been analyzed above. Recall that from now on the analysis is restricted to choices x € (0,1) 
which makes setting V h = V 1 impossible.
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Notice x«~Q = co(l — a) so that
(x* — x«~°) (a (x  +  xa) +  px) = px*~a. (4.20)
Hence, an increase in C makes a government choose a x lower than x. The lowest 
x is chosen by a government representing the representative high skilled worker. 
Call the x chosen by a £ = 1 government x*. Then x* < x < x for 0 < C < 1*
Proposition  4.4 IfC  = 0 and x  € (0,1), the government represents the average 
low skilled worker only and acts like a Rawlsian government. Both choose x  and 
maximize the after-tax return on capital and growth.
I f  (  = l, the government represents the average high skilled worker only and 
acts like an Anti-Rawlsian government Both set x* < x  and have lower growth 
than the Rawlsian government.
Any other government with a welfare function W b = +  (1 — and
C > 0 sets x < x. The optimal choices imply 7 if £ =  0 and 7(xh) if C =  1 
where 7 > 7(x/,). Furthermore, for £ € (0,1), 7(x>i, 1) < 7(x,C) < 7(2,0) and 
/ (x c=1) > 7(xc) > 7(xc=0).
Thus, inequality is lower and growth higher under a Rawlsian than under any 
other government with a welfare function as considered above. Notice that the 
proposition does not claim that the Rawlsian government chooses to eliminate 
all income inequality.
4.3.3 A Strictly Utilitarian Government
The strictly utilitarian government has the welfare function
W u(Vh, V 1) = x V h + { \ - x ) V l (4.21)
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where Vh,V l again are the individual utility indices. This government is strictly 
utilitarian because it wants to maximize the sum of the individual utility in­
dices. The utilitarian government’s problem is non-trivial in the model, because 
maximization of (4.21) does not only involve maximizing the individual utility 
indices, but also choosing the weights attached to the indices. Using (4.17) one 
may express 1FU(-) as
w»(x) =  z lnCl I 1 7  I (*-*) lnca ! (1-*) 7
p f  p P2
_  x  In Ci (1 — x )  In Co 7
~  P P Pr  '
The utilitarian government maximizes H^“(-) with respect to x. The derivative 
o: W u with respect to x  is given by
/ _  d\Vu 1 ( y , dci x  dco 1 - x \  7*
v ( s )  _  — —  =  -  In ci +  ----------- In Co +  —----------- +  —
ox p \  ox Ci ox Cq )  p*
where v(x) denotes marginal welfare and 7* =  | j .  As the consumption of the 
low skilled does not depend on x  in steady state ( ^  =  0), I simplify to obtain
+ l xp2* (4.22)
For an optimum v(x) =  0 is required. Recall Ci = afco(l +  xQ_1) +  pk0 so that
Aj(x) ee ^  u  '  dx c,
a ( l  — a)x° 1 
a ( l  +  xQ_1) +  p < 0 .
Also for In one verifies that
A,W = l . ( ! ) - to( 2 ! i ± £ > ± i ) > 0
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since > 1. Thus, unless Ai(x) +  A2(x) =  0 one gets x ^  x in (4.22)
which follows from the concavity of 7. I will show that A2(x) +  Ai(x) > 0 for all 
x  G [0,1], To this end let A3(x) =  a ( l  +  xa_1) + p and S(x) =  A2 +  Ai so that S  
is the sum of two functions. For showing that S(x) is strictly decreasing in x for 
any x € [0,1], I take the derivative of S(x) with respect to x which is given by
dS  _  dA2 c?Ai _  a (l — a)x°- 2 a ( l  — a)2xQ_2 a 2(l — a)2x2a~3 
dx dx +  dx A3 +  A3 A§
_  a 2(l — o)2x“*2 a 2(l -  a )2x2°“3 
£  A2
and is negative for any non-negative x. Thus, S(x) is strictly decreasing in x. 
Next, I wish to show that lim^5(x) =  0 implying infS(x) = 0, Vx G (0,oo). So I 
need to show that lim A2 +  lim Ai = 0. Notice that
£—► 00 l - f o o
^  _  a (l — a)xa_1 __ (1 — a)x tt_1 _  (1 — a)
1 a ( l  + xa_1) +  p l  + xa-1 +  £ x 1-°(l +  £) +  1’
Then the claim is true since
lim AiI—fOO = lim ( -£-►00 \
(1 -  a) > =  0 and
+ +
lim A2 = lim In (fa(l  +  X0' 1) +  p^1 = 0 .1-» 00 X-^ OO \k a + p  )
As x G [0,1] one has x < 00 and so inf 5(x) > 0 for all x G [0,1] and so £(x) > 0. 
But then v(x) > 0 at x =  i  and by the concavity of 7 one must have 7X < 0 
and so xu > x  in an optimum. (Subscript u denotes the optimal choice of the 
utilitarian government.)
Thus, marginal welfare t>(x) > 0 and so the optimal x chosen by a strictly 
utilitarian government must satisfy x > x. Next, I want to show that the level
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of welfare W(x)  is lower at x  -*• 1 than at x. Let x =  1. Then the difference in 
welfare levels is given by
W u(x) —■ iy u(l) =  ^  ^ ^  ~ ^  ^  ~  ¿) In Cp — (1 — x) In cp ^  7 ~ 7
P P P2
where Co is independent ofx. Furthermore, using (4.12),
7 ~ 7  =  (1 -  a) [ l + x Q] -x *  -  p -  [(1 -  a)2 -  1 — p] =  a  +  (1 - a ) x a -x *  
= a  +  xa [(1 -  a )(l -  ea)] =  B  > 0.
Then the condition for the difference in welfare levels to be positive is
x l n c i - x ln c i  (x -x ) ln c o  B  ------ i---------- i  +  i------ '— -  +  — > 0  & (5)' B_ C le** > —Co
where d =  § and x =  1. Note that > 1 and ey =  ( l +  fi +  *£ + 7^ +  • • •)• 
Then a sufficient condition for the inequality with x =  1 to hold is
1 B  1 +  T - +, xp - ) > 1 +
ax Q-l
a + p
C + B  > 
C  + xQ [(1 — a )( l  — ea)] >
pa
a  4- p 
pa
a + p — a
(4.23)
where C is a positive constant. Thus, the inequality holds because the RHS is 
negative. Hence, Wu(x) > iy u(l) implying that t;(l) < 0, that is, marginal 
welfare is negative if x is close to one.19 But then the optimal solution must be 
such that x < xu < 1, because S(x) is strictly decreasing for any x > x and 7 is
19It is not difficult to verify that a similar result may be obtained for x  > x. If 7  — 7  > /> 
then Wu(x) > W7u(x) and u(i) < 0  by reasoning as above.
concave in x. As W u(x) > iy u(l) and all the derivatives exist, there must be one 
x € (x, 1] where t>(x) =  0 . Then, the choice x < xu < 1 implies 1(1) < Iu < I(x) 
and 7(1) < 7« < 7.
Proposition 4 .5 ' A strictly utilitarian government chooses x < xu < 1 implying 
Z(l) < I U< I(x) and 7(1) < 7« < 7-
That is an interesting result and the intuition for it is not as straightforward 
as it seems. The strictly utilitarian government maximizes the individual utility 
indices and the weights, the groups contribute to overall welfare. More precisely, 
it trades off a higher individual high skilled worker’s utility requiring a low x 
with its desire to maximize the number of high skilled people. On the other 
hand, it has to trade off higher welfare of each low skilled person which would 
imply choosing x  with its desire to minimize the number of low skilled people. In 
the optimum, it attaches more welfare weight on having high skilled people in the 
economy than choosing the growth maximizing number of high skilled persons. 
Thus, it chooses lower than maximum growth, but by this pushes down inequality 
in the PV of lifetime wages compared to a growth maximizing government.
4.4 Comparison of the Different Policies
In the previous section I have analyzed governments with different objectives and 
their optimal choices. In this section I compare these different choices under the 
realistic assumption that there is heterogeneity in skills. Propositions 4.1 to 4.5 
imply that x* < x* < xu where xu denotes the strictly utilitarian, x* the high 
skilled labour and x/ the low skilled labour governments’ optimal choice. The 
following proposition summarizes the results.
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Proposition  4.6 The optimal choices of the governments are such that 
1. 0 < Xh < xi < xu < X.
2- 7ui7fc)7z > 7(1)- 
3. 7/ = 7 > 7ui 7/i- 
7« |  7h- 
5. Ih > I i>  Iu.
Figure 4.3 below visualizes the proposition’s results.
Figure 4.3: The governments’ optimal policies
The strictly egalitarian policy with either x =  0 or x =  1, is generally bad for 
growth compared to most other governments’ choices. A government represent­
ing the average low skilled worker acts like a growth maximizing government and 
generates less inequality in the P V of lifetime wages than a government represent­
ing the average high skilled worker. The rationale for that is not difficult to see. 
For the low skilled workers an increase in x  increases the growth rate and that 
is good for them. Due to the externality, high skilled people exert on production
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in the model, the low skilled workers1 wages do not depend on x in equilibrium. 
Thus, they choose maximum growth and the highest after-tax return on capital.
For the average high skilled labour representing government things are quite 
different. The positive externality of more high skills in production (higher x) has 
a negative impact on high skilled people’s wages and that makes them choose a 
low x. On the other hand, a high x increases their capital income. The resulting 
trade-off is solved by not choosing the growth maximizing x so that the wage 
income component of their utility in steady state dominates.20 Thus, it is socially 
desirable to have sufficient high skilled labour, but for the representative high 
skilled person it is privately bad, if too many of its kind are present.
The strictly utilitarian government maximizes the sum of the individual util­
ity indices. It chooses more than the growth maximizing number of high skilled 
workers. The problem for this government is that it faces the non-trivial problem 
of solving simultaneously for the number of individuals of each type and max­
imizing each type’s individual welfare. In the model it weighs the number of 
individuals more than the average utility of each type and that leads to a policy 
inducing a more equal distribution of the PV of lifetime wages. From the analysis 
it is not clear whether a utilitarian government has higher or lower growth than a 
government representing high skilled labour, but it definitely has less inequality 
in the PV of lifetime wage income.21
Interestingly, in the model the strictly utilitarian government chooses a policy 
that is more egalitarian in terms of the PV of lifetime wages as well as utility than
a government representing low skilled labour. Thus, in the model the utilitarian
20For a representative high skilled worker and absent any costs to education, the preferred x  
would actually be zero in this model.
21 That follows since the implicit solutions with x  > 0 for the Anti-Rawlsian and the utilitarian 
governments in (4.20), resp. v (x ) = 0 in (4.22) are not easily solved and depend in a non-linear 
way on the parameters of the model. As an exact solution does not add significantly to the 
qualitative results, I leave this an open question.
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policy is more egalitarian than a Rawlsian one. This provides an example that 
a Rawlsian welfare function does not always imply more egalitarianism than a 
utilitarian welfare function.22 > ■».
4.5 Conclusion
The experience of high growth economies suggests that there is a positive link 
from providing education to income equality and growth. The chapter presents 
a model that attempts to explain that stylized fact.
In the model the composition of human capital matters in t ae growth process. 
Assuming that human capital is ’lumpy’ so that only those people who have 
received a degree can take high skilled jobs, it is shown that the public choice of 
human capital directly affects income inequality and economic growth.
In this chapter high skilled labour contributes more to effective labour in the 
production process than its unskilled counterpart. That is meant to reflect the 
fact that often the unskilled are not hired for high skilled tasks due to market 
imperfections or institutional restrictions. Hence, the number of people carrying 
high skills plays a crucial role in the model.
The government levies wealth taxes on all individuals and provides public 
education which produces human capital in the form of high skilled people. It is 
shown that the productivity of the education sector has a positive influence on 
growth and equality in the present value of lifetime wage earnings. In the market 
equilibrium an increase in the number of high skilled people lowers inequality in 
the present value of lifetime wages, raises growth up to a certain point and there
2 2 The textbook comparison of utilitarian and leximin welfare functions usually argues that 
the choice of a utilitarian leads to more and not less inequality. See, for instance, Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green (1995), p. 828.
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exists a growth maximizing number of high skilled agents.
Introducing governments with different objectives reveals that strictly egali­
tarian policies are generally bad for growth.
A government representing the average unskilled worker acts like a Rawlsian 
government and chooses the growth maximizing number of high skilled people. 
Under both policies the after-tax return on capital is maximal.
The average high skilled worker’s government acts Anti-Rawlsian and both 
choose less skilled people than a Rawlsian government. This policy makes the 
distribution of the present value of lifetime wages more unequal and growth lower 
than the policy chosen by the Rawlsian.
A strictly utilitarian government chooses more high skilled people than the 
Rawlsian government, because it simultaneously maximizes the utility of the 
average individual in each group and the weights the groups contribute to overall 
welfare. In the optimum the utilitarian government values the weight effect more. 
It is ambiguous how the strictly utilitarian policy compares to the policy preferred 
by the average high skilled worker in terms of growth. But in the model the 
utilitarian policy implies a more equitable income distribution than the Rawlsian 
one. That is theoretically interesting, because it is usually argued that Rawlsian 
choices lead to more egalitarian outcomes than utilitarian ones.
The main insight of the chapter, however, lies in the result that a government 
representing the average low skilled worker chooses maximum growth, the highest 
after-tax return on capital and an income distribution that is more equitable than 
the one chosen by a government representing the average high skilled worker. That 
stresses the importance of education in the growth process, its distributional 
implications and - in light on the results of chapter 3 - suggests consequences for 
maintaining international competitiveness. The model may provide a theoretical
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explanation why some, highly competitive East Asian countries have r;:;pirically 
been found to exhibit low income inequality and high growth rates.
The results have to be interpreted with some caution, however. It would 
be desirable to know more about the exact link between government revenues 
channelled into education and the education output. The level of human capital 
that individuals carry may be important. Human capital acquisition may entail 
more than one degree for different levels of human capital. These and other 
questions are left for further research.
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Appendix C
C .l The relationship between I(x) and some mea
sures of income inequality
In this appendix and for convenience, the PV of lifetime wage income will simply 
be called (wage) income.
Lorenz Curve A Lorenz Curves (LC) relates the population to the income 
shares. Total wage income is f.tdN . Furthermore, L0 -  xN, L\ -  xN and mean 
income nd is increasing in x . The share of total income going to the low skilled 
is = s0 Lorenz curve looks like Figure 4.4 below.
Figure 4.4: Ordinary Lorenz Curve
SL
share in total income
(1-*)
(1 +i°)u;{j
0 1 - 1
share in population
235
m ju u u u iu u w ih iw i**
The Lorenz Curve (LC) has a kink at the point A  a t which (1 — x) percent 
of the population receive percent of total wage income. On the margin an 
increase in x shifts A  to the left by 1 unit for a given income share. On the other 
hand, a marginal increase in x reduces the income share by
(1 +  xQ) +  axa_1 (1 — x)
( l + x Q)2
for a given population share. If such a change would move A  up to any new 
position above the old Lorenz Curve (LC dominance), then inequality would un­
ambiguously have been reduced. Thus, one must analyze whether the movement 
of A to the left is greater or less than the movement up or down. In the model 
A moves down. Thus, the condition amounts to
(.LH S  4) :
( l + x Q) +  axQ *(1 — x)
(1 + I “)2 < l : [RHS <-)
If x is rather low (x —► 0), the inequality does not hold. Hence, in general the 
LCs cross no unambiguous ranking of the wage income distributions is possible 
according to the LC dominance criterion.
Gini Coefficient From the LC one may calculate the Gini coefficient as
G =  1 - 2 (1 — x)2 x (l — x) x2(l + x° *)+ +.2 (1+  x°) l + x û 2(1 +  xQ)
__ xQ(l — x) 
1 +  xa
where the expression in square brackets represents the area under the LC. Then
sgn(Gx) =  [ax° J(1 — x) — xû] (1 +  xa) — axtt-1xa (l -  x) 
=  xQ_1 ([a(l — x) — x] (1 + xQ) — axQ(l — x))
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For low x, x  —y 0, an increase in x raises the Gini index, whereas for higher 
values of x a higher x  reduces it. Hence, the Gini coefficient does not produce 
unambiguous rankings of the wage income distribution.
T he  Variance and th e  Coefficient of Variation The variance of personal 
wage income V d(x) is
Vd = ( w î - i i d)2x + (wd - t i d)2( 1 - x )
= [w£(l +  x0' 1) -  wjl(l + xa)]2 X + [tojf -  + xQ)]2 (1 -  x)
=  w f  | x 2q ( “ “ )  x  +  (” x ° ) 2 (x -  x )
=  w f x 2 a ~ l (  1 - x )
which is decreasing in x if a  < The coefficient of variation is defined by
Cd =  and amounts to
cd( x) = w 0 x a  ( x - 1 ) 2
W q (1 +  XQ)
The sign of ^  depends on
ax
=  a x Q~
" (^ )1 - ? ( W  *i(i+*■> - '
' (4*/[(-(4*)" (=))<■+ xQ) — Xe
which is definitely negative for all x € [0,1] if a <
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C.2 W elfare M easures
The workers’ welfare integral is given by U{ =  Jq In cJ>t e~ptdt where j  =  0,1. 
Let t —► oo and use integration by parts. Define v2 =  lncJtt, =  e~pt. Then 
dv2 =  Cj/cj =  7 =  constant, and t>x =  — J e~pi. That implies
Jo°°lncu  e-“‘ dt = — ~ [lncj,i e - ] : ^ f 7 e -  dt
=  -  i l ^  e-'", (C.2.1)
p r l o
where j  =  0,1. Evaluation of the expression at the particular limits establishes 
vh in (4.16) and V" in (4.17).
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